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This thesis ~nes the British state's international
econanic strategy in the postwar period of Attlee' s governrrents
1945-51. It assesses the international political deterrrdnants of
econcmic manageaent in the Chancellorships of Dalton, Cripps, and
Gaitskell. Special attention is paid to a critical examination of
the orthodox interpretations of postwar British action which claim
that the British state capitulated to Allerican demands. The evidence
of this thesis suggests that this claim is incorrect.
The Labour goverment rejected a radical socialist solution
to the econanic problems facing Britain in 1945. To realise Labour's
programme of domestic reconstruction the state required rapid
accumulation which could only be achieved if Britain could
reconstruct an adequate international payments system to facilitate
trade and secure regular inp>rts of essential conmodi ties and raw
materials.
Although the postwar structure of production and trade left
Western &!rope heavily deperdent on the econcmic resources of the
United States, Britain had a strong bargaining position which rested
on wrXion' s role as the primary financial centre and the UK's initial
political and econanic strength in relation to the other nations of
Western EUrope. Britain exploited these strengths to subvert the
American objectives of world dcmination and ultimately coax the USA
into accepting an Atlantic partnership to the mutual interest of each
party.
Whilst Britain's long-term objective was to re-establish
sterling as a world currency, this objective should not be seen as
simply serving US wishes or realising the interests of the City of
tordon against 'national interests'. The objective was based on a
material necessity, to overcane the primary barrier to aCCURlllation
which was the inappropriate structure of production and trade
experienCEd in the dollar gap. Britain therefore used dollar aid to
restructure trade, stinulate production, and reduce the dollar gap to
gain sare degree of independence fran the United States.
1Introduction
PART I: The Theoretical Context
1 The State and h::cuItulation 16
I.
II.
III.
IV.
The Pluralist Approach to the State
Statism as a Theoretical Model
Theorising the International State Systan
A conclusion on Theoretical Frameworks
17
25
40
47
PART II: Accumulation Strategy under Dalton
2 Towards the Washington Negotiations 52
I. The Economic Basis of the British Request for Aid 55
II. The Political Rationale for AnglO-American
Collaboration 73
3 '!he Washington IDan Agreement 94
I. The Negotiation of the Loan
II. Assessing the Agreement
III. Neo-Bilateralism and the Loan
94
102
110
PART III: Accumulation Strategy under Cripps
4 The Marshall Offensive 135
1.
II.
III.
IV.
The 1947 Crisis
American and British Attitudes to Marshall
The Administrative Apparatus
Assessing the Impact of the Marshall Plan
138
147
157
170
5 The Revision in State Strategy
I. A New Sterling crisis
II. Devaluation and Multilateralism
III. A Revision in State Strategy
PARI' IV: Accumllation Strategy Under Gaitskell
198
200
206
225
6 246
I. ExpaOOed British AccwIulation and American Policy 249
II. Econanic Growth and RearInalDant 262
Conclusioo 285
I. The Changing Structure of ~tary Account Areas in
1947 288
II. The Research Process 290
Footnotes 303
Bibliography 335
2INTROOUcrIOO
The Labour adrrdnistration of 1945-51has been described as
one of the roost "crucial in British history".l/ Yet with the passing
of almost two generations since the electoral landslide of July 1945
manycontradictory interpretations of Attlee's governanceexist.
Confusionabounds over the extent of Labour' s 'socialism', its
comnitn'entto deaocracy, and its responsibility for full enployment
and the creation of the welfare state. To clarify these issues
recent studies have appeared which provide self-contained surveys of
this phase of British developrnent.2/ It is not the purpose of this
thesis to recount these studies or assess their accuracy. Rather,
the objective of this study is an explanation of the direction that
economicpolicy took in postwar Britain. The following chapters
attempt to understand the political detenninants of economic
managercentas revealed under Attlee's administration.
This focus is justif ied on three counts. Firstly the
postwar state' s3/ accunulation strategy and the refashioning of the
Atlantic and FAlropeancircuits of capital has not received the
central treatment warranted by the "intellectual sea-change in
caaparative social science" towards the historical analysis of the
state and its relations with accumulation.4/ Labour's rejection of
planned trade neant that the primary political problemconfronting
the governmentwas to SUcceSsfully catpete in international markets.
A study of British capital's successful re-integration into the
international circuit of capital accumulation is therefore a
prerequisite for understanding state action in this period.
SecoIXlly,a focus on the state's managementof this re-integration
points up manydeficiencies in conteBt;X>raryaccounts of the
3,capitalist state'. 'lb begin reconstruction and neet the objectives
of full employment and welfare provision the state sought to create
international conditions conducive to the profitable expansion of
British capital. Historical study of the postwar state reveals its
role in the regulation of capitalist accumulation. The research thus
contributes to overcaming the seemingly deadlocked ahistorical
debates on the 'nature of the capitalist state' whilst revitalising
the weak theoretical bases of existing historical interpretations.
Finally the thesis makes positive contributions to the vastly
expanding literature on the II relative econcmi.c decline of Britain",
the postwar role of the Unitel States, and the political and economic
reconstruction of Western FAlrope.
It is surprising to find that the diverse interpretations
of Attlee's domestic policy-making are not accompanied by contrasting
assessments of the development of the state's economic strategy.51
Although the existing literature dealing with this issue varies in
its level of S9phistication it is almost unanimous in cla~ng that
the period saw the capitulation of the British state to American
hegsoony and the subordination of UK accunulation into a US dominated
world econanic and political structure. By focusing on key episodes
within the life of the Attlee governments - notably the washington
Loan Agreement of 1945, the convertibility crisis of 1947, the
Marshall aid scheme covering the years 1947-50, the 1949 devaluation,
and Korean rearmament in 1950 - many analysts associate this
capitulation with the relative econani.c decline of the UK.
These allegations are not borne out by the research of this
thesis. By adopting a perspective which charts firstly the
structural constraints on the exercise of state pc:74ieI' and secondly
4the international relations of daninance which exist between
CCll'l'petingnation-states, an alternative interpretation has errerged.
The thesis showsthat the developmentof the state's accumulation
strategy was an ambiguousand unevenprocess involving shifting
patterns of temporary Atlantic and Ccmoonwealthalliances for
short-term WesternEuropeanpurposes ultimately at odds with the aims
of early postwar Americanforeign econoadcpolicy. This conclusion
is reached by considering those very aspects cited by the
,capitulation' theorists as evidence for their account.
To situate the ar~t of the following chapters the
remainder of this introduction will present the most sophisticated
exampleof the 'capitulation account' as revealed in the writings of
Brett et al and other more narrative assessments.6/
The 'capitulation View' of British Postwar Developnent
The guiding thread of Brett's work is that in the postwar
era "the relative autonany of the state was decisively rooderatednot
so ouch by the power of the danestic boorgeosie as by that of its
foreign counterpart in the US".7/ Increasing subordination to the
United States "PlShed the governmentawayfran planning towards
traditional capitalistic mechanisms"wherebycomplete British
integration into the "Americandaninated liberal capitalist alliance"
laid the seeds for subsequent economicdecline. This interpretation,
assueed by Radice to be "beyonddispute" ,8/ begins fran a particular
reading of the state's involvement in the washington loan
negotiations fran which further acts of subordination flow.
The British state, it is clai.ued, could either have adopted
5a "bilateralist or an Atlanticist" policy orientation in 1945.9/ The
farner would have rooant detailed daoostic planning and the
developrent of an autoncxoous economic strategy, whilst the latter
looked to increased American borrowing and the adoption of rapid
trade liberalisation policies. Rather unpatriotically, Brett
ass\.1IOOS,Keynes (acting on behalf of the UK in the washington talks)
was "unable to resist a series of dreary capitulations" to the
Anerican negotiators. The Anerican extraction of "fwXlamental
concessions in exchange for very limited promises of financial
assistance" - by which is meant the state's obligations on
convertibility and non-discrimination signed to secure the $3.75
billion loan - signalled a "sometimes slavish and faintly ludicrous"
British support for US policy and the abandonment of "a more
autonomous and self sufficient line". With regard to the loan
agreement Brett leaves no roam for doubt, "capitulation to Anerican
hegemony had been rapid and oomplete".lO/
This orthodox account is also supported by Gatt's brief
review of British policy.l~ Drawing solely on Foreign Office
documents - to the total neglect of Treasury and Economic Staff
l1leIlkJraOOa - he concludes that the loan marked "the uanent when
Britain became, if not a colony, then a client state of the
Americans".l2/ In an American orbit of power Britain took its junior
partner position "with hardly a protesting voice".
The state's subsequent international econanic strategy is
defined in the context of the loan agreement as a series of acts
which turned "Britain into a willing American client" grcdually
creating comi tions which were to guarantee "a decline into econanic
and political mediocrity".l3/ The balance of payments crisis of 1947
6is therefore seen as the result of the "enforced attelll>t to introduce
convertibility" in July of that year and it is clairred that without
this attelll>t the "huge sterling losses would have been avoided".
MoreoverBritish negotiation with Americaover the EuropeanRecovery
Progranme(the Marshall Plan) begun in late 1947and concluded in the
sumnerof 1948 is interpreted as "involving nore concessions on both
foreign and dooestic econanic poliey". TheMarshall Plan "legally
bound the Attlee government-to greater liberalisation through
participation in the Organisation for EuropeanEconanicCo-operation
(OEEC)discouraging an irrlepeIXientBritish planned trade progranme
and increasing the close ties of Americaand Europe. For Brett the
terms of Marshall clearly indicated that British financial poliey was
nowopen to dictation fran the USgovernment.14/
In sirrdlar vein Vander Pijl's analysis of capitalist class
formation in the North Atlantic area concludes that through the
Marshall offensive "the Pax Americanawas inp>sed on the econanic
ruins of the defunct Pax Britannica in Europe".15/ TheMarshall Plan
allowed the liberal internationalist bourgeoisie in Europe, with a
backgroundin either the colonial or Eastern Europeancircuit of
IlDlleycapital, to restructure their interests in a wider Pax
Americana,with the Marshall offensive leading to a "concrete
transformation of the Europeanclass structure along the lines of the
USIOOdeI".16/
Thus by 1949 the developnent of an autonaoous internal or
external econanic policy was untenable - "the pass had already been
sold- .17/ Devaluation in September1949 is seen as grossly excessive
and positively injurous to British interests whllst the rearmament
programnecarried out under Gaitskell represented "the end product of
7the processes of subordination to the global strategy of the United
Stated whichBevin and Attlee had established as the keystone of
British policy" .181 In an overall context wherebythe Iabour
goverI1llellt"felt swayedby the need to back up the Americansat
almost all costs·,l91 the washington loan episode had initiated
British econoadcdecline. The liberalisation measures implicit in
this agreeaent had been extended in the Marshall Plan and culminated
in Cripps' excessive devaluation. Koreanrearmamentintensified the
economicslide causing the "heart of British manufacturing industry
and engineering to be virtually pulled out of operation".201
The capitulatian thesis has rapidly becorre orthodoxyanong
cont.erlp:>raryanalysts. It points to the underminingof the autonomy
of UKdaoostic political and econamicstructures and argues that the
possibility of Haviable British economy••• dependedon a
willingness to make a break in overseas policy in opposition to sema
of the roost powerful elements in the political and economic
establishment".2l/ It is an interpretation which has important
iuplications for three areas of study.
Firstly it is significant on an empirical level from the
perspective of the developoent of postwar British politics. 5ecoI¥ily
it has inplications beyond those concernedwith British historical
developnent since it posits a particular view of international
accunulation structures and the relations between international
capitalist states. Finally the account raises conceptual issues
about the nature of the capitalist state and its ability to remove
barriers to successful capital aCCUlllllation.
8Plan of the Thesis
Thechapters that follow engage the capitulation thesis and
refute its implications on all three levels. A review of the postwar
Treasury and cabinet records does not empirically support the
capitulation account regarding the developmentof British politics or
the relations whichare thought to have existed betweeninternational
capitalist states. To provide an adequate W'Xierstandingof the
ability of the state to removespecific barriers to accumulationwe
need a theoretical modelof the polity itself.
CHAPTER ONE
Chapter Onethus provides the theoretical context for the
study by reviewing those modelsof the polity whichappear most
suitable for the purposes of this thesis. It challenges the view
that econanic policy is determined by the interplay of external
interests. Througha criticism of the pluralist approach, and its
fractionalist variants, it clarifies that the correct focus for
analysis is the state. '1he perspective adopted in the thesis
however, should not be confused with the "state-centred" approach to
political econany. Adetailed assessment of the state-centred
approach reveals limitations in its fr~rk which remer it equally
unsuitable as a m:xlel of the polity. 'Ibe chapter concludes by
offering an alternative frameworkderiving fran Marx's critique of
poli tical econany. It highlights the structural limits within which
the state has to operate whilst enphasisinq that in the context of
inter-imperialist state rivalry, the accumulation of capital within
each danestic econany depends on the aCCWllllationof capital on a
world scale. Fran this basis the study can assess the nature of the
9relations of dominancewhich existed betweenpostwar international
states whilst relating this discussion to the specific barriers
confronting the British state's strategy to expand accumulation.
This is the first part of the assessment of Britain's
economicstrategy urxlerDalton's Chancellorship. It begins by
clarifying Britain's need to construct an international payments
systemwhichwouldfacilitate international trade and ease dollar
shortage. Although the United States held a virtual IOOnopolyof
essential rawmaterials in 1945 (and had unrivalled production
facilities), Britain had a significant bargaining position based on
the strength of sterling as a world currency and the City of London
as the world's financial centre. These factors (together with
Britain's relative economicand political strength vis a vis the
other nations of WesternEllrope- at least until 1947), ueant that
to achieve its foreign economicpolicy aims the United States had no
alternative but to work through Britain, realising that the UKheld
the key to the USpenetration of EUrope. The postwar years were thus
characterised by a series of catplex negotiations in which the
British Treasury succeeded in thwarting the IOOrestrident US
aspirations. '!be first such negotiation was the washington loan
agreement. This chapter assesses the strength of British capitalism
on the eve of Attlee' s electoral victory, and looks at the econanic
and political rationale for Britain's request for aid. This leads to
a focus on the econanic legacy of the war, howchanges in trade and
production had produced an imbalance between the Western an:i Fastern
hemispheres, and the evolution of British and Americaninternational
econanic strategy.
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This chapter concludes the review of accumrl.at.ton strategy
uoder Dalton. It discusses in detail the negotiation, terns, and
implications of the Washingtonloan agreement. Alternative policies
to seeking USaid could not overcone the problemthat bringing more
nations into the Sterling Area that were themselves in deficit would
do nothing to help the UK overcomeits own deficit. With traditional
trade routes inoperative in war~ged WesternEUrope,Britain had
no alternative but to seek dollar aid. Keynestherefore negotiated a
$3.75Om. loan fran the United States and accepted a series of
obligations whichwere designed to force the UK into a subordinate
position within a USdaninated IIUltilateral econanic system. It's on
this basis ~hat the 'capitulation thesis' begins its account of
British subordination. 'Ibe final section of this chapter therefore
traces the fate of these obligations (sterling convertibility,
non-discrimination in trade, and tariff reduction), and showsthat
fran the outset Britain did not take the obligations seriously. The
British state neededdollars to inpleoent its reconstruction
progranme. Eca1anic strategy had a dual orientation whichconsisted
of nee-bilateral trade and paymentsarrangements and .Americandollar
aid. Ccmiidly the Treasury took the view, "we have broken our
agreements left and right ••• (the only remaining question is)
how far we can dress it up to look as it we were inside it".22/ The
•capitulation thesis I cannot draw support fran the episode of the
washingtonloan agreement.
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TheMarshall Aid programneis often depicted as offering
the UK a timely econ~c lifeline. This chapter challenges that
interpretation and places the Marshall Plan within the context of
econ~c strategy under Cripps. It begins by overturning the popular
view of British crisis in 1947. The origins of this crisis did not
lie in the convertibility obligation or in industrial stagnation.
The crisis was one of foreign currency which had dwindled because of
the expansionist progranmepursued by the government. Whilst Britain
sought newdollar aid to meet this crisis (and to continue domestic
reconstruction), the United States sought a newstrategy to achieve
its foreign econanic policy aims follOWingthe failure of the
Washington loan agreement. TheMarshall Plan arose to meet this
Americanobjective, yet in its final form it siIrply fed Britain more
dollars without achieving the Europeanintegration whichwas its
political rationale. The evidence for this conclusion is drawn from
a study of the administration of Marshall Aid (via its agencies, the
esse, and the QEOC), the negotiation of the Econanic Co-operation
Agreement,and the industrial and trade restructuring which the
United States atteapt.ed in association with Marshall. 'lbe Marshall
Plan sought to integrate Britain within a regional multilateral
clearing system fusing WesternEurope into one large market achieving
the political and econanic stability necessary for later insertion
into a Us-danl.natedworld multilateral system. British resistance at
every stage of this plan transformed the notion of integration into
one of nm-canni. tal cc:rordination whichwas coaxed into displaying
sufficient signs of co-operation to enable dollar aid to flow. As
with the Washingtonloan capitulation account, the Marshall Plan
capitulation thesis is an inaccurate assessment of Britain IS econanic
developnent.
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CBAPI'ER FIVE
1949 saw the outbreak of a newsterling crisis followed by
devaluation and a revision in the state' s econanic pol.Icy, Chapter
Five begins by reviewing economicgrowth under Cripps and assessing
the resistance to an early sterling devaluation. The fact that, in
contrast to 1947, Britain was almost alone in experiencing a severe
balance of paymentscrisis in 1949 indicates the precarious nature of
Britain's trading structure at this time. Whilst the rest of Western
Europeengaged in vigorous intra-European trade, Britain concentrated
on renewing its traditional trading links with the Ccmronwealth. The
largely inflexible capacity of the Sterling Area to supply exports to
the United States and sterling's role as a world reserve currency,
meant that changes in econanic fortunes in the United States set up
unique pressures on British reserves. 'Ibe decision to resolve the
sterling crisis by devaluation indicated that the Treasury's primary
objective would be the achievement of a pattern of world trade in
whichdollar and non-dollar nations operatai together within a single
nultilateral system. TheUnited States welcaned this declaration and
atteRpted a new route to their aims via a IXllicy of harroonising trade
and paymentsarrangeaents in the EllropeanPaymentsUnion (EPU). 'Ibe
USTreasury and the State Departmentwere howeverdivided on the
extent to which the EPUwould further Americanaims, and this
indecision allowed Britain to defuse the IOOreradical inplications of
the EPU. Adramatic upturn in British econanic fortune folloong
devaluation, plus European dissatisfaction with Britain's continued
resistance to nultilateralising trade, had the effect that the UK
proposed to enter the EFOif the United States wouldgrant particular
concessions relating to the privileged IX>Sitionof sterling. By the
eIXi of Cripps' Chancellorship Britain had IOOVed awayfran the
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nee-bilateral dual accumulation strategy and had established an
eoonoadcpolicy based on the twin pillars of regional multilateral
paym:mtsin Fllrope, consolidating traditional trading arrangemants
with the Sterling Area. Britain had resisted this last assertion of
Americanhegemonyand the EPa could no longer be seen as the first
step towards the political and eoonoadc integration of Western
Europe.
CHAPl'ERSlX
This embarrassing series of Americanforeign economic
policy failures produced a newcrisis for the us adHdnistration in
1950. WithMarshall Aid tapering off, COngressfaced the prospect of
a falling us export surplus and domestic econaadc stagnation.
Massive us and Fllropeanrearmam:mtin the wakeof the I<oreanwar not
only errphasised the importance of the United States in the defence of
liberal capitalism, but also provided a tenporary solution to the new
Americaneconanic crisis. Chapter Six explores the econanic and
political implications of rearmamentin Britain and the United States.
Contrary to the 'capitulation thesis', the British decision to rearm
was not an exampleof the UKbowingto .Americanpressure, but was a
decision taken by the government to shaw the United States that
Britain had attained independent econanic status in Western Fllrope
and would not be treated as •just another necessitous Fllropean
nation".23/ The chapter moveson to discuss the precise impact of
rearmamenton the British econany. It challenges the received wisdom
on this issue, and points to the uneven, often indirect, iDpact which
rearmamenthad on sectors of capital. It reveals that whereas
rearmamentinterrupted British econanic grCMthin the check it caused
to exports, manysectors of productive capital (in particular the
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motor trade, and civil construction industries) greatly benefited
trom the programmevia subsidised construction of newplant and
buildings. Rea.rmaIrentcane at a tine whena numberof economic
factors canbined to slow economicgrowth. Its selective impact was
teap>rary and easily reversed.
CONCWSION
The postwar years did not see the iaposi tion of UShegeIOOny
over Britain. By the end of 1951 the United States was no nearer its
ambition of creating a US-dominatedworld multilateral system than it
had been in 1945. The British state by contrast had overcomethe
primary barriers to accumulation which had constrained the econQm¥in
1945, and despite sterling crises had established a payments system
which facilitated high rates of growth. The thesis concludes by
discussing whether the very success of Britain's resistance to
Amer ican pressure proved her later undoing. As a consequence of
withdrawal fran Europe the UKcontinued its traditional geographical
distribution of exports and was largely excluded fran the expanding
intra-western EUropeantrade markets where the demandfor
technologically advanced goods stimulated higher producti vi ty and
increased exports. But this is to introduce a long-term perspective
which is clearly absent in capitalist econanic policy. Ellropean
integration (and catpliance with the USwish for early sterling
convertibility), and the scrapping of camoonwealthrelationships, was
inconceivable for the postwar state since it would have entailed a
radical restructuring of production and trade and the abandonmentof
the privileged world role for sterling. Having gained hard-won
advances in econanic growth since 1945 the Treasury was justifiably
15
resistant to risking future economic performance for the benefit of
dubious American political objectives. The following decade saw a
generalised European economic boom which was not the result of 'the
Bretton Woods system' (which had effectively collapsed in 1947), or
the work of an AlDer ican 'hegaoon' imposing international economic
co-operation. The boom was the result of individual nations pursuing
specific reconstruction policies. Once the British strategy had been
formulated it had its own developmental logic which, if only by
default, prcxiuced a pericxi of sustained capitalist prosperity.
An appendix exandnes the informal problems of conducting
research into political econany based on the study of primary
archival material.
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TheState and AccunUlation
Introduction
This chapter does not attempt an extensive review of
contemporary"theories of the state" .1/ The focus of study is rather
IOOrespecif ic, and is oriented to understanding the relation between
the state and econanic policy.
Part Oneof this section criticises pluralism in relation
to econanic policy, pointing out the futility of basing an analysis
on the study of pressure groups or party politics. It eaphasises
similar errors in the "fractions of capital" interpretations which
seek to explain policy by counterposing the interests of the City
against those of industry and the nation (finance versus industrial
capital). '!be second section provides a critique of the
"state-centred" approach to political econanywhich sees econanic
policy as the result of key decisions of state managersmadein
regard to technical state interests.
By highlighting the inadequacies of these lOOdelsthe
chapter presents an alternative account of the state suitable for the
purposes of this study. '!be state is not separate fran society (as
the state-centred approach claims), but is integrated politically am
econanically into the capitalist regine of accunulation. A review of
the relation between 'interests' and the state showsthat since the
interests of particular capitals necessarily conflict, there is no
other basis for the formation of a 'general interest' (which is the
17
pre-condition for the realisation of particular interests) than the
state.
The Labour Administration elected in 1945 rejected a
radical socialist econoadc strategy. To achieve the reconstruction
policies of the labour goverrurent, the state therefore needed rapid
accumulation. But however interventionist some state policies may
appear, the capitalist state cannot displace the market as the form
of regulation of the reproduction of capital as a whole without
abolishing the capitalist mode of production. The capitalist state
does not control acCUI1l.llation.Its main role is therefore
essentially negative, to remove the barriers to rapid accumulation.
In the postwar condi.t.Ionsof serious production aOO trade inDalance,
the state's primary task was to construct an international payments
system which would ease balance of payments constraints. This
chapter ends by relating this task to a discussion of the
international state system emphasising that the accumulation of
capital within the danestic econany depends on the aCCUIIUlation of
capital on a world scale.
I. The Pluralist Ag?roach to the State
Pluralism is the roost widespread theoretical franework used
to interpret government policy.2/ Although Alloond3/ has suggested
that the diversity of pluralism is its strength, and Martin4/ has
indicated that there is no single school of self-professed
pluralists, there are a nwnber of assuuptions which constitute a
pluralist approach.
Essentially pluralism considers that political developnents
in liberal democracies result from competitive elections among
18
parties and fromcompetitive pressures applied fram a plurality of
interest groups all operating within a given constitutional
framework.51 Political outcomesare the result of governmentstrying
to mediate and adjudicate betweencompetingdemarrlswhilst power is
viewedas non-hierarchical and competitively arranged throughout
society. The state is therefore conceived in either a neutral
fashion passively responding to contending interests or its agencies
are seen as in a sense simply another set of organised interests. 61
Pluralism thus specifies a system of interest
representation in whichcompetitive units articulate with the state
but do not exercise a monopolyof representative activity within
their respective categories. Variables such as the eoonQm¥or
deroographyare recognised as factors or given parameters but it is
the constitutional structure and the political business cycle which
are seen as having paranount causal inportance. As Berger puts it
"the division of labour between interest groups, parties and
governmentis one in which interest groups transmit' pragmatic
specific' demandsto parties; parties aggregate those demarxis••• and
bureaucracies enact themas policies and laws and implenent them". 7/
The principal inadequacies of this IOCrlelof the polity have been well
documented.81 For our plrposes hC*'eVerweneed to focus on pluralist
approaches to econanic policy and isolate their specif ic weaknesses.
'Ibe pluralist approach to econanic policy suggests that the
state's actions are the result of pressures applied both fran
'polyarchy' (free elections, free political debate), and "organised
interests".91 A series of pressure groups competeand state policy
reflects the ascendencyof a particular interest group. 'Illis type of
analysis is pop1lar across the political spectrum, interpreting
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policy in terms of the predaninanceof particular interests such as
that of 'the workingclass', 'the City', 'Americaninterests', 'CBI
influence', 'the Bank of England', or an alliance balancing these
interests.10/ Aparticularly influential variant of this pluralist
approachis represented by the "fractions of capital n argum:mt.ll/
Fractionalist Analysis of the State
Orthodoxfractionalism12/ argues that since the decline of
the larded interest, economicdaninancehas rested in the nards of
"twofractions, the City or bankingcapital (the financial sector)
and industry or productive capital".13/ In the conflict between
these fractions, the City has prevailed. Its daninance has rested on
an alliance with other fractions of the ruling class, ensuring that
the state furthers City prerogatives at the expenseof those of
industrial capital. Economicpolicy has remainedin favour of the
City because of the direct links betweenits institutions and the
Bank of Englard and the Treasury. Thepolitical position of the
City, this argurrentsuggests, has been reinforced through its
association with inperialism and overseas investment, resulting in
the formation of a strong 'sterling lobby' whichhas influenced the
state to pursue City interests at the expenseof British industry.
longstreth, for instance, concludes that the City has ·set
the parameters of econanic policy" in Britain for two centuries.l4/
As a consequencethe state, acting in the City's interests, has
foll<*ed a line of policy detrimental to industrial growthwhilst at
the' sametime financial capital itself has failed to supply the
finance needeJito ensure expanded production and nmernisation. For
fractiooalism the rivalry betweenfinance and industrial capital is
20
an nimportant contradiction in the structure of capitalism in
Britain".15/
This frClIle«>rk,which sees the state pursuing policies
favouring specific interests in opposition to the 'general national
interest', is not confined to simply oounterposing the City and
British industry. Many writers suggest that the dominanceof finance
capital is also due to a strong internal state pressure group - the
Treasury interest. BothHaines and Pollardl6/ argue that the
Treasury's obsession with oonetary and financial matters has been at
the expense of the "real econany". Searching for "a bodyof ideas
and principles strong and pervasive enough"to continually swaystate
policy, Pollard finds that the Treasury 'view' fits the bill.l7/ He
explains, "it is the principle of concentrating first and foremost on
synbolic figures and quantities, like prices, exchangerates, and
balance of payments, to the neglect of real quanti ties, like goods
and services produced and traded".18/ His conclusion is clear,
"industry has everytime to be sacrificed on the altar of the City's
and the financial system's primacy".19/
This approach to the analys:isof state policy is initially
attractive. With the state seen as a neutral body, abberations in
state policy can be laid at the door of numerousexternal pressure
groups. Writers can explain awaypast Labour Party policy failures
by reference to the City as a fifth columnist blowing the governm:mt
off course. Similarly, Thatcherism can be defended by reference to
the eoonan.iccrisis created by the influence of the TUCand the
supposed trend towards neo-corporatism.20/ Vandar Pijl even
suggests that the entire postwar econanic system can be understood in
terms of the interplay of interests representing productive,
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ccmoodity, and lOOneycapital. 21/ Howeverthere are major problems
with the pluralist frameworkaffecting all its variants fromDahl's
classic approach22/ to Marxist 'fractionalist' accounts, which render
untenable its interpretation of economicpolicy.
Theovert &npiricismof the Pluralist Approach
Themajor methodological defect of the pluralist framework
is its overt empiricism. Pluralist discussion showsa circularity of
reasoning whichdeprives the analysis of explanatory power. By
considering that the political process is best studied by viewing
powerful interest articulation, pluralism is reduced to the tautology
that powerful interests are those that prevail and they prevail
because they are powerful. 'Ibe impact of political variables becomes
a nebulous catch-all incapable of adding muchto an understanding of
the canplex determinants of economicpolicy making. For examplean
enphasis on the interaction of such forces as interest groups and
political parties in the formation of postwar policy does little to
explain howthe process of reconstruction developed to meet changing
circwnstances in international capital markets and reflected the
bounded international position of nation-states pre-occupied with
clinching short-term viability and politically acceptable levels of
domestic growth. The simple empiricist exercise of identifying
powerful prevalent interests fails to acknowledgethe carplexity of
the political process, a.OO is unable to generate productive
explanations of the role of the state in the capitalist economror
the constraints within which the state attempts to overcamebarriers
to aCCl1ltlllation. 'Ibe conceptual weaknessof the pluralist approach
is also evident in its treatment of the relation between the
representation of interests and the state. Theprincipal error of
22
pluralism in this area is its attempt to explain state policy by
reference to the supposedascendencyof the group in whoseinterest
the policy is said to lie.23/ Tbunderstand the error of this
approach, and to suggest a lOO~eproductive alternative, we need to
explore the notion of eoonoadcgrowthand the interest of the
capitalist state in securing conditions for profitable accumulation.
'file capitalist State and the 'General Interest'
In the total productive circuit of accumulation, capital
takes three basic forms.24/ In the course of its reproduction cycle
we can distinguish betweenproductive capital, producingprofit in
the sphere of production, and the two formsbelonging to the sphere
of circulation, comooditycapital and lOOneycapital. These
functional forms can be further identif ied in the formin whichthey
operate at the surface of society, in terms of industrial capital,
comoodity-dealing and nerchant capital, and IOOney-dealingand bank
capital respectively. It is of course on the basis of this
differentiation that fractionalists explain state policy by reference
to successful political representation of particular interests. This
is an error easily cannitted when the notion of 'capital-in-general'
is ~tted fromanalysis.
The concept of capital-in-general is a fundanental one
analytically prior to a specification of particular capitals and the
state.25/ Its particular value is that it enables us to
conceptualise the social limits to the relations betweenparticular
capitals and the activity of the state. capital-in-general only
exists in the fo~ of particular capitals, which likewise can only
be seen as differentiatei parts of a social whole. Ultimately the
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limits within whichcapital-in-general are bound, and whichpress
uponparticular capitals, are limits on the ability to produce and
realise profit. These limits are therefore social but are perceived
as natural barriers limiting a particular aspect of economic
developrent.
Bearing in mindthat each functional formof capital is
siRply a particular formof the total social capital, we can suggest
two iaportant points for an assessm:mtof the relation between
interests and the state. Firstly, no particular formof capital can
have an adequate understarxiing of its own interest in the
reproduction of total social capital since it will only have a
partial view of the circuit in which its own fate depends. Secondly
whilst particular capitals have an interest in commonwith others in
preserving the overall rule of capital, different capitals will have
slightly different emphasesin relation to this commoninterest.
Coopetition betweencapitals and ignorance of their
interdepeOOenceneans that no fraction of capital (or pressure group
interest) can constitute the general capitalist interest. Economic
policy, whichconcerns general accuIIUl.ation,cannot therefore be
determined by the interplay of particular interests. The task of
realising particular interests within the frameworkof general
aCCUIlUlationfalls to the capitalist state. Identifying the 'general
interest' is the pre-oolXii tion for the realisation of particular
interests, regardless of whether the general interest is described as
'econc:micgrowth', 'capital-in-general', or 'capital aCCUIIUlation'.
'!bus the state can only realise the interests of particular
groups to the extent that it can secure the sustained accunulation of
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capital, whichin turn is constrained bymaterial, social, and
financial factors. Theargumentof this thesis is that these
constraints wereprimary in determining the pattern of accumulation
and the formof postwar state intervention and so limited the extent
to whichparticular interests could be realised. In devising an
overall strategy not only does the state not express a general
interest determinedoutside it, but it cannot do so - only the state
can define the general interest of capital, since interests of
particular capitals necessarily conflict.
This is not howeverto argue that everything the state
does is 'functional' for capital. Whilst each individual capitalist
seeks to overcomethe barrier of the market by selling commoditiesat
their highest possible price, the reproduction of capital-in-general
dependson the subordination of all individual capitals to the
discipline of the market. The interest of capital-in-general
therefore is not equivalent to the combinedinterests of the
ioo.ividual capitals that are its canponentparts. Rather the
interest of total social capital is opposedto the specific interests
of particular capitals and confronts themas a barrier in the formof
conpetition in the market. 'Ibe state therefore is not sinply
functional for capital. It does not act to directly secure the
interests of particular capitals. Rather, the state meets the
interest of capital-in-general by enforcing the discipline of the
market through the rule of law and the rule of lOOneywhichare the
mediatedforms in whichthe rule of the capitalist market is imposed
on the workingclass and all particular capitals.
Within the capitalist system there is no other basis for
the formation of the general interest than the state. In this sense
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the state has an autonomywhich is not political but which rests on
its role of expressing the general conditions of accumulation and
determining overall econanic strategy. Thekey point to note is that
although this general strategy mayfavour particular
capitals/interests rather than others, this is an unintended
consequenceof policy and there is no necessary relation to their
poli tical representation. The following chapters for instance
irrlicate that in the postwar period the restoration of sterling was
essential to restore productive capital. It was also a poliey
favouring City interests, but this was a consequenceof a strategy
directed towards the reconstruction of general profitable
accwrulation. In fact, far from the City being the fifth columnist
forcing the Labourgovernmentto capitulate, the following account
will denonstrate that 'it was the City and the Treasury, with an
interest in the restoration of sterling, that offered the IOOSt
resistance to Americanmultilateral objectives.
Pluralism confuses the relation of cause and effect between
these factors and its theoretical position is ultimately one of overt
empiricism. Thepluralist approach is consequently of little use to
this study which is concerned to urxlerstand how the state rsooved the
barriers to accunul.ation in the postwar period. ThelOOStsuitable
focus is one whichconsiders state poliey in relation to a strategy
for general aCCUDUlation,and as will be shawn, in 1945 this had
little to do with pressure group representation, adversarial party
politics, or the influence of capital fractions.
II. Statism as a Theoretical Medel
To claim that the study should focus on the state, to the
neglect of pressure groups and adversarial politics, is a suggestion
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that wouldbe welcaoodby the "state-centre:}" approach (statism for
short> to political econany.26/ The similarity howeverbetween the
frameworkdeveloped in this thesis and the state-centre:} approach
ends with agreementon this point. With regard to both conceptual
foundations and substantive content there are major divergencies
betweenthe frameworks. Whilst statism suggests that the state is
wholly autonomousfrom society enjoying a full political
indepen:lence, this thesis points to the state having an indepeIXience
which is based on its representation of the 'general capitalist
interest' • It cannot be wholly autonaoous or separate fran society
since it remains integrate:} politically and econoadcally into the
capitalist regime of accumulation.
In manyways the state-centre:} approach continues the
pluralist tradition of viewing capitalism primarily in terms of the
apparent dondnation wielded by politics whilst ignoring the
particular characteristics of the capitalist modeof accumulation and
the insertion and subordination of all 'spheres' to the reproduction
of that nost, basic relation, the uneven renewal of the social
relations of production.
Statism and Weber's Analysis of Class and the State
The conceptual basis of the state-centred approach is
often claimed to be a coobination of Marxismand Weberianism. Mann
for instance describes statism as "Marxified Weberianism",27/ with
his s~le insistence that analysis must focus on class relations
within a state theory eaphasising the territorially centralised
military organisation of international states. It is howeverclear
that statism's conception of class and the state draws heavily on
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Weber and owes little to Marx. By wayof differentiating the
approachoffered in this thesis from statism, it will be useful to
drawattention to the irreconcilable differences betweenWeberianand
Marxianapproaches to class and the state, since manyaccounts now
suggest that state theory should be eclectic. 28/
Methodologicallyweber's political sociology reflects his
general concern to establish sociology as a science concernedwith
the interpretative understanding of social action linked to a causal
explanation of its course and consequences.29/ Without attempting in
this space a canprehensive review of his methodology, it can be
pointed out that Weber's concern with social action leads into a
study of understanding individual meaningsand motives, and the
developmentof a typology of motivational characteristics. The
Weberianapproach is thus ~tted to accepting both the structural
variability and the historical specificity of data. An approach
centred on disclosing the meaningsand intentions held by isolated
individuals gives a somewhatfragmentary appearance to Weber's
writings - an appearance it has been suggested30 that belies the
unity in Weber's corpus - which rests upon the overall theme of the
inportance of the "inner logic" of ideas as world views that guide
the flow of interests. This overall methodological stance has an
inp:>rtant consequencefor Weber's understanding of the notions of
class and the state.
Weber's schemaclassifies actions not only with regard to
their typical value orientations but also according to the types of
meansand ends to which they are directed. Variables which therefore
C<ll1;)risea social order, such as the eoonany, the polity, and 'civil
society', are given no overall structure in Weber's assessment, but
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rather each has a 'real autonany' which precludes any
over-determining element. Political actions therefore, although they
may have econanic inplications, are deemed as not directly oriented
to econanic gain and as such IlUStbe analysed Lndependent.Iy of
econanic factors since their orientation is to a distinctive form of
action. This position is often championed by neo-Weberians as
offering a rrethodology which has no pre-conceived image of society or
its patternings and thus replaces theoreticism within sociology by
pure eapirical assessment. However the true consequence of Weber's
position is that an analysis concerned simply with the construction
of a typology of motivation characteristics is only able to study the
given institutions arrl organisations of society resting on the
abstraction of the social individual fram within the historical
social relations within which he/she is constituted. Such a move
severly restricts sociology to a pluralist empiricism lacking in
explanatory power since the mere elaboration of a typology of
hypothetical social action can explain neither the systematic
connections between values, social relations, and institutions nor
ironically provide an adequate interpretation of the historical
specificity of the capitalist process of production and its
consequences.3~ The validity of this criticism is aptly illustrated
by a brief look at Weber's notions of class and state as they
developed fram his methodological framework.
Weber's pre-occupation with the autonany of the econany
from the polity, and the latter fran 'civil society', firrls
expression in his statement that political action is directed to the
achievement of political power for its own sake. Types of action and
corresponding organisations must be analysed independently of one
another. Thus Rone can define the lOOdern state sociologically only
29
in terms of the specific meanspeculiar to it, as to every political
association, namelythe use of physical force".32/ Emphasisingthree
aspects of the roodernstate - its territoriality, its IOOnopolyof the
meansof physical violence, and its legitimacy - Weberoffers an
account of the relations betweenaccumulationand the state in purely
political terms.
At one reuove, his analysis of class mimicsthat of the
state inasmuchas classes for Weberconsist of individuals pursuing a
COOIOOll economicinterest and they constitute in themselves only one
limited aspect of the distribution and struggle for power, with
"status groups" and political parties at least as significant.33/
Thenotion of class is thus linked to the concept of "class
situation" which "is ultimately market situation" .34/ Since class
derives froma commoneoon~c situation it can be classified either
with regard to the differentiation of property holdings (property
class) or to non-property resources such as occupational skill
(acquisition or commercialclass). Social class is thus constructed
to CCIIPrisea nurrberof groupings whoseclass situation is similar
and within which individual and generational roobility is easy. This
finally reveals an overall classification into workingclass, petit
bourgeoisie, propertyless intelligensia and specialists, and classes
based on property or educational resources. Theclass structure is
thus caIp)Sed of a plurality of social groups whichare based on
"readily possible and typically observable" characteristics.
In the samewayas the state is seen as autonaoousand
characterised by eapirical factors (territorially based legitimate
use of force), class is a notion only appropriate to enpirically
observable econanic ems and takes as its starting point the
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relations of distribution as determined by an uncritically examined
notion of the market. The creation of 'the market' as a historically
determined institution resting uponprior relations of production is
overlooked in the Weberianassessnent.
It is clear that Weber's pluralist conception of society
provides the basis for muchstate theorising. Not only Mann but many
"post-Marxistn35/ accounts put forward a conception of state and
class which is essentially Weberianbut claUns to offer same
conbination of notions deriving both fran Weber and Marx.Howeverthe
Weberianand Marxianpositions are incoopatible.
MethodologicallyMarxrejects a starting point based on the
abstract irxlividual - "my starxlpoint fran which the developnent of
the econanic formation of society is viewed ••• can less than any
other makethe individual responsible for relations whose creature he
remains •.• howevermich he maysubjectively raise himself above
them".36/ Individuals are dealt with only as personifications of
econanic categories, of particular class relations and interests, and
as Marxnoted in relation to the critics of Ricardo - "whatother
people reproach him [Ricardo] for i.e., that he is unconcernedwith
Ihumanbeings I and concentrates exclusively on the developnent of the
productive forces when considering capitalist production, is
precisely his significant oontribution".37/
This approach does not introduce a positivist anti-humanism
as sane critics suggest.38/ Rather it is adopted because it
corresponds to the alienated character of capitalist social relations
(including that of the capitalist state) in which social relations
betweenpeople take the formof relations between things. The social
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formof the capitalist relations of production invalidates an
approachwhichsimply begins fran the individual. To aasumethat
social relations betweenindividuals are expressed as a goal which
appears to exist for its own sake, is to neglect the underlying
processes whichgave rise to those relations.39/
Marx's use-value, exchange-value distinction (and its
corresponding concrete, abstract labour distinction) makesit clear
that the relations of production are not simply relations concerning
the purchase and sale of labour poweron whichyou could construct
classes in a Weberianfashion, but are the relations constituted by
the valorisation process, that is, relations of a total process of
social reproduction governedby the law of value. Theextraction of
surplus value, and the class relations on which this is premissed,
have a foundation in production, and classes therefore are not simply
aggregates of individuals determined in the Weber ian sense by
relations of exchange. Since the valorisation of capital appears as
the starting and the finishing point, as the IOOtive and purpose of
production - "capital's historic mission and justification"40/ - it
is in the developnent of the contradiction betweenvalue and
use-value that the relations of distribution, circulation and
consumptionare subsumedunder the relations of production. These
latter relations are therefore not distinct from society but rather
"the relations of production in their totality constitute what are
called the social relations, society, and specifically, a society at
a definite stage of historical developmentw.411
In markedcontrast to the Weberianpluralist assessrent
which takes certain variables as given and studies each in an
independent fashion (the independenceof class and state for
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instance), Marx approaches the social formation as an interacting set
of processes historically specified and inserted in such a way that
all relations are subsumed under the capital relation as the basis of
the valorisation process. The notion of class is therefore
analytically prior to the distribution process, formdng the basis of
the production process on which accumulation is constituted, whilst
the apparent separation of the state fran the econany cannot be taken
at face value but is rather seen as a foon taken by the relations of
production - a form in which the state is actually directly
incorporated into capitalist reproduction. The Marxian position on
class and the state ~s aptly summarised in Capital volume 3 with the
assessment, "the specific economic form in which unpaid surplus
labour is pumped out of the direct producers determines the
relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of
production itself and in turn reacts upon it as a determinant. But
on it is based the entire formation of the economic community growing
out of the productive relations themselves, and therewith its
specific political form likewise. It is always the direct
relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the
direct producers ••• which holds the innenoost secret, the hidden
foundation of the entire social structure ••• and hence the specific
fom of the state in each case". 42/
Marx theorised the developtent of the liberal form of the
state in terms of the contradiction of interests between particular
capitals and capital-in-general. The relentless nature of capitalist
accumulation implies that unless the authority of the market is
ilIp)Sed on particular capitals, they will seek to overcate the
barrier of the market by suppressing competition, and ult~tely by
the use of force. For Marx, out of this very contradiction between
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the interest of the individual and that of the communitythe latter
takes an irrleperXientformas the State, divorced fran the real
interests of individual and community. "Just because individuals
seek only their particular interest, whichfor themdoes not coincide
with their carmunalinterest ... the latter will be imposed on them
as an interest 'alien' to them, and 'irrleperrlent' of them, as in its
turn a particular, peculiar, 'general' interest". 43/ The state
therefore embodiesthe power of capital-in-general (against the power
of the workingclass and the direct demandsof particular capitals),
whilst the abstract nature of state powerenables the state to
represent itself both ideologically and politically as the
embodiuentof the general interest.
Marx's understanding of class and the state (as a totality
in whichclass forms the basis of surplus value extraction and thus
of aCCURUlation,and in whichthe state as a formof the social
relations of production acts to regulate the latter primarily in
terms of law, property and money)stands in total opposition to the
empiricismof Weber'saccount whichnevertheless continues to exert a
strong influence in both pluralist and statist writings. Skocpol,
the key architect of the statist framework,illustrates its Weberian
lineage.
'!he Principles of Statism
Drawingdirectly uponWeber and Hintze, Skocpoltheorises
the state as nuch IOOrethan an arena in whichsocial groups make
demands and engage in political struggle and canpranise. 44/ The
state is considered as IOOrethan the government. It is "the
continuous ~nistrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive systems
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that attempt not only to structure relationships betweencivil
society and public authority in a polity but also to structure many
crucial relationships within civil society as well".45/ Building on
Hintze46/ the statist position sees states as organisations
controlling territories - an idea whichleads awayfran enphasising
basic features commonto all polities and towards consideration of
the waysin whichstate structures and actions are Icondi,tioned I by
historically changingtransnational contexts. Themodernstate,
stands at the intersection betweendomestic socia-political orders
and the transnational relations within which it manoeuvresfor
survival and advantagewith other states. Contrary to classical
pluralism, statism baldy announcesa focus on states as "distinctive
structures with their own specific histories",47/ in an attempt to
afford "sufficient weight to state and party organisation as
independentdeterminants of political conflicts and outcanes.". 48/
Theultimate focus of the statist position is the autonanyof
states, the capacity of states to pursue goals, and the rationality
of state actions. 'Ihe notion of autonanyneeds clarification since
it is fundamentalto this perspective.
Skocpolclaims that the Marxist tradition makesit
virtually i.np)ssible even to raise the possibility that fuOOamental
conflicts of interest might arise betweenthe existing daninant class
or set of grwps, on the one hand, and the state rulers on the other.
Statism by contrast views the state as Ran autonanousstructure - a
structure with a logic and interests of its own not necessarily
equivalent to, or fused with, the interest of the daninant class in
society or the full membersin the polity".49/
Statism appears attractive therefore by claiming to promote
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a comparativeand historically based analysis of state managers,
political rulers and ~nistrators pursuing autonomousstate
interests and goals. Of particular interest here is Krasner's study
of the aims of the USpostwar state in relation to private
corporations, since it highlights the internationalist orientation
whichaccompaniesmuchstatist writing.
In classic statist style Krasner declares his interest to
lie in the analysis of lithe preferences of Americancentral decision
makers"given his thesis that the state "is an autonomousactor"
whose"objectives ••• cannot be reduced to sane sunmationof private
desires".SOI A s~larity can be noted here to Block's most recent
workwhichclaims that "state power is sui generis, not reducible to
class power" .511 State managers, those at the peak of the executive
and legislative branches of the state apparatus, are asswnedto be
self-interested maximisers, concernedwith the extension of power,
prestige, and wealth. For Block this focus reveals that the present
crisis of a sharpening contradiction betweenthe "interests of
capital and the fundamental interests of state managers"will find
resolution in a further extension of state power. Block's focus on
contradiction is unusual within the statist tradition yet his
analysis is explicitly indebted to Skocpol's frameworkgiven his
insistence on the need to go "beyondrelative autonany".
Krasner's studymre typically rejects the radical
pretensions of Block's schemaby listing fifteen cases in which the
expressed goals of private corporations were over-ruled by state
managers (WhiteHouseand State department officials). Be concludes
that the state is aut.onaoousfran all private interests, acting with
the notion of ideology (on behalf of the national interest) as
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paranount;rather than being explicable in terms of direct material
interests. This conclusion reveals the heart of the statist
orientation to international political economy.
The inplication of statist writing is that the
international econanic order is ultimately determinedby the state
itself. In this sense it is a n~cantilist position whose
'intellectual lynchpin' is the powerand security of societies.52/
TheWeber-Hintzeanheritage ensures an international focus on state
pursuit of policies that aim at the maximisationof military and
econanic strength and self-sufficiency. 'Ibis focus usefully corrects
the weak stance on international political econany adopted by
pluralism. But statism logically leads to the claim that it is the
state itself that determines the policies affecting the international
econany - "as regards foreign econanic policy tout ensemble, the
state's goals are distinct from and ultimately domdnatethose of
other groups in society".53/
Statism at present enjoys widespreadpopllarity and has few
critics. Whilst Held for instance applauds its frameworkfor
providing detailed analysis of the state, Mann sj_q)lyasserts "the
best state theory has now arrived" .54/ It is certainly the case that
statism corrects manyof the rooreobvious defects of pluralism
particularly by focusing on the effects of the inter-state systemon
domesticpolitics55/ and in its movestowards developing a
transnational perspective. Its attenpt to provide detailed
historical analysis is also laudable yet the quality of this analysis
largely deperns on the adequacy of its theoretical framework.
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TheProblemsof Statist Analysis
TWo areas in particular call for critical attention.
Firstly the internal consistency of the statist notion of the
autonomyof the state and secondly the adequacy of basing state
theory onWeberianlines with its implicit separation of politics and
econanics.
Theatteapt to establish that states have independent
histories "shapedand re-shaped through the struggles of politicians
amongthemselves",56/ leads statism into specific difficulties.
Firstly by assUDdngthat these struggles in turn shape state
interventions in the economy, statism makes political institutions
and managersof such vital iuportance that the perspective at times
represents what carnoy terms "ex post facto eupiricism that is
atheoretical and explains nothing".57/ Theemphasison the state as
an entity 'for itself' - totally autonaoous, against all classes and
groups in society - is not an ~opriate a priori assumptionto make
in the context of societies characterised by identifiable class and
power structures. Statism has not therefore plI'ged itself of
pluralism's notion of the neutral eupty state. EDpirically, as
Milibandpoints out,58/ it is very difficult to see what the
interests of state rulers wouldbe whichwouldalso place these
rulers in fundamentalconflict with all classes and groups in society.
In attempting to conceive au~ the statist position is left with
a viewof the constraints existing on state action less sophisticated
than LiOOblan'salready insufficient pluralist position.
'lbe state-centred approachdespite its pretensions is
reduced via its notion of autonany to viewingcapitalist developrent
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and social changeas simply involving the actions of political state
managers. Evenwithin the political field howeverit is evident that
concrete proposals cannot be understood simply as the result of
decisions of key individuals. Not only administrative structures but
social forces morewidely conceivedmust also enter into adequate
explanations. Therbornnotes that in Skocpol's account of the
formation of the Americanwelfare state the reader is told nothing of
the social IOObilisationsagainst social insurance in the USin the
1910's, an agitation that is incarprehensible from her account of the
incarpatibili ty betweenthe social insurance proposals and the
Americanformof "state building" in the pericxl.59/ A similar
by-passing of the importanceof the mobilisation of class interests
is apparent in orloff and Skocpol's treatment of the developoont of
British social insurance schemes,60/ in which the rise of an
independentworkingclass party and the demandsof the labour
lOOVementare not considered worthy of analysis. The general results
of statist research are very limited. Mann can only conclude that
"States are central to our understanding of what the society is.
Wherestates are strong, societies are relatively territorialised and
centralised. That is the 1lk>Stgeneral statement we can makeabout
the autonalols power of the state". 61/ If statism cannot generate
moreuseful insights concerning the nature of the state in
oonteaporary capitalism then its ascendancy will be short-lived.
A second series of problems for the statist perspective
also derives fran its Weberianlineage exeoplified in its focus on
state managersand organisations rather than on the structured unity
of capitalist formations. The separation of politics and economics
to which statism adheres leads in discussions of global political
econany to the claim that the state itself determines the
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international econcmicorder. '!he notion of 'national interest'
gives a degree of voluntarism to the international political arena
which is only possible in the absence of an adequate notion of
structure. Weber's treatment of the state as the organisation
claiming a monopolyof the legitimate use of force ignores the
historical specificity of the state and its characteristic relation
to the accumulationprocess. Althoughthe state codifies property
rights and regulates the use of force it is by no meansthe case that
the state inevitably constitutes property rights or monopolisesthe
use of force.62/ The reproduction of capitalist relations cannot be
reduced to the physical violence which is its ultimate sanction. The
forcible exclusion of the workingclass from the meansof production
and subsistence, the catpllsion to workbeyondthe necessary labour
time, the capitalist's appropriation of the final product and the
competition betweencapitalists to realise the product as capital,
consti tute aspects of the reproduction of society whichcentrally
involve the state but are not given their political significance in
Weber's schema. confrontation at the site of production,
distribution and exchangeare power struggles whoseresolution can
change the structure of the econany. The' determination', to use
Krasner's phrase, of the international econanic order is only
partially attributable to the political action of states. The
contingency of political struggle involving co-operation, alliance,
repression and co-option cannot be conveyedby a theory whosefocus
reduces politics to the actioos of state managersand divorces
poli tics in a larger sense fran capital accumulation. The
theoretical and methodological limitations of Weberianism,
particularly the absence of a notion of structure within which
governmentactions take place,63/ renders the statist position
incapable of developing beyonda weakly theoretical factor analysis
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whoseunderstanding of the state's relation to the integration of
national and international capital accumulationremains incomplete.
To announcethat policy is the product of state action,
whether this action has resulted froma confluence of interest group
representation or been madein the 'national interest' is of limited
value in advancingour understanding of the role of the polity in
late capitalism.64/ Whilst statism draws attention to the importance
of the political dimensionsof econanic policy making, it cannot
grasp either the limitations on action deriving fran the state form
or the tight constraints inp::>sed on the latter by its insertion
within capitalist econanic relations. As such it can offer little to
an analysis concernedwith the politics of econanic managementas
they developed in the postwar period.
III. Theorising the International State System
Poli tical managementof econanic policy is not the result
of state rulers pursuing state interests defined as separate fran
society. The task of the state as a regulator of general capitalist
accunulation is to achieve rapid econanic growth. But, contrary to
what statism iDplies, the state does not control accunulation. It
does not therefore have the primacy or the type of autonany that
statism suggests. Rather, the role of the state is essentially
negative, rellDVingbarriers to accuuW.ation. The barriers to the
aCCUlllllationof capital however do not directly confront the state,
but appear in the formof fiscal, financial, and mnetary crises. If
the state is to overcaoe these barriers it nust develop an
accunul.ation strategy that will enable capital to successfully expand
accunuJ.ation. The limits of state action however are determined
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by the fact that such a strategy is constrained by, and
institutionalised within, the existing regtme of accumulation.
Econanicpolicy in 1945was not decided on the basis of state rulers
workingout their own interests. 65/ 'file task of the state was to
find a strategy whichwouldprovide for general economicgrowthgiven
the unevenworld develop:nentof capitalism.
In conditions of serious imbalance in production and trade
betweenthe Eastern and Westernhemispheres, the British state's
primary objective was to construct an international paymentssystem
whichwouldsustain the econany until the 'dollar gap' could be
overcane. Other WesternFAlropeanations had a similar objective,
whilst the United States sought to exploit its powerful position and
inpose international political and econcmichegerony. '!he
reconstruction of the world financial systemwas thus a central issue
in the postwar er a . Tb explain the role of the British state in
renoving the primary postwar barriers to aCCUlllllationwe therefore
need sane understanding of the nature of the international state
system and its relation to world accumulation.
Mandel on the Internationalisation of capital and the State
A review of the progress made by Mandel66/in this
direction is useful in advancing study and indicating the lim!tat ions
of his framewock.
To clarify the long-term developnental tendencies of the
international centralisation of capital and its relationship to the
late capitalist state Mandel makes strict distinctions betweenthe
internationalisation of the realisation of surplus value (the sale of
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carm:xlities), the internationalisation of the production of surplus
value (the production of canrodities), the internationalisation of
the purchase of the carm:xlity labour power, and the
internationalisation of the power of command over capital which is
ultimately based on the internationalisation of capital ownership.67/
While the sale of commoditiesreached its international zenith up
until the eve of the First WOrldwar with exports accounting for an
increasing share of industrial output in the advancedcapitalist
economies, this process entered a relative decline before overtaking
its previous level in the 1960's. The internationalisation of the
production of carm:xiities, by contrast, constitutes a newand
specific late capitalist developmentbeginning after WorldWar TWo
and provides an international frameworkfor the competition of
capital. Oonoamitantlythe internationalisation of the purchase of
labour power has accanpanied the previous developmentalthough in a
fundamentally unevenfashion (since production abroad can proceed
without mich foreign labour power), and the material infrastructure
enabling capital to exercise a real international powerof carmand
has only arisen in the wakeof the third technological camunications
revolution. Building on this workMandelcites three variant types
of state strategy whichmayaccanpany these developments.
Firstly the international centralisation of capital maybe
accatpa.nied by the international extension of the power of one single
state with foreign capitalists participating as junior partners.
Alternatively the international developmentof capital maysee a
gradual dismantling of the power of various nation states and the
rise of a new federal supranational bourgeois state power. A third
variant is that of the relative indifference of internationalised
capital to the late capitalist state. Fach theorisation posits a
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possible modelfor the international structure of the metropolitan
political system.
Thus the first state variant is linked to the modelof
super-imperialism in whicha single imperialist powerpossesses such
hegeroc>nythat other nations lose real independenceof it and sink to
the status of sead-colonial small powers. Ultra-imperialism by
contrast incorporates elem:mts of the relative indifference variant
plus the supra-national interpretation by suggesting that the fusion
of capital has advancedso far that all critical differences of
econanic interest betweenthe capital ownersof the different
nationali ties disappear. '!he state is thereby no longer an
imperialist nation state but a supra-national world state. Finally
as a counter to this updated Kautskian thesis Mandelcites a variant
of Lenin's modelof inter-~rialist competition wherein, although
the international fusion of capital has proceeded far enoughto
replace a larger numberof independent imperialist powerswith a
smaller nunt>erof imperialist super-pc.MeI's,the counteracting force
of the unevendevelop:nentof capital prevents the formation of an
actual global camunity of interest for capital. 68/ capital fusion
is thus achieved on a continental level but thereby intercontinental
inperialist carpetition is all the IOOreintensified. Mandelof
course subscribes to this latter position given his observation that
"the main tendency of the intensifying international canpetitive
struggle today is not for big capital to mergeon a world scale, but
for several imperialist formations to harden in their nutual
antagonism".69/
Mandel's contribution lies less in his rather mechanical
atteapt to account for the internationalisation of capital, than in
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his effort to relate developmentsin state for.mto a modelof the
global accumulation system. To makehis observations on
inter-imperialist competition moreproductive we need to explain the
hierarchy of dominancebetweennation-states and develop a more
sophisticated treatment of the internationalisation of capital.
Developingthe Conceptof Inter-inperialist carpetition
Farlier it was stressed that capital can only exist as many
capitals and it is through the interaction betweenparticular
capitals that the principles of capital-in-general are realised.70/
canpeti tion betweencapitals haNeveris not confined within a
domestic econany. '!he aCCWllllationof capital within the danestic
econany depeOOson the accunulation of capital on a world scale. The
role of the capitalist state is to express the 'general interest' of
capital. Howeverthe national for.mof the state inplies that the
state can only constitute this 'general interest' on a national basis.
Nation-states therefore have a similar relation of conflict and
collaboration as individual capitals. Nlilst there is little love
lost aIOOngstthe capitalist class in their lll1tual ca'lp!tition, they
are nevertheless "united by a real freemasonryvis a vis the working
class as a wholen•71/ Similarly whilst each nation-state is involved
in a carpetitive struggle to secure individual econanic growth, the
overall interests of nation-states are not directly opposed, and the
relation of antagonismand collaboration is reproduced on the world
stage.
The concept of inter-iDp!ralist CCJII)etition is therefore a
useful one helping us to understand the international state system in
the postwar world. It is in markedcontrast to the sinplistic
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neo-uercantilist view adopted by the statist perspective, wherein
nation-states are seen as directly opposed and international state
strategy is viewed in terms of a zero sumpower game. M:xiifyingthe
notion of inter-Unperialist competition enables us to develop a much
moreadvanced study of the relations of daninance between postwar
international states.
Although the nations of Western Furope CCJrpetedfiercely to
gain advantage in the postwar scramble for dollars, they were
nevertheless united in their resistance to the Americanaim of world
dcmination. The struggle over Furopean trade and paym:mtsagreements
illustrates the degree of conflict which existed in Western Furope,
as each nation sought a solution to the dollar gap which would secure
a coopatitive advantage. Yet Western Furope as a whole was opposed
to Americaadopting a super-iuperialist position, as the canbined
resistance expressed in the CEEX:: and the OBEx::anply c:iem:>nstrates.72/
Britain's aDi>ivalent stance towards Western Ellrope and the
United States, placed her in a unique position in the inter-state
system. ()l the one hand the British state was the supremeadvocate
of Western &1ropean resistance to the hegelOOnicaims of the United
States. But this attitude of collaboration co-existed with one of
conflict towards Western &!rope which found its expression in
Britain's withdrawal from vigorous intra-European trade in 1949, in
favour of reviving CcJIIoome'eal.th trading links. For its part, the
united States clearly wished to iqx>se itself as the
super-inperia!ist state. ltl1chof its policy therefore was designed
to subocdinate Britain and prevent the British state establishing a
privileged position in Western Furope. 'Ihese objectives were
continually frustrated in the postwar period and had been largely
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abandonedby 1950.
ThusBritish and Americaninterests were opposedwhilst
either sought to establish itself as a super-imperialist state. This
antagonismh~ver was reconciled in Atlantic partnership as the
immediatepostwar scarcities receded in 1950, and both nations
m:xhfied earlier strategies roovingtowards a limited formof economic
mu1ti1ateralism. With the spectre of Soviet expansionismproadnent,
this econ~c partnership was reinforced by political unity in 1950,
as Britain joined the United States in large-scale rearmament.
Developinga notion of inter-imperialist competition in
this fashion allows us to construct a hierarchical command structure
of nation-states at particular historical momentswithout recourse to
abstract concepts of hegemony. The' capitulation thesis', it will be
recalled, portrays the British state subordinated to American
hegenony. The notion of hegE!lOOnyis usually left unanalysed. Where
the concept is explored it is either used in a secondary sense to a
IOOrebasic but equally abstract concept of power (the
Realist-weberian usage - the power of a political unit over others),
or approached in a IOOreself-consciously Gramscianfashion, stressing
in its IOOresophisticated forms the catpatibility betweendaninant
ideas and the formation of a .power bloc·. 73/ The generality of such
discussion and the inability to eradicate the base/superstructure
analogy74/ with its inplicit functionalism, rerners lroSt hegemony
approaches to the study of international state/aCCU1lU1.ationrelations
invalid and unenlightening.
By contrast a presentation based on explaining the role of
the state in rEmJVingbarriers to aCCUlllllationin the context of
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inter-imperialist rivalry offers a more systematic approach to
ordering the relations betweenstates in the postwar period. The
hegeaonyapproach is content to simply assert that in 1945Britain
was subordinated politically and economically to the United States.
The frameworkdeveloped in this thesis by contrast begins by
focussing on the major developmentsin the international commodity
markets up until 1945 and then relates the maldistribution in world
trade to the underlying inbalance in the structure of world
production, relating both these factors to the aIlbiguousposition of
the United States with regard to trans-Atlantic moneymarkets. This
approach highlights the dilemmafacing the USthat, whereas the
United States was in a clear position of international dominancein
terms of production and exchange (hence the world dollar shortage),
specific factors existed within the USpreventing NewYorkfinancial
markets displacing Londonas the world financial centre.
The highly fragmented structure of the banking system, the
regulations established under the New Deal which tightly restricted
the financial operations of the various deposit institutions, and a
significant lack of experience in risk evaluation and managerial
aut.onal\Yvis a vis direct shareholders interests, were all factors
constraining such a geographical shift.75/ Consequentlythis gave
the British state a strong bargaining position whichwas used to
subvert the ume strident 1IDericanaspirations for world daninance
and transform these aims to an Atlantic partnership to the nutual
interest of each party.
IV. AConclusion on Theoretical Frameworks
The theoretical frameworkof this thesis rests upon a view
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of the state politically constituting the 'general interest' and
economically securing an integrated regime of accumulation in a world
context characterised by inter-imperialist competition. Oontrary to
Jessop's analysis,76/ whichworkswith a strict divide betweenthe
state's political and economicroles (lithe hegeoonic project" and the
"accumulationstrategy"), this study suggests that the state's
managem:mtof economicpolicy belies the easy separation of political
and economiclevels.
In manywaysJessop reproduces the error of the
fractionalist position in claiming that an 'accumulation strategy' is
based on the "economichegeoony"of a particular capital. His
interpretation of the postwar period thus mimdcsthe fractionalist
account by suggesting that "British banking capital subordinated
industrial capital to its long-term strategy of restoring the
international economicdoDdnationof City interests after 1945".77/
Jessop then IOOVesto consider the political basis of state action and
decides that the key to political leadership "is the developmentof a
specific "hegemonicproject" which can resolve the abstract problem
of conflicts betweenparticular interests and the general
interest".78/ This project involves the mobilisation of support
behind a national-pop.llar progranmeof action which asserts a general
interest in the pursuit of objectives that advance the long-term
interests of a heqElOOl'licfraction.
As noted earlier, although a general econanic strategy may
favour particular interests rather than others, there is no necessary
relation to their political representation. Basing study on the ex
);X)Stfacto identification of fractional interests served by a
particular policy reduces analysis to overt empiricism. Although
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this is not Jessop's intention, his interpretation of postwar
acCUIIlllationreproduces the error of fractionalist theory. ltt>reover
his separation of political and economiclevels seemsat best
artificial. General econanic policy is fornulated by the state, and
the success of Jessop's hegemonicproject clearly relies on the
performanceof capital accumulation.79/ The evidence fram a study of
postwar developnent indicates that the state had very lindted scope
for action and its role was essentially negative, atteapting to
removethe barriers to rapid accumulation. This sits uneasily with
Jessop's voluntaristic claim that "there will typically be several
economicstrategies whichcould be pursued".80/
To counter the voluntaristic and fractionalist tendencies
of Jessop's account of the state, this study is guided by the
assumptionthat the state can only realise the interests of
particular groups to the extent that it can secure sustained
accumulationof capital, and accumulation remains tightly constrained
by material, social, and financial factors. This thesis demonstrates
that these constraints were decisive in determining the pattern of
accunlll.ationand the postwar formof state intervention, thereby
limiting the extent to whichparticular interests could be realised.
By abandoningthe artif icial division betweenthe political
and econanic aspects of the state, a deeper understanding of postwar
internatiooal relations of daninance and danestic policy
opportunities and limitations can be grasped. Furthenoore the
central notions of the "regulation school approach" to contemporary
capitalist crisis,81/ such as "regimes of accumulation",
"taylorisation", and "fordism", can be stripped of their catch-all
connotations and can productively be eaployed within a frauework
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capable of charting the particular effects of these processes on
sectors of the economy.
This chapter has sought to denonstrate that the state DUst
be the focus of an analysis concernedwith the political dimensions
of econanic management. Tb grasp the ability of the capitalist state
to zerove the main barriers to aCCUDUlation,a purely eooncmic
technicist account will not suffice.82/ Howevera review of the most
praninent models relating the polity to the economyhas revealed that
none seemsentirely suitable for explaining the construction and
execution of econanic policy under Attlee's governance. Whilst
pluralism relies on an ex post facto errpiricist assessment incapable
of generating an explanatory account of the developnent of econanic
management,statism reduces analysis to state rulers securing state
interests iooependentof both society am the economy.
Tb establish a moreproductive theoretical frameworkof the
constraints on state action we need to recognise three points.
Firstly, a review of the relation between 'interests' and the state I
showsthat since the interests of particular capitals necessarily
conflict with one another, as manifest in fierce catpetition, there
is no other basis for the fOIllllltionof a 'general interest' than the
state. 'Dlis is not howeverto argue that the state siDply represents
the general interests of capital against the particular interests of
specific capitals. '!he 'general interest' of capital, as of the
'nation', is a pure abstraction. All that exists is the particular
resolution of CXXlflictinginterests, with the 'general interest'
being the pre-comi tion for the realisation of particular interests
whether this is called 'econanic growth' or 'capital accwlUl.ation'•
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The second point to note is that a view of the state
politically constituting the 'general interest' and econoadcally
securing an integrated regime of accumulation, does not bnply that
the state IIUst firstly advance a 'hegE!lOOnicproject' in order to
provide an 'acCUllUllationstrategy'. This mechanistic approach to
state action is both conceptually untenable in dividing political am
eoonoadclevels, and unrealistic since historical study showsthat
the state attempts to restructure accumulation in general with the
success of any political strategy largely dependent on economic
performance.
Finally it has been stressed that since accumulation of
capital within the domestic eoonQm¥depends on the accumulation of
capital on a world scale, nation-states have a similar relation of
conflict and collaboration as individual capitals. To urnerstand
this tension, and to chart the hierarchy of daninance between
international states, a modified notion of inter-imperialist
canpetition is valuable. It provides a frameworkfran which
Britain's articulation with the world accumulation process can be
analysed and the relations of daninance assessed in a
non-reductionist, non-empiricist mannerwhich avoids the use of vague
assertions of hegeDO.'lYand understands the nation's position in terms
of international production, and ca1IOOdi. ty and IOOneymarkets.
Consistent with these observations it is initially
necessary to locate the position of the British state within the
chaotic international state and accumulation structure of 1945.
Analysis will therefore begin by focussing on Britain's relation to
international eoonani.cdeveloptents and relating the evolution of UK
policy to the position of the United states in terms of the relations
of daninance within the international state system.
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The i.Irmediateeconomicconstraints facing postwar Britain
derived from the legacy of the war which had seriously disrupted
international production and thrown into chaos international trade
and paynents systems. on political as well as economicgrourxis the
Attlee govermnenthad rejected a radical socialist approach to these
problems. Tb realise the Labour government's programmeof domestic
reconstruction, which gave high priority to the maintenance of full
euployment and the expansion of welfare, the state required rapid
accumulation. But to achieve high economicgrowth Britain needed to
reconstruct an international payments system which would facilitate
international trade and secure the regular iuport of essential
catm::Xiities and raw materials.
The primary barrier to rapid accunulation in 1945 was
therefore the uneven developnent of world capitalism which had
produced a serious disequilibrium in production and trade between the
Fastern and western hemispheres. The British state's postwar
econanic strategy turned on finding a solution to its balance of
payments problems which were a manifestation of this disequilibrium.
To successfully expand the econany, the state had to ueet its
existing balance of payments deficit in addition to finding extra
dollars to pay for increased ilq;x)rts of essential materials that were
abundant only in the western hemisphere. The need to maximise
accuDIllation was thus translated into the need to 4ccum.llate world
currency. In 1945 the state therefore sought a solution to this
problem by constructing an internatiooal payments system which would
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allow maximumcommoditytrade in inconvertible sterling whilst
minimising the outflow of dollars needed for essential American
purchases.
Thepostwar structure of world production and trade left
WesternEUrope heavily depen:ient on the economicresources of the
United States. Yet despite British weaknessand the strong economic
position of America, Britain had a substantial bargaining position
resting on two factors. Firstly New Yorkcould not take over
romon's role as the primary international financial centre. The
danestic political regulations which enneshed New York, and the
material economicorganisation of its banking syst~ and money
markets, prevented New York fran becaning the world's financial
centre. The United States therefore relied upon rebuilding the
strength of sterling as a world currency to sustain the financial
role of rondon. SecoOOly,Britain was, at least until 1947, in a
mich stronger political and econonic position than the rest of
Western FAlrope. To achieve its foreign econanic policy aims the
United States therefore had no alternative but to work through
Britain, realising that the UK held the key to Americanpenetration
of FAlrope.
Britain could exploit these strengths to subvert the
Americanobjectives of world danination, and to coax the United
States into accepting a US/UKpartnership to the uutual interest of
each party. Britain thus resisted all Americanattenpts to
restructure aocunul.ation which were based on the notion of a
subordinated Britain integrated within an American-daninated
IIUltilateral system. '!be British state's long-term objective was to
re-establish sterling as a world currency (but at a pace suitable for
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the British econQm¥)and to ultimately secure an Atlantic partnership
l1llltilateralism. This objective should not be seen as serving US
wishes (whichwere clearly opposed to such an idea in the early
postwar per iod) , or sinply realising the partial interests of the
City of IDndonin opposition to the 'national interest' (as many
fractionalist accounts infer). The objective was based on a material
necessity, to overcaoo the primary barrier to accumulationwhichwas
the inappropriate structure of prcxiuction and trade experienced in
the dollar gap. Britain thus sought to use dollar aid to restructure
trade, stimulate production, and red.ucethe dollar gap to gain sane
degree of independencefran the United.States.
Theprimary task of British econanic policy was thus to
restructure the international paymentssystem to sustain trade in
conditions of world production and trade iubalance. The canplexities
involved in such a restructuring meant that econanic policy was left
largely in the hands of civil servants and 'expert advisers'.
Tracing the developnent of postwar econanic strategy therefore means
tracing the thought of state officials, associated principally with
the Treasury. Cabinet ministers had no direct expertise of these
involved issues. Foliticans therefore played little part in deciding
the furXJamentalstrategies open to Britain in this pericxi.
This chapter clarifies the issues involved in the American
loan agreement. It reviews Britain's econanic position in 1945, am
focuses on the econanic and political rationale for seeking tEltplrary
financial assistance fran the United States. It also considers the
ains of Americanforeign econanic policy following the surrerder of
Japan, and points to the constraints on the internationalisation of
us capital.
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The loan agreement, signed between the governmentsof the
United Kingdomand the United States on the 6th of December 19451/,
is the benchmarkfran which crucial decisions regarding the
developnent of the postwar econanic world were foIllUllated. The
negotiations concerned international moneycapital - convertibility,
the postwar role of sterling, and the position of Londonas a major
financial and banking centre; oammoditycapital - discr~nation and
the structure of trade within Western EUrope, betweenBritain and the
Sterling Area, and between the latter and the US; and productive
capital - the utilisation of newcapital equipnent, newregimes of
accunulation, and the necessity of directing industry towards export
production. This chapter sets the context for an assessment of these
important issues as a prelude to Chapter Three which places the loan
agreementwithin a broader discussion of trade and payments
arrangements under Dalton's Chancellorship.
I. The Econanic Basis of Britain's Request for Aid
IBgacy of the War
In May1945 Keynes circulated to the War cabinet a
llleIOOrarxlum'overseas Financial Policy in Stage III' 2/, concerned with
the optimal path for British aca.mulation.3/ The announcementby
Truman on the 21st August 1945 that following the surrender of Japan
all contracts for lend-lease were cancelled, forcai the governmentto
seriously consider Keynes' options and decide upon the best path for
econanic reconstruction. In calstrast to the position of the United
States, which by the close of the war had rapidly expaIrled its
industrial plant and doubled in real terms its national outp!t, the
depleted UK econany faoecl two major problems.
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The first arose out of the deficit in the external balance
of paymentsthat was forecast to develop during the first three or so
years whenthe necessary adjustments could be made- principally a
restriction on imports and a 75%increase in exports over the 1938
figure - to restore financial equilibrium. '!he second problem
concerned the indebtedness of the UKto overseas nations arising fran
the massive proportions of the sterling balances and other
accumulated liabilities since 1939.
Al.Ioost25%of prewar national wealth - estimated at
£30,00Om., in September19394/ - had been destroyed by 1945.
Shipping tonnage was nowless than three quarters of its prewar
figure. Massive physical destruction of property (estimated at
£1,45Om.), and serious iIIpairment of industrial capital accanpanied
considerable dalestic disinvestment (£885m.). Large scale external
disinvestment (£4,198m.)innensified the serious deterioration in the
external position as a result of the realisation of external capital
assets (£l,llBm.), an increase in external liabilities (£2,879m.),
and a decrease in gold and dollar reserves (£l52m.).
The extensive liquidation of foreign securities,
repatriation of loans by overseas debtors and increased interest
payments to holders of sterling debts caused by the UKIS heavy war
experxliture overseas, had the result that the net incaoe fran
overseas investment in 1945was less than half the 1938 figure. 'lbe
UK export trade had been deliberately abaOOoned during hostilities so
that manpower, production and materials could be fully 1OObilised.
The index of the volumeof exports which stood at 100 in 1938 had
fallen to 30 by 1944with the value of cannercial exports falling
fran £47lm., in 1938 to a figure of £2s8m., by 1944.5/ Exports of
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coal, metal, and engineering goods had virtually ceased. Cotton
piece goods were only 27%the prewar figure, and it was only with
goods such as whisky and pottery, where demandcould be met fran
prewar stocks, that exports neared the 50%mark.61
The increase in the volumeof exports needed to finance a
1938 seale of imports was agreed on the spur of the momentin a
midnight conversation between Keynesand Robinson to be 75%.71 Yet
senior Treasury officials were aware that it would not be sufficient
to restore 1938 as twenty-five years earlier they had attempted
~sguidedly to reconstruct 1913.81 1938 had seen a balance of
paynents deficit equivalent to 8%of British inp)rts and unemployment
ran at an annual figure of 1,870,000.
The increase in overseas indebtedness - the second major
problem resulting fran the enorDOlS cash expenditure on the
maintenance and supply of UKforces overseas - had risen fran a
figure of £76Om., in 1938 to £3,355m., by June 1945 and cont.Inued to
rise even at the end of hostilities.91 Whensales of foreign
invest:uents and a small annmt of gold and dollars are also added to
the sterling liabilities accwwl.ated during the war, the net change
on capital account between 1939-45 aonmted to £4,70Om.lOI
The problem of the size of the sterling balances was
exacerbated by the fact that the character and distribution of the
debts precluded any CCII'IOOrl approach to their solution. Differences
in Britain's political relations with creditor nations posed
problems, specifically with two of the largest creditors India and
Fgypt. Manyof the debts were the result of local ~litary
expenditure incurred by the UK<FlnPt is an exanple) whilst others
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were the result of trading operations (Argentina for instance).
M:Jreoverwhilst a large nunoer of the debts were held by the central
bank or currency authority of the creditor nation, others were widely
spread amongstcommercialbanks and private individuals. The
character of the debts thus posed specific economicproblems for the
Attlee administration and meant that the UKcould not take seriously
the USsuggestion that they should be viewed as a haoogenousentity
and simply written off.
TheUKended the war with the largest external debt in
history and with a level of reserves which had fallen to £3m., in
April 1941 recovering to £45Om.,by June 1945 only because of the
paymentfor USforces in the Sterling Area.ll/
To meet the CUIIIllativedeficit on external balance of
payments whichwas estimated at £1,250m., over three years and to
release part of the accunulated sterling balances - a necessary 1l¥JVe
to assist the depleted economiesof the largest creditor nations,
Iooia and Egypt, - the governmentrealised that it DUst receive S<D!
form of external credit to avoid, in Dalton's view, "our people
[being] ••• driven ••• deeper into the dark valley of austerity ...
facing ••• greater hardships aIXl privations than even during the
war" .12/
This calplicated postwar situation provided the econanic
rationale for the British state to seek. temporary financial help fran
the only nation which could meet the urgent need for lOOlleyto buy
supplies for oonsunption and the re-generation of danestic aIXl
exporting industries on the world market. Yet to develop a nore
precise understanding of Britain's international econanic position at
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the close of hostilities we need to go beyondbald statistical
presentation and portray the underlying 100Verentsin the
international circuits of capital accumulation that had taken place
by 1945. Firstly I will turn to the circulation of commoditycapital
and analyse howrecent changes in international trade affected the
British balance of paymentsup until 1945.
TheTrade Structure in 1945
The first point to stress is that historically the UKhad
been the largest COll'IOOditymarket in the world. In 1938Britain
absorbed one-fifth of the exports of the rest of the world, with
thirty seven nations directing one-tenth or less of their exports to
Britain, fifty seven one-fifth or less, and foor directing
three-fifths of their exports to the UK.13/ Conversely in 1938 52%
of UKexports went to countries other than the United States for
which the UKwas the chief market, whilst 4%went to the US, 21%to
countries for which the USwas the chief market, and 23%to nations
which found their chief market neither in the USnor the UK. The
fact that even in 1938 the UKimported 17%of USexports whilst the
USabsorbed only 4.4%of UKexports was to prove an ill anen for the
pattern of postwar British camxiity trade. As regards the main
constituents of the British iq;x>rt/export accounts, the principal
iDported camaiities prewar were food and rawmaterials with 'luxury'
manufactured goods the mainstay of the British export programre.
Thus on annual average between 1934-38 the UKimported 88%of grain
flour, 93%of fats, 82%of sugar and over 74%of fruit.14/ In all,
well over half the UK's food supplies were iDported. With regard to
prewar intra-&1ropean trade in foodstuffs two lIk)Vementsare
discernible. Firstly bread grains and cereals roovedfran Poland,
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Hungaryand South Fast Fm'ope to the UK,Germanyand Austria - with
intra-European trade providing 20%of Europe's total grain imports in
1935.15/ Secondly, with grain excepted, the flow of the rest of
Europeanfoodstuffs was chiefly directed to the UKwhich in 1938 drew
22%of her total focxi inports fran ntrope.
TheUKeconanywas equally dependent on the inp:>rtation of
vast quantities of rawmaterials. Thuswith coal an exception, the
UKimported its entire cotton supplies, nine-tenths of its wool, a
third of its iron ore, 90%of its timber and all of its natural
rubber supplies.16/ In 1938 the UKhad an import surplus with every
Europeancountry except Greece and Turkey, with British trade in
textiles, machinery and manufactured goods, together with inp:>rtant
invisible receipts, providing a trade and paymentsbalance.
Between1938 and 1945 significant changes occurred in the
above pattern transfo~ng the relative equilibrium in international
trading positions. Intra-Fm'opean trade in foodstuffs and raw
materials fell sharply below prewar levels, with Fastern ntropean
nations no longer able to export grain and several even becaning
inp>rters.17/ Themassive decline of trade within Fm'ope (which
constituted in 1938 30%of world trade but by 1946 only 17%of the
world total) was exacerbated by the collapse of Germanywhich
resulted in approximately 1,OOOm.,dollars worth of trade being lost
in both directions in Fm'ope.18/ '!his decline of &1ropean exports
corresponded to a signif icant expansion of USexports evidenced in
the fact that in 1938 Fm'ope's exports to overseas nations were three
times the total of USexports, but by the end of 1946 the UStotal
was slightly larger than the exports of all the Fm'opeannations
cxubined.
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During the later war years close links developed between
the econanies of the United States, Canada, and the UK. Under
lend-lease the USand Canada not only provided 40%of the UK's
munitions requirements, they also provided a quarter of Britain's
total food supply and a significant proportion of rawmaterials (in
1944 30%of all USaid to Britain was non-munitions).19/
The growth of the United States in international trade
between 1938 and 1945must also be seen in the context of the
movementstowards the relative self-sufficiency of the American
continent with regard to iIq;x>rts. This tendency on the part of the
USwas exenplified in the attenpt to makeitself independent of raw
material i.np)rts fran outside the Western hemisphere. The creation
in the early 1940's of the tin smelter on the Texas seaboard and the
propagation of the synthetic rubber plantation industry are exaq>les
of this development.20/ By 1947 the UShad achieved a balance of
trade surplus of 9,975m.dollars and an overall balance of payments
figure in excess of 8,70Om.dollars.21/ With respect to ccmoodity
trade this was a position reached not only as a consequence of the
close knit econanic system of the CUstansUnion of the United States
- allowing trade preferences to nations such as Puerto Rico, a major
sugar supplier - but also fran high USinp)rt tariffs and export
industry subsidies and progranmes such as the agricultural support
price am acreage allotment programne.
Whenit is also realised that the principal camoiities in
the British export trade to the USin 1946 consisted of such items as
pottery, whisky, linoleum, knitted goods and books22/ and not a
single one of these leading cxxmolities was aDalg the twenty lIDSt
valuable categories of USi.np:>rts it becanes clear that the UKfaced
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the prospect of substantial visible trade deficits with the Western
hemisphere. Irrleed at the beginning of Attlee's term of office the
USoccupied only sixth position in the league charting Britain's
geographical distribution of exports, that is to say somewaybehind
the value and volumeof British exports to India, South Africa,
Denmark,Australia and Eire.23/
Throughoutthe 1930's Britain had financed muchsmaller
trade deficits through a high level of invisible earnings. These
earnings had chiefly derived from interest on foreign (often US)
investments, activities of British companiesoperating outside
EUrope,from the services of merchant fleets (as carriers of cargo
which the Board of Trade estimated earned approximately £lOOm.per
annum24/) and from foreign tourism in EUrope, insurance prsniUlIlS,
cxmnissions and other miscellanea arising out of foreign travel and
trade. Allied to these invisible earnings Britain had previously
reduced trade deficits with the USby earning dollars in third
markets such as the Far Fast, India and Malaya. Both of these
avenues had been severly curtailed by 1945. With regard to invisible
earnings, whereas in 1938 net invisible incane for EUrope fran
non-Fm'opeansources amountedto 2.16 billion dollars - an aIOOWlt
equalling &1rope's deficit on trade account25/ - by the end of 1946
Europe had a net deficit on invisible account of 0.6 billion dollars,
0.4 billion of which was directly with the United States. The loss
of invisible inccmes corresponded to many dollar earning third
markets being closed to British exports since the underdeveloped
nations faced similar reconstruction tasks to those in FAlrope and
were drawn to the United States as the daninant supplier for food,
rawmaterials and capital goods rather than accepting restricted
trade patterns with the UK.
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This short analysis of the underlying changes experienced
in the international ccmooditymarkets up until 1945 has pointed to
the tremendousobstacles facing the renewal of capital accumulation
in Britain at the end of the war. It has specifically highlighted
the rise of the United States and the conditions of international
trade disequilibrium which were implicit in the unbalancing of
carmxiity trade between the Western and Fastern hemispheres. This
disequilibrium was not confined to the international circulation of
carm:xiity capital but was mirrored in the spheres of productive and
noney capital to present the British state with fundamental econanic
problems, the first step towards the resolution of which lay with the
participants in the Washingtonloan negotiations. Only by analysing
developoonts in these other aspects of capital acCUJIU.lationcan we
arrive at a more complete assessment of the international position of
British capital on the eve of Labour's parliamentary victory.
International Production in 1945
It is of course no s~ise that a maldistribution in the
world's demand and sUR>lyfor internatiooally traded camDdities
corresponded to an wxlerlying iabalance in the structure of world
production. At the height of the industrial revolution (1840-1860)
the UKled not only in the volumeof world manufacturing production
but also in the volumeof external trade. Howeverby 1938 the UK
accounted for only 9%of the world total for manufacturing production
- as against 31%in 1870 - falling sanewhat behind Germany (10.7%),
Russia (18.5%), and the United States (32.3%)26/ • To understand this
position of relative inml.ance in world production which existed in
the mid-nineteen forties we need to identify the underlying
comi tiona which gave rise to the daninance of the USin the interwar
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pericrl and isolate the catparable factors whichwere absent fran
productive capital in the UK.
Theprcrluctive daninance of the US over WesternEurope had
its origins in the decade after 1909 whenthe Americaniron and steel
industry ceded its position as the fastest growing industry to the
transportation machinery, oil and chemical industries - in short the
industries associated with the Rockefeller nexus.27/ 'rbe nascent
aut.oloobileindustry headed by Ford in the transportation machinery
category was crucial for the developing prcrluctive outplt of the US.
In EUrope a carparable breakthrough of the autaoobile industry and
the associated restructuring of capital did not occur. TheFordist
socialisation of the prcrluctive forces under mass production
conditions in the US, particularly in the interwar pericrl, not only
affected autaoobile prcrluction, but was also significant for class
relations in general. TheFordist productive strategy was
significant in three principal areas.28/
Firstly it introduced the assembly line and mass production
techniques, replacing the skilled worker characteristic of Taylorism
with the semi-skilled operative. Furtherloore Fordismcarried with it
the reoognition that wagesare not just a cost but also an outlet for
capitalist production. It thereby anticipated Keynesiandemand-side
econanic {X)licyby approaching the standardisation of the aut.croobile
as an exampleof the intimate relationship betweenmass prcrluction
and mass COllSuaption. Finally Ford exteOOed industrial management
beyond the workplace to the sphere of the constitution and
reproduction of labour power - intervening in the determination of
household budgets, family practices and the propagation of
'puritanical' ethics - in an att.ellpt to hoIlo;Jenisethe workforce and
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produce a well-adjusted psycho-physical equilibrium preventing the
psychological collapse of the worker exhausted by the newproductive
techniques.291
The Fordist strategy therefore broke the resistance of the
skilled workforce, tapping the large reservoir of cheap unskilled
labour and dramatically raising the rate of exploitation. In this
way articulating rising living standards and a flexible format of
labour relations the Americanautomobile industry engendereda
dyn~c automotive-industrial complexinvolving the growingoil,
rubber and glass industries whilst pioneering newmarketing and
maintenancepractices, stimulating suburbanisation, the development
of road networks and the managementof mass consumerism. Throughthe
revolutionary nature of its practices and the rationalisation of the
class structure which it praooted, Fordismrapidly becamein the
interwar years the daninant IOOdeof UScapital accunulation with its
influence spreading well beyondthe autaoobile industry.
The material conditions enabling such a transformation of
production relations are traceable to developnents like that of the
continuous wide strip steel mills, whichwere pioneered in the USAin
the interwar period as the natural corollary to the gra.rt.h in demand
for all types of flat steel products.30I The first of these mills
was laid downin the USin 1924where the growth in demand for flat
products was initially apparent in the notor industry but whereupon
the vast outp.lt of consistently good quality cheap steel fran the
continuws strip mills gave rise to the search for newoutlets, and
the twin processes of production and consunption growth becane
CUlIlllative. The inportance of the continuous wide strip steel mills
and the cold rolling of flat products for UScapital accunulation was
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evident in all major manufacturing industries from notor vehicles,
shipbuilding and container industries (food canning industries) to
capital goodsmanufacturing (railways, electrical power, general
mechanical engineering, office equipment, construction industries)
and the production of vast quantities of standardised consumer
durables fromwashingmachines, refrigerators and cookers to a
IlIlltiplici ty of danestic appliances. In all these sectors of
productive capital the contrast with Western Fm'ope is striking. By
the 1930ls the United States had a well established continuous wide
strip steel adll industry with total production of thin sheet
steel increasing 277%between 1929 and 1948. Total production
throughout the entire nations of Western Europe increased by only 34%
over the sane period, with the UKpossessing only one, partially
conplete, continuous strip adll by 1940.31/
The i.:abalancein the structure of world production which
existed at the cessation of hostilities thus reflected not only the
short-term effects of the UK'swar-mobilised industrial situation but
had IlIJChroorecanplex origins to do with the regi.:aesof acCUltD.1lation
puraued respectively in Western &!rope and the United States. Ql the
one hand the UKand Western Fm'ope had been locked into a
predaninantly extensive regime of capital accunulation.32/ GrCMth in
outplt encountered recurrent obstacles am increases in capital stock
did not alter existing production techniques thereby resulting in low
producti vi ty growth. The United States, even in the interwar years,
had entered upon a predani.nantly intensive regime of aCCU1IUlation.
Advancesin the technical and social organisation of work (increases
in the rate of relative surplus value extraction and the developnent
of a social nor-mof consumptiontogether with the efficient
organisation of investm:mt) had ensured rapid producti vi ty growth.
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Under the conditions of extensive capital accumulation growth in
output and technical change occurred in a faltering fashion only in
Departm:mtI (the production goods industries) with Departmant II
(consunption gcxxisindustries) remaining largely unchange:l. By
contrast the phase of intensive accumulation achieve:l a balanced and
significant expansion of both departments and a sustained generalised
increase in productivity understcxxi not only in a narrow technical
sense but in an international context integrating industrial,
cannercial and financial interests involving a restructuring of class
relations.
An abundanceof capital and superior production techniques
coupled with a large internal market provided the USwith an enoIIOOUS
advantage in uost fields of industrial production. The strength of
USproductive capital, allied to underlying IOOvementsin the
international CClIm:xlitymarkets created a postwar situation of
serious international trade and production disequilibrium between the
Western and Eastern hemispheres. British exports to the Western
continent thus faced apparently insuperable problems at a time when
Attlee had pledged to increase exports 75%above the prewar figure.
Havingoutlined trans-Atlantic developnents in the
production and circulation of commoditiesas they affected British
accumulation up until 1945, it is now possible to analyse the
wnerlying mvements in the international spheres of lOOneycapital up
until the cessation of hostilities - an aspect which is vital to this
study given the inp)rtance attached in the Washingtonagreement to
the use and role of sterling.
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The Position of Sterling in 1945
It will became clear from the course of this account that
whereas Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
had promotedsterling as the key international currency with the City
of Londonthe major commercialand financial centre, this was
principally because Britain's domestic economydepended for its
growth on increased levels of world trade based on colossal exports
of capital by the UKbetween 1870 and 1914. Fran 1918onwards
however, the decline in Britain's percentage of the world total of
manufacturing production (corresponsing to the rise of the us
percentage) irrlicated that the material foundations of sterling as
the top international currency were cI'lJlri:)ling. Yet the United States
_ with an increased material capacity to support the dollar as the
key international currency - was reluctant to assume the role Britain
had successfully played up until this point principally because
(regardless of institutional obstacles which will be detailed later
and which could have been surmounted) the us danestic econany was far
less dependent than that of Britain on m::wementswithin the world
econany. This reticence on the part of the United States was equally
evident in the postwar period, as seen initially in the obligations
of the Washingtonloan agreement which attelrpted to resurrect
sterling and underwrite its role as the top currency.
'Ibe emergenceof sterling as an international currency
occurred as international trade patterns in the mid-nineteenth
century became increasingly focused on Britain.33/ The economic
weight of the UKin world comnerce, the econanic advantages of a
politically far-flung Empire pursuing a policy of free trade, the
efficiency of United Kingdan international service irrlustries such as
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shipping and insurance, and the increasing flow of capital exports
all extended the international use of sterling both within the Empire
and beyond. Sterling's ability to finance approximately 60%of world
trade between 1860-1913and in the sameperiod to take up £4,00Omof
long-term securities fram overseas34/ was achieved through a rapid
internationalisation of the Londoncapital and moneymarkets and an
expansion in the rate of growth of banks established in Londonfor
operation abroad, particularly in nations providing primary products.
Thus the total nUlIt>erof overseas and foreign banks in Londongrew
continuously from a figure of ten in 1842 to over one hwdred and
twenty by the 1890's.35/ The extension of British banks into the
domestic banking structure of manyforeign nations was concomitantly
very high. For exampleby 1914British banks controlled
approximately a third of the deposits of the Brazilian banking system
and over a quarter of those lodged in Argentina and Chile.36/
By the eve of WorldWar One the City of IDndon and the
sterling system had developed into a cooplex and highly
institutionalised structure for facilitating international financial
transactions. The ability to attract short term funds fran the
&lropean gold staOOardcountries through the interest rate mechanism
(raising the rate of interest in the Daley markets whenthe Bank of
England's gold reserves cameunder pressure) enabled Britain to
sustain an overall surplus in the balance of paymentsbetween
1850-1913.37/ A consequence of the international sterling system was
thus the extreme dependence of British capitalism on the state of the
world econany. '!be successful continuation of international
investment by the UKand growth in world markets dependedon rising
levels of international trade, the ability of the UKto continue
exporting long-term capital, and the proclivity of overseas
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territories to absorb British goods and services.
The 1914WorldWar effectively halted the flow of credit
from Londonand whilst most countries continued to define their
currencies as equal to certain quantities of gold they acted to halt
international gold shipments and close down free gold markets. The
war shattered the basis of an already unstable gold standard order
which continued to exist only in the sense that currencies were
nominally based on gold.38/ Fromthis period onwards it is clear
that the British econany was no longer in a position to provide the
material foundations uponwhich the international financial role of
sterling had been built.
With the liquidation of approximately three billion dollars
worth of European (predominantly British) investments in the United
States, as well as Americanloans madeby JP l-Drganand the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (totalling three hundredmillion dollars) to
Britain in the aftermath of the Great war, the control panel of the
Atlantic circuit of moneycapital effectively shifted from London to
New York turning the United States fran the world's leading debtor to
the world's leading creditor nation.39/ The accunulation of vast
debts, the curtailment of overseas investments, the termination of
colossal long-term capital export and the loss of invisible earnings
meant that the British econany could not support sterling as an
international currency, particularly in the face of the strong and
freely available dollar - the JOOStobvious candidate to replace
sterling. Although representatives of Americaninternational money
capital such as ~rgan and 'lhanas Ianalt sought to makeNew York the
geographical centre of world banking and finance (and although both
the econanic base and Britain's ability politically to guarantee the
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sterling system had all but been destroyed) - the old British
institutional structure and its class base remained.
In addition to prevailing nationalist sentUnent in the us
three major obstacles prevented New York financial markets fran
~ng the world's financial centre. The highly fragmented
structure of the banking system, the regulations established under
the New Deal which tightly restricted the financial operations of the
various deposit institutions, and lack of experience in risk
evaluation and managerial autonomyvis a vis direct shareholders'
interests, were features delaying this geographical shift. Britain's
dependenceon world markets rooreoverrooant that despite (or even
because of) its relative economicdecline, the international role of
sterling was essential to the production and international
circulation of commodities.
The interwar period was thus characterised by a close
interdepeOOenceof USand British lOOneycapital, with the UK
providing institutional facilities for a restoration of the gold
stamard and the USeffectively underwriting sterling as the key
international currency. '1he dollar's strengthwas not acc."alpUliedby
the growth of New Yorkas the major international banking aIXi
cannercial centre. America's decentralised and thereby inappropriate
banking network40/ and a configuration of class interests reflected
in Roosevelt' s New Deal policies gave praninence to nationalist
solutions to America's eoonanic problems which largely precluded
internationalist solutions based on notions of New York and the
dollar as the pivot of a new international monetary order. In
conditions of British econanic weakness and Americaninability and
unwillingness to assumethe international monetary role Britain had
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carried out prior to 1914, the 1931 financial crisis ended the gold
standard and ushered in a decade of exchange controls. Britain's
negotiation of the Ottawa Trade Agreementsreinforcing imperial
preferences, and the enactment in the us of protectionist bills such
as the Smoot-Hawleytariff and the imposition of quantitative
restrictions, thus culminated in the emergenceof a confused monetary
state of loosely defined currency blocs.
The restrictions iuposed on the m:::wementsof moneycapital
by these blocs is a subject taken up in the following chapter which
will discuss the working of the Sterling Area and the mechanismof
'dollar pooling'. It suffices at this stage to understand that an
international monetary system composedof increasingly antagonistic
blocs - the Sterling bloc composed largely of the British Dominions
(except canada), British colonies, Egypt, Denmark,Norway,SWeden,
Finlam, Estonia, Portugal and SiamJ a loose USbloc including
Canada; and a EUropeangold bloc4l/ - could not serve as a basis for
the future expansion of international capital. The chaos of the
pre-1945 monetary system led analysts in both the USand the UKto
seek the construction of a newpostwar international monetary order.
The predani.nant Americannotion that a new international
system could be constructed without fW¥lamentally changing the old
established role of sterling or the centrality of the ei ty of Iondon
(provided that the USnow play a more responsible stabilising role)
emergedas the primary solution in the Washingtonneqotiations.
HoWeVerthis solution did not address the issue of the relative
weakneSsof the British econany which had been a principal cause of
the international monetary confusion prior to 1945. Nor did it
appreciate the newburdens i.uposed on the UKar ising oot of wartime
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debt and damage and the development of a significant maldistribution
in the structure of world production and in the world's demand and
supply for internationally traded carm:xiities.
This survey of the principal movements in the international
circuits of capital accumulation up until 1945 has demonstrated the
precarious domestic and international position of the British economy
inherited by the Attlee administration. The Lmmediate problems of
the forthooadng deficit in the external balance of payments and the
massive proportions of the sterling balances formed the British
state's primary economic rationale for negotiating an American credit.
HcMeVer the underlying trade and productive disequilibrium and the
state of international llOl'letarychaos were also under deep
consideration by both sides and, as will be shawn, were the real
issues facing the negotiators in their various attempts to
restructure British accumulation. Having laid bare the British
state's econOHdc rationale for approaching the United States the
remaiooer of this chapter will seek to uncover the political
rationale for this collaboration as it existed for both parties in
the negotiations.
II. The Political Rationale for Anglo-American Collaboration
Keynes and British Policy
The British state's position in August 1945 was largely
defined in terms of Keynes' IneIOOrancium'Overseas Financial Policy in
State III', referred to earlier, which had been one of the few
in~th atteapts at analysing econanic policy in the wake of the
defeat of Germany. Before reviewing the contents of this IneIOOrandwn
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it is worth considering the intellectual standpoint of Keynesin 1945
since as Clarke - postwar member of the Overseas Finance Division of
the Treasury - recorded on the day of Keynes' death on the 22ndApril
1946, throughout the war and early postwar years Keyneshad been the
"brains and the conscience" of the Treasury. 42/
Keynes' strong advocacy of econanic nultilateralism
espoused before, during and after the loan negotiations stands in
sharp relief to his interwar views on national self-sufficiency.
Arguing the benefits of a greater measure of national
self-sufficiency and econanic isolation between countries than that
which existed before 1914 (whenthe UK was the industrial, ccmnercial
and financial centre of the world econany) Keynesconcluded in 1933
that the econanic advantages of the international division of labour
lIllSt seriously be questioned.43/ His critique of maxirrum
international specialisation and the maxtmum geographical diffusion
of capital regardless of its seat of ownership, led Keynesto
synpathise with those who wouldminimise rather than maximise
econanic entanglement between nations. Bowever this advocacyof
gradually bringing the producer and the consumer within the anbit of
the samenational econanic and financial organisation, gave way, in
the wakeof the increasing chaos of international Daley capital in
the late 1930's and early 'forties, to a marked turnaround in Keynes'
perspective.44/
Belief in the efficiency and necessity of econanic
III1ltilateralism increasingly infoI1DedRaynes' thought and action fran
the early 1940's onwards. In contrast to national self-sufficiency
wherein bilateral nation to nation trade and lOOnetaryagreements
predaninate, lDlltilateralism is the 1DJde1of a system in which a
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nation balances its international accounts with a numberof different
nations.45/ Ideally multilateralism refers to a situation in which
nations wouldbe incorporated into one paymentssystem with all
currencies freely convertible thereby enabling surplus earned in
trade with one nation to be used to balance deficits with other
nations. The notion of currency convertibility is essential to the
concept of lIl1ltilateralism and is worth clarifying. CUrrency
convertibility refers to the ability of anyone to exchangedomestic
for foreign currency at sane agreed rate of exchangeon demand. In
the case of Britain, for instance, this wouldmeanallowing all
countries which have paymentsagreements with Britain (that is, are
in the samepaymentssystem as Britain if IOOrethan one system
oo-existed) to use the proceeds of their sales in Britain to buy
goods in other countries, or siItply exchange sterling assets for
foreign goods/assets (a situation contrary to that which existed in
the early 1940's whensterling was only convertible within the
Sterling Area and exchangeable for other currencies only after
British consultation). In addition to currency convertibility,
econanic nultilateralism also ioplies, on a miniImnndefinition, the
reduction of trade barriers and a non-discriminatory application of
those that remain. \milst in practice nultilateralism does not
require the absolute elimination of trade barriers, any obstacles
plaoed in the wayof foreign PlI'chases DUSttheoretically apply in
equal measure to all nations. Trade thereby ideally flows in
accordance with the market price mechanismencouraging the
international division of labour and specialisation according to the
principle of cooparative advantage.
'lbese principles represent the essence of the
III1ltilateralism ostensibly espoused and re-affirmed by all the
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participants in the loan negotiations. TheBritish state's support
for multilateralism as a long-term objective can be traced to Keynes'
advocacyof this position, expressed fran 1941onwards, and in
particular in his important March1945 llle!OOrandum.In that paper
Keynescounterposed three possible paths open to the British state.
Firstly arguing that this "is not a well chosen naoent for a
declaration of our financial independenceof North American46/,
Keynesexplored the iIIplications of such irdeperrlence and drew four
conclusions. Firstly such a movewould require a continuation of war
rationing and controls more stringent than at present for say three
to five years after the war. Secondly, national planning and
direction of foreign trade on the lines of the Russian modelwould
need to be instituted. Thirdly, such policies would result in a
serious retardation of Colonial developnent and Far Fastem
rehabilitation, and fourthly, in the long run would lead to a virtual
abaniormentof all overseas activities whether military or diplanatic.
Econanic isolationism wouldengender unacceptable levels of hostility
fran canada and the USand lead to serious political and social
disruption at haoo. This "Austerity" alternative of • starvation
corner" was counterposed to another equally unsatisfactory option,
that of "Tellptation". Altllooghpreferable to the former option, the
path of 'l'eIIptation would meanBritain accepting a very large American
loan perhaps of $8 billion on USterms with inmediate free
oonvertibilityof the sterling balances, major reduction in inperial
preference, full sterling convertibility and non-ciiscriminatory
trading even during the Bretton Woodsprovisiooal period. Keynes'
main objection to this option lay less in the problems of shouldering
the burden of such credit and turned Dm'eon the fact that Britain
would be surrendering control of econcmicpolicy to the dictates of
the USState Department.
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Rejecting these alternatives Keynesoutlined the "best path
both technically, politically and psychologicallyn under the rubric
of nJusticen• 'Ibis would involve a contribution of approximately $3
billion fran the USA- the "oost, of the war to the USAfor a
fortnight" - together with a dollar refurn to the UKfor purchases
Britain had madein the USbefore lend-lease became fully operative,
and the scaling down, funding and convertibility of parts of the
sterling balances whichwouldenable 'de facto convertibility' of
sterling within a year after the end of the war. It is important to
clarify this last feature to distinguish it fran what Keynesregarded
as the unacceptable notion of convertibility outlined in the path
labelled Terrptation. In the wakeof confusion on this point Keynes
later outlined in correspondencewith Lord Brand - Treasury
representative in washington 1944-46- that he was using a
"pickwickian, Bretton Woods sense" of the term which did not mean
"that the Sterling Area countries can take their balances awayfor
any p1Z'POSe whatever, e.g. to turn them inta gold or to set up a
dollar reserve of their awn in New York".47/ In essence under
conditions of 'de facto oonvertibility' Keynesassumedthat
"everything wouldproceed as at present except that there wouldbe no
pressure fran us on the rest of the Sterling Area to refrain fran any
pIrchase in the USwhich they considered themselves rich enough to
make, and equally no pressure ta buy preferentially in the Sterling
Area as OCJIPlI'ed with North America, except in gradnal liquidation of
their funded sterling debt" .48/ As far as this early llleIIOrandumis
concerned Keynes defined convertibility uOOer the Justice rubric as
relating exclusively to the Sterling Area nations - not to the use of
sterling by non-Sterling Area JDSl'berssuch as the South Americanam
western EUropean nations which was the real bone of contention in the
negotiations with the os. In this instance Keynes seemed to be
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referring to a state of non-discr~nation rather than currency
convertibility as the latter is normally understood.49/
By the 23rd July 1945, after lengthy Treasury meetings,
Keyneshad clarified his earlier confusion stating that if the US
were to offer the financial assistance proposed, Britain would
probably have to abandonthe idea of a transitional inconvertible
period and accept the full Bretton Woods obligations fran a fixed
date approximately one year after VJ day.50/ The overall emphasis of
Keynes' paper madeit clear that nno fair solution can be reached
without the participation of the Americans·.5l/ With such
participation he estimated Britain wouldbe able to face the econanic
future without serious anxiety.
In contrast to his interwar theorising Keyneswas now a
supremeadvocate of the restoration of I1lll.tilateral world trade.
UnderAnglo-Americanauspices encapsulating the healthy rules of
1lIltual advantage and equal treatment, I1lll.tilateralism was in "the
prime interest of our country", calculated to restore prosperity and
prestige and eliminate the hostile tendencies of bilateral barter,
discriminatory practice and econanic blocs. 52/ In short Keynes
regarded his proposals for collaboration with the USas the capstone
of the great constructive effort on which he had eubark.ed in the
early 1940's to create a worldwidemultilateral econcmdcsystem.53/
'Ibe British state's position was not synonYfOOUSwith the
one advocated by Keynesyet the latter was very influential and the
British state drew freely on his ideas, particularly in the official
statements erdorsing multi lateral ism which helped secure the American
line of credit during the loan negotiations. Yet despite Keynes'
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daninance at the Treasury and his persuasive influence over Dalton
(uneasily aware of the tutor-student relationship established at
cambridgenearly forty years before54/), to fully understand the
British state's official endorsement;of Keynes' Justice option (which
mutatis mutandis not only formed the basis of Britain's negotiating
position but clearly approximated the final agreem:mt) we need to
consider the historical precedents favouring the political decision
for initial econoadc collaboration with the United States.
Precedents for Postwar Anglo-AmericanEconanic
Collaboration
Three such precedents can be discerned occurring within a
four year period prior to the loan negotiations. Firstly the Charter
arising out of the Atlantic Conference begun on the 9th August 1941
betweenRoosevelt and Churchill presented a definition of
Anglo-Americanpostwar economicobjectives in which collaboration was
praninent. For instance Churchill added a fifth paragraph expressing
"the desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all
nations in the econanic field",SS/ whilst the infamous fourth clause,
although amended,originally proposed to "praoote nutually
advantageous econanic relations between (the USand the UK)...
through the elimination of any discrimination in either the USor the
UKagainst the iDlx>rtation of any product originating in the other
oountry".S6/ It is worth pointing out that the principal amendment
to the fourth clause was made at the insistence of Churchill who
safeguarded the Ottawa Agreementsregarding i.nperial trade preference
by inserting the saving clause 'with due respect for existing
obligations'. Despite welles' later disclaimer that "it was fully
understood ••• that this reservation was inserted solely to take care
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of ••• nerely temporary inpediments to the IOOrefar-reaching
~tment originally envisaged in that article",S7/ Churchill had
managedto extract fran Roosevelt the assurance that Britain was no
more ~tted to the abolition of ~ial preference than the
AJIericanqovernment;were cannitted to the total abolition of their
high protective tariffs. We need to be clear on this issue since it
remained a source of confusion for manyanalysts in the subsequent
discussions concerning trade discrimdnation raised by the
non-discrimdnation obligation of the washington Agreement.
Closely following this advocacy of equal access to trade
and international collaboration came the signing of the MutualAid
Agreeoont on the 23rd February 1942. In particular Article Seven,
whichwas signed as the British 'consideration' for the generosity of
Americanlend-lease policies, encouraged further discussioo on
collaborative postwar trade policy. In essence Article Sevenmade
provision for agreed action by the US and the UK"directed to the
expansion, by appropriate international and danestic measures, of
production, eaploymentam the exchange and consunption of goods •••
and ••• to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment
in international ccmnerce ••• and to the reduction of tariffs and
other trade barriers· .58/ These mutually interdependent obligations,
extracted largely as a quid pro quo for the provision of lend-lease,
were seen by The Times59/ as opening up the prospect of the two
governmentsworking together ·to praoote the prosperity for all
instead of calp!ting for selfish advantage·, evidently re-affirming
the favourable political climate for collaborative postwar
reconstruction. As with the Atlantic Charter it DUStbe realised
that the terms of the draft did not state directly that
non-discriminatory trade policies would be adopted but ooly that
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'agreed action' towards this end shoo.ld be an Anglo-American
objective. By linking trade liberalisation to the expansion of
employuentand drawing a parallel between the reduction of UK trade
discrimination and substantial us trade barrier reductions Article
Seven became a particularly significant reference point in the
subsequent Americanloan discussions.
The final developDentworth pointing to in this context was
the conpranise of the KeynesaOO White plans (two blue-prints of a
mechanismfor international IOOnetaryco-operation) presented in April
1944 as the Joint Statement by Experts on the Establishment of an
International ~etary Fun:l, the key provisions of which were
entxxiied in the Articles of Agreementof the IMF adopted at Bretton
Woods in July 1944. '!his financial developnent was linked to
proposals for an International Bank for Reconstruction arrl
Developnent, whoseplan had been published in Noveai:>er 1943, whilst
in early 1945 Board of Trade representatives fran wndon aM
washington began a series of carmercial poliey negotiations
culminating in the publication of the IProposals for Consideration by
an International Conference on Trade am EnploymentI .60/ These
negotiations reflected a significant measure of agreement between the
US am the UK on issues initially raised in the tolltual Aid
Agreements, such as linking the reduction of trade barriers to the
maintenance of full enployment, and provided an iDportant framework
for both the washington Agreementand the subsequent Havana
International Trade Charter. Alt.hOlgh there are manydifficulties in
assessing the true value of the Bretton Woods agreements there is
little cblbt that these political manoeuvrings created a postwar
envirorment conducive to a collaborative solution to Britain IS
i.nmediatepostwar econaaic problems.
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TheBritish state's political rationale for seeking
Americanassistance in the early postwar transitional period was thus
clearly defined. Whilst it is inaccurate to assumethat the state's
position was synonymouswith the views of Keynes,whodominating the
Treasury wished for a restructuring of British capital along
Atlanticist multilateral lines, there were manyhistorical precedents
favouring Anglo-Americaneconanic collaboration. Indeed prior to the
disclosure of the obligations involved in the WashingtonAgreement,
which sparked off a waveof resistance to collaborative
multilateralism, it is difficult to find any ~rtant representative
of the British state (with the notable exception of R. Clarke in the
Treasury) or the econany without at least a theoretical cannitlOOnto
nultilateralism. Thus, whilst it maynot be surprising that The
Bankersawonly one road open to mercantile Britain 'to fully
co-operate with the United States', and Olarles Lidbury - President
of the Institute of Bankers and Chief General Managerof Westminster
Bank - with few provisos acclainei the benefits of "genuine
nultilateralism" on the Americanscal.e,61/ it is interesting to note
that Clive Baillieu - postwar President of the Federation of British
Industries - agreed that a "nW.tilateral world econanic systemwill
be as nuch in Britain's interest as in that of any Daninion",62/ once
Britain had adjusted to the change in status fran a creditor to a
debtor nation. Official TabourParty policy carried a similar
conviction. Both Dalton and cripps announced in cabinet meetings
that the labour Party was ocmni tted to makinga sincere atteapt to
secure co-operation with other countries t.aBrds a nultilateral
system of world trade.63/ Similarly Attlee looked towards nutually
"advantageoussolutions" conducted on "lII1ltilateral non-discriminate
baseS" for the establislDent of a world trading and I1aletary
systen.64/ But it is important to be clear on this point. Whilst
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the belief in the value of Itllltilateralism appeared universal this is
not to argue that the British state capitulated to Americanhegemony,
as for instance argued by Brett. 65/
Keynes' position mayindeed have been that British capital
should be restructured along IIUl.tilaterlist <largely American)lines.
Yet the historical precedents cited above and the general theoretical
support for Itllltilateralism expressed not a capitulation to American
hegenonybut siIrply a view that, given an environment conducive to
Anglo-Americaneconomiccollaboration, the first step towards
negotiating a solution of Britain's economicproblems lay in joint
us/UK washingtondiscussions. In fact the de jure nultilateral
~tments on the part of the British state belied an application of
de facto neo-bilateral alternatives, as I will later denalstrate, a
contradiction the British state was adept at concealing behind the
argwoent that the Sterling Area was in any case the world's largest
multilateral system.
British policy prior to the negotiations amountedto little
IOOrethan the belief that DUltilateralism was ultimately beneficial
to the UKprovided Britain was not asked to 'nultilateralise
unilaterally' before the end of the Bretton Woods transitional phase.
To understand howthe Americanparticipants in the loan negotiations
atteapted to force Britain into such a position am r~ali9n the UK
accwmlation strategy in accordance with the wishes of the USState
Department, it is necessary to end this review of the road towards
the WashingtonAqreementswith an analysis of us foreign econanic
policy objectives as they stood in the winter of 1945.
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us Foreign EoonORdcPolicy in 1945
It is easy to assume that, following the implementation of
fordist accumulation strategies after 1914which had given us capital
an incomparable canpetitive position in the world economy, a direct
line can be drawn in US foreign econanic policy fromWilsonian
internationalism to Truman's assertions of Atlantic universalism.
Such a view conceals the important foreign policy conflict
experienced particularly, though not exclusively, under the Roosevelt
Administration. In the latter's tenn of office this conflict was
significant enough to manifest itself in terms of a struggle between
the Treasury and State Departments. Whilst the State Department
staffed by Cordell Hull, Dean Acheson and William Clayton advocated
the notion of a massive us export surplus to stLmulate the domestic
economy in the context of world IIIlltilateralism, the Treasury led by
Henry!t>rgenthau and Barry Dexter White favoured not only an
extension of the danestic policies of the New Deal but also an
international application of New Deal policies in the context of a
world system of national capi tal isms pursuing full eaployment and the
creation of international institutions funneling capital into
underdeveloped areas prcmx.ing international roonetary stability.66/
The eventual defeat of the Treasury view was partially a result of
the disorganisation of the Americanworking classes who stood to gain
significanUy fran the Treasury progranmebut whose lack of support
allCMedTruman to gain power upon Roosevelt's death in April 1945.
SUbsequentTreasury re-shuffles with Ik>rgenthaureplaced by Fred
Vinson - a conservative Southern DeIoocratwith State Department views
on international econauics - further diminished White's influence.
Yet the nauentary dcmi.nanceof the Treasury in the early 1940's left
its mark in the provisions of the Bretton Woods agreements. Unless
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recognition is given to the configuration of interests represented by
the Treasury at this point in us policy development, it is difficult
to understand howthe idea of the international IOOnetarysystem
devised at Bretton Woodswas fomulated, since its articles clashed
strongly with certain aspects of us State Departmentpolicy which
regained ascendency in the period prior to the loan negotiations.
The articles of agreement signed at Bretton Woods derived
fromWhite's earlier notions of an International Stabilisation Fund
and International Bank. Following varioos canpranises (involving
consultation with Keynesand others) negotiations were signed for the
creation of the International !bletary Fund and International Bank
both interxied to facilitate the expansion of international trade am
contribute to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of
enploymentand real incare. The forty-four nations party to the
agreementwouldbe allowed to maintain restrictions on current
transactions for a five year postwar transition period after which
extensions to the continuing use of restrictions wouldbe granted
after consultation67/ (the Fund howeverhad no real powers to
guarantee that any nation would lift restrictions after the five year
period even if consultation had not been entered into at this stage).
In addition to measures designed to provide stable and orderly
exchangerates <currencymaintenance at a constant exchange rate
relative to other l'QeIlt)ers'currencies 1 avoidance of CCIlP!titi ve
exchangerate depreciation1 exchange rate changes of over 10' only
after consultation) the Fund woold have resources of 8.8 billion
dollars in gold and national currencies on which nations could draw
to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments. Nations
running chronic surpluses could DDreover have their currencies
declared scarce and be subject to trade discrimination by other
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member countries. It is certainly the case that technical problems
doggedmanyof the proposals. For instance the 'Scarce currency
clause' proposed that a currency could only become scarce after
countries had exercised their full drawing rights under the Fund and
used their 'quotas' to purchase the currency in question from the
Fund in exchange for their own currencies. ~er, limitations on
the extent and speed of withdrawal plus increasingly high rates of
interest levelled on nations frequently using their drawing rights
and the ability of the E'llOO to borrowmore of the currency in
question, resulted in the emaciation of the clause with dollars for
instance remaining in good supply within the Fund whilst being
extremely scarce in reality in the imnediate postwar years.G81
Nevertheless the key point to note is that the Bretton Woods
agreements bear the mark of the USTreasury Departmentunder
Roosevelt and were viewedwith growing dissatisfaction by IIleIItIersof
the State Department.
In this sense it is inaccurate to portray the 'Bretton
WOOdssystem' as providing Americancapital with the optimal
structure for the integration of the international circuits of
capital. Although the agreements in theory made possible exchange
stabilisation, slowly broadening into a basis for currency
convertibility and a nultilateral trade and payments system, in the
State Departmentview (which daninated USforeign econanic policy
fran April 1945 onwards) the articles allowing such a long delay in
rEIIkWingcontrols wwld be disastroos for the creation of US style
IlIlltilateralism, a central tenet of which was to maintain a 1009-
running USexport surplus.
In its return to dcm:inancein USforeign econanic policy
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makingthe State Departmentenshrined the fomer aims of US
internationalist policy based on two fundamentals. Firstly maxiaum
production in the US and secondly maxiIrum trade throughout the world,
together with advocacyof the Most FavouredNation Clause under which
no state can give a preference of any kind to a near neighbour or
kindred state without conceding the same advantage to all other
states. As Kipping, the postwar Director General of the Federation
of British Industries, perceived, the USAin taking this attitude
were doing no more than advocating a principle which the British
applied with great tenacity in the nineteenth century.69/ A USstyle
multilateralist world economy would eliminate political interference
whilst upholding the laws of the market, allowing trade and capital
to flow freely across national boundaries creating the markets and
the investment opportUnities necessary for a massive international
expansion of UScapital ensuring a large export surplus and
increasing USbank and industrial grCftlth. This overall objective,
a~ng firstly at the integration of Western European circuits of
capital, and secondly at the integration of the former into a US
daninated world econanic structure (excluding of course the Soviet
Unionand the Fast &.1ropean nations) had specif ic policy inplications
for the united Kingdan.
Focusing on Britain as the lynchpin of its strategy
(perhaps foolishly, given the inportance of France and Germany to
the reconstruction of Western Europe) the USState Department
besieged the UKon two fronts. Firstly, realising that the
conditional form of the !bat Favoured Nation ClaUSewas a rather
ineffective practical basis for the policy of non-1tiscrimination in
trade, the State Department sought a DIlChmre extensive and rigid
application of non-discrimination. Specifically they swght the
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elimination of the British Imperial Preference system formalised at
Ottawa in 1932 and the abolition of the so-called discriminatory
aspects of the Sterling Area dollar pooling m:!Chanism. 'Ibe workings
of both these systems will be detailed in the following chapter which
will also consider the validity of the us objections lodged against
the systems. It suffices at present sinply to point out the
significance of this issue for USforeign economicpolicy prior to
the washingtonAgreem:mts.
Contrary to the solutions proposed at Bretton Woods, the
revised USeconanic policy aimed at the inmediate abolition of
exchange controls. In correspondence with the British Treasury,
WilliamClayton - Assistant Secretary of State for EoonanicAffairs -
stated in June 1945, lillie believe that exchange controls on current
transactions hCMevernecessary in wartime are restrictive of free
ccmpetition on the basis of ccmnercial values and therefore
restrictive of free enterprise ••• lIIe want them ended as soon as
practicable. '!be State Department is supporting measures which will
aid in ending this unhappy situation".70/
The second front taken by the Americansaiming to end this
.unhappy situation· focused on lifting the major obstacle to
increased world trade (as they saw it), the inconvertibility of
sterling and the wartime eclipse of IDlXIon as the world's major
financial centre. Not only did sterling have access to an
institutional structure through which international transactions
could flow but USpolicy makers were acutely aware of the dollar
shortage whichwould occur in the illmediate postwar world aoo
realised that trade within &lrope and between &lrope and the Sterling
Area could only proceed IIIl1.tilaterally in the sbort-term if sterling
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was madeconvertible.7l1 The alternative was intra-European trade
based on a system of bilateral agreements. The restricted nature of
bilateral trading wouldadversely effect the freest possible flow of
factors promoting efficiency and integration and as such constitute a
serious obstacle to America's global strategy. '!be inpJrtance of
sterling was all the greater given the continuing reluctance of New
Yorkbankers and the institutional inappropriateness ot its banking
system, to promote the dollar and New Yorkas the major world
financial centre. Yet here again the Bretton Woods agreeaent on a
lengthy five year transitional phase threatened to scupper America's
global integrative strategy.
To urrlerstand the developnent of us econanic policy in the
wakeof these difficulties it is inportant to be aware that the State
Departmentcircumvented the obstacles to their plans inherent in the
Bretton Woods agreements by re-casting their international ronetary
policy in the light of the so-called KeyCurrency proposals.
Nevertheless it is inaccurate to claim - as does Block721- that the
Americanssi.q;>lyforgot that Bretton Woods had ever occurred and
instead pursued wholeheartelly the KeyCurrency proposals. Rather,
the KeyCurrency proposals substantially informed us policy
throughout the washington Agreementand Marshall Aid phase, whilst
particular aspects of Bretton Woods were invoked (particularly the
notion of international trade agreements) to bolster, at least on an
ideological level, the new us international policy stance.
'!'heKeyCurrency approach - enthUSiastically pramlgated by
John Williams (Vice President of the New ~ork Pederal Reserve Bank),
IBon Fraser (President of the First National Bank: of New York) and
WinthropAldrich (Olairmanof the Board of the Chase National Bank),
90
whotermed the proposal the key nation approach73/ - identified three
aspects necessary for postwar international monetary order. Firstly
bilateral stabilisation agreements between the key currencies,
sterling and the dollar, since these currencies, it was argued, are
the principal media facilitating international trade and are the only
ones predominantly used for making international payments. Secondly
non-keycurrency rates mist; be permitted to fluctuate and eventually
be stabilised in relation to the values of the key currencies.
Thirdly, and most significantly, substantial credits should be made
available to the UKto aid the stabilisation of sterling as the
initial step towards restoring general currency stability. The
objective of the KeyCUrrencyapproach therefore lay in the
establishment of an international system wherein only key currencies
were generally convertible and only a limited aroountof international
co-operation in ID.JIletaryaffairs was necessary. Bretton Woods failed
(in Williams' eyes) to recognise the ~rtance of key currencies in
international trade, and therefore, in opposition to the IMF
proposals, any extension of credits made by the USshould only be
negotiated on a bilateral basis not centrally through an
international organisation.
Essentially these proposals represented the New York
bankers solution to the situation of postwar monetary chaos. The
solution wooldatteopt to restore the financial and CCJIIDercial
prowess of wmon co-operating with New York in the joint management
of the international IOOlletary system whilst the US loan ($5 billion
suggested by Fraser in 1943, $3 billion by Aldrich in 194474/), in
underwriting the international use of sterling, wcul.dact as a
financial lever on Britain forcing the pursuit of USstyle
uultilateral trade policies. Nevertheless the ¥.ayCUrrencyproposals
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in their pure form inplicitly carried a threat of creating currency
blocs with their disregard for generalised international economic
collaboration. Tbguard against this threat the State Department
allied the principal aspects of the proposals to the moreeclectic
principles of Bretton WOOds resulting in a campcomisewhichdepended
in reality on close Anglo-Americancollaboration in line with the Key
Currencyproposals but which also allowed the USto endorse on an
ideological level the generalities espoused at Bretton Woods
concerning genuine international co-operation.
By the winter of 1945 the State Departmenthad galvanised a
series of dynamicUSforeign eco~c policies to serve as the basis
for the Americanposition in the Washingtonloan negotiations. It is
not the case that at this point the United States stmply sought
-drastic liberalisation of the world market-.75/ InfoDmedby the Ray
Currencyproposals the United States principally sought
Anglo-Americanreconstruction of the international monetary system
through policies aimed at restoring sterling convertibility and the
elimination of discriminatory practices whichwoold enable an
integrated nultilateral Western Fm"opean trade and paymentssystem to
flourish in the overall context of a Dllltilateral world econanic
structure daninated by UScapital with its superior fordist
accuuulation techniques. At this stage USpolicy focused on EUropean
market integration led by Britain and not upon rapid 1tmericantrade
liberalisation since strong protectionist interests still prevailed
within the USCongress. Financial leverage, in the form of
substantial tied loans to the UKon the basis of the ley CUrrency
proposals, rather than an assurance of major UStariff cuts thus
infOI'llBithe nultilateral strategies of USforeign econani.cpolicy
prior to the Washingtondiscussions.
92
Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned to highlight the nature and
complexity of the issues involved in the reconstruction of British
capital accumulation as they developed in the early postwar world on
the road to the Washington negotiations. Beginning from the
observation that capitalist development must be viewed in terms of
both political and econanic contingencies, whilst acknowledging that
economic policies confront and llUSt partially resolve contradictions
generated by the uneven reproduction of capital aCCUlllllation,it has
laid bare the two roost inmediate econanic problems confronting the
British state's strategy of capitalist reconstruction - the massive
def icit in the external balance of payments expected to develop in
the first three or so transitional years, and the massive proportions
of the sterling balances and other liabilities accumulated since 1939.
In this way the study has clarified the British state's econanic
rationale for seeking temporary financial help fram the United States.
It has also highlighted the coooitions of the maldistribution in the
structure of world production and in the world's demand and supply
for essentially internationally traded commodities which left the
united States in such a superior postwar position that Balogh
assessed the disequilibrium as one wfor which there is no parallel,
at any rate since the days of the Raman Empirew.76/
The political context within which the early British
postwar state sought to develop the optimal accunul.ation strategy
for British capital also receiVed attention. A review of the
poli tical context demonstrated that the existence of strOD,;J
historical precedents favouring AnglO-American economic collaboration
plus a generalised British belief in the value of nultilateralism
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created an environment conducive to joint US/UK discussions as an
initial step towards negotiating a solution of Britain's immediate
postwar economic problens. 'l'nerise to dominance of the US State
Department (and the alIOOst total eclipse of the Treasury Departnmt
which had been ascendent and instrumental in laying down many of the
articles contained in the Bretton Woods agreements) illustrated the
convoluted process through which multilateral integrative strategies
became the basis of the AlIerican position prior to the toen
negotiations. Tb gain a deeper understanding of the British state's
accumulation strategy requires a close consideration of the
Washington Agreement itself and a detailed study of British reaction
to the loan obligations which was by no means as uniform or
concessionary as the formal structure of the docwnent would illi>ly.
Such a consideration constitutes the central theme of the following
chapter.
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CBAPl'ER THREE
TheWashingtonnegotiations are a central focus of the
'capitulation thesis' view of postwar British developnent. The
British state, according to this view,embraoedthe tenets of
multilateralism outlined in the agreement and established a strategy
of accumulation based on accepting a subordinate position in an
Amer ican imposedliberal internationalist alliance.
This chapter directly challenges that interpretation. By
situating the Americanloan within the wider context of the state's
international trade and payments arrangements it becanes clear that a
dual accunulation strategy emergedunder Dalton consisting of a de
jure carmitment to multilateralism tE!llp!I'edby a de facto carmitment
to neo-bilateralism. This cari:>ination thwarted the asceOOantUS
policy ideals and provided a successful environment for the expansion
of British capital in those postwar years characterised by the
'dollar shortage'.
I. The Negotiation of the loan
Alternatives to the !Dan
The previous chapter showedthat the British request for
aid was based fundamentally (although not exclusively) on the
econanic constraints facing post-war reconstruction. D. Eccles -
JIItIIIber for Chippenham- slJanedup Parliamentary feeling by asking
-if we do not get a credit fran Americawhere are the goods caning
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fran to fill the gap? It is no use saying that the goods can core
fran the Sterling Areai they are simply not there" .1/
Dalton agreed. '!he rejection of these arguments meant not
only "an econcmicand financial disaster for this country ••• (but
also) ••• a disaster for the whole future of international
co-operation" •2/ Whilst subsequent analysts have drawn on Dalton's
account and suggested that "there seemedno alternative but to seek a
loan from the United States" ,3/ we should recognise that at the tiIoo
there was no such bankruptcy of statesmanship and a variety of
alternatives were voiced fran manysources.
The principal source of Parliamentary opposition camenot
fran Churchill, whoregarded any bilateral alternative as "utterly
fatal " involving a "prolonged rough and tUJrille ••• in the econanic
and financial sphere between the us and the British Ccmoonwealthof
nations and the Sterling Area ••• (of which) ••• I amsure we should
get the worst", 4/ but fran his Party colleagues Boothbyand 1irery.5/
This latter pair expended 1Ik)Stenergy in criticising the conditions
of the loan rather than offering any serious bilateral alternatives.
Boothbyagreed with Henderson6/ that the convertibility obligation
would rerove all incentive for other countries to buy fran Britain
since they could obtain goods Rm'e readily fran the USA. He saw the
proposals as a re-instatement of nineteenth century laissez faire
capitalism designed to prise open the markets of the world for the
benefit of the United States with extrao~inarily little for Britain
in return. But in describing Labour~s "economicMunich"in which
Attlee was to "sell the British &lpire for a packet of cigarettes", 7/
Boothby could offer only a weakly stated alternative of "the Sterling
Area bloc, based upon the British &lpire, and fortified by the
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countries of Western &lropen. Similarly, while 'Plreryderided the
agreement as a return to the econoadcs of Cobdenand Bright, a single
gold standard and the Most FavouredNation Clause, his only
alternative (and that of his group the Empire Industries Association)
was the abolition of the MFN clause substituted by straightforward
agreements with foreign nations and the development of Imperial
Preference as a definite policy of mutual trade stUmulation.8/
Neither of these loosely stated options offered a solution to the
immediateproblems of the transition period. With Americaholding a
virtual monopolyof the most important supplies the attractiveness of
the dollar rendered any alternative based solely on the Sterling Area
as likely to be unworkableand highly unpopular, not least moong
other Sterling Area IlleI.'lbers.
The most seriously argu~d alternatlve accumulation strategy prior to
British and Americanratification of the Washingtondocuments derived
fran Richard Clarke - postwar IIIIe!Ili)er of the Overseas Finance division
of the Treasury - in his two papers 'Financial Policy in Stage III'
circulatEd to the cabinet in June 1945, and 'What Happensif we do
not get the USLoan' written on the 12th February 1946.9/
The siIlplest plan proposed by Clarke and consolidated by
Fady - Joint Second Secretary of the Treasury - was an abaDdanmentof
KeyneS' 'Grand Design' policies of several years' Daley, sterling
balances, convertibility and non-discrimination, and their
repl.aoementby 'Plan 2'. 'Ibis was a progranmebased on the creation
of as big a III1ltilateral group as possible (Sterling Area, French,
Belgian, Dutch areas and Scandanavia) to trade freely aDalgst
themSelves (about 75' of pre-war world tradelO/) and to pool alXi
allocate their dollars. Allied to this "Wld be an atteapt to borrow
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what dollar credits were available fran the USAthrough the Export-
Import Bank or by pledging investments. If both could be achieved
Clarke assumedthat Britain could proceed to 1948 with only the
following domestic and international costs incurred. Firstly the
reduction in food inp:>rts experienced throughout the war, falling
fran an average of 22,026 thousand tons inported in 1938 to 11,032
thousand tons inp:>rted in 1944,11/ wouldcontinue with retarded
recovery in consumptionprincipally because the US was a significant
supplier. Secondly, Plan 2 wouldhanper reconversion of industry
because of the need to cut rawmaterials and machinery suWlies
together with the retention of basic petrol rationing. '!be severity
of further cuts in for exanple tobacco, film, and cotton supplies
wouldultimately depend on the extent to whichBritain could borrCM
fran the USA. Ckl the international front manySterling Area nations
wouldalso go short of USgoods, with particularly serious
consequencesfor the Colonies, and especially Canada, who could well
be obliged to lend Britain dollars in order to sell her goods and
wouldhave to strictly limit her iuplrts fran the USA. Finally, as
Keynes was wont to point out,12/ the loss of the USloan woold
severly debilitate Britain's military and political experditure
overseas involving the wittnrawal of forces in the MiddleEast and
Ir¥iia and the termination of British finance to EUropean relief and
reconstruction schemeswith the erxling of suWlies to Germany. In
spite of the drastic political effects of alJoost total withdrawal of
British overseas camdtments and the serious econanic effects
entailed in the loss of US markets for both the UK and the Sterling
Area Clarke nevertheless put Plan 2 forward as a viable option
maintaining -we could scraable through saDehow" .13/
Clarke's internal Treasury IDE!IOOranda, and to a lesser
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degree someof the more publicly expressed criticism of the
agreem:mts, increasingly influenced the British state's negotiation,
conduct, and appraisal of the Washingtondocuments (particularly
after Keynes' death in April 1946). Yet these bilateralist
strategies could not overcomethe principal objection that bringing
more nations into the Sterling Area that were themselves in deficit
woulddo nothing to help the UK cover its own deficit.14/ As Keynes
had sardonically observed, "fran which countries can we expect to
borrowwhat we have failed to obtain fran the United States? •.• the
alternative is to build up a separate econanic bloc which excludes
Canada and consists of countries to whichwe already owe more than we
can pay, on the basis of their agreeing to lam us lOOneythey have
not got and buy fran us and fran one another goods we are unable to
supply".15/ In such COIXiitions"asPimlott notes, austerity would
have been blamedon 'socialism', whilst the lack of dollars would
seriously have curtailed the Government's socialist progranme.16/
Both eoonani.cally and politically the Labour governmentrequired a
successful outcane to the loan negotiations, with success judged less
in terns of attendant obligations and Jlk)rein respect of substantial
dollar credit. In this sense the British state's negotiations were
successful, in spite of the fact that Britain's econanic policy
appara.tus had changed little fran its wartime structure.
'!he cabinet and Eca1anic PoliCY-Making
Between the outbreak and the am of the war the central
machinery for econanic policy underwent three principal changes (fran
the Treasury period of Septeaber 1939 to May1940, to the period of
caanittees fran Mayto Decemer 1940, culminating in the period of
the IDrd President's camu.ttee fran January 1941 to August 1945),
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effectively fragmenting the ~c policy-making process.171 with
the doadnanceof the Lord President's Committee structure the
Treasury found itself uncustanarily "under a political shadowwhich
not only diminished its standard privilege and authority but
disqualified it from access to the newcentres of deliberation".181
This warti.Ioostructure elevated the control of the labour markets
above both finance and production so that, as Middlemasrecalls,
Bevin stood nwhereno cabinet minister had previously done, rival to
the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself".191
Themain characteristics of the organisation of central
goverrunentunder the Lord President's Ccmnittee stage can be
sunmarised as involving firstly, a reliance on interdepartmental
co-operation, secondly, a central focus on the allocation of scarce
resources (particularly manpc7flleI'and materials, with financial
decisions largely of secondary iaportance), and thirdly, in line with
point two, the demise of the Treasury and the rise of an external
adRdnistrative machinery responsible for eoonoodc co-ordination.
Both Dow and Chester201 are at pains to eIIPlasise that this system
was retained by the incani.ng Labour government with Dalton becaning
Chancellor, r-t>rrison taking up a position as IDrd President of the
Council with overall responsibility for econanic co-ordination and
cripps becaning President of the Board of Trade. A division of
responsibility for econanic policy thus existed with financial and
budgetary policy the de jure responsibility of the &m:>ted Treasury -
with both the Econanic Section and the Central Statistical Office
hoUSed outside the Treasury in the Cabinet Office - and direct
planning largely outside Treasury responsibility. This fragmentary
system was further oalPlicated by the fact that, in addition to his
role as eoonanic co-ordinator, It)rrison had other onerous tasks as
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Leader of the Houseof Carmons,chairman of the Future Legislation
Ccmnittee, and chairman of the cannittee on the Socialisation of
Industries. '1llelack of a central planning departm:mt, a chief
planning officer or an econanic general staff (all introduced under
CrippsI Chancellorship) was only plblicly acknowledgedduring the
crises of 1947, yet privately experienced by those concerned with
overseas negotiations and balance of payments control throughout
Dalton's Chancellorship. Thus, as cabinet ll'IeRk:)randa disclose, with
regard to overseas negotiations "no organisation [exists] capable of
handling this task".21/ Proposals for a ~ttee consisting of
representatives of the Treasury, Board of Trade, Foreign Office,
CorIIronwealthRelations Office, MiniStry of Food, Bank of Englandand
the Econcmi.cSection of the Cabinet Office to make good this
def iciency, appeared only long after the loan agreement had been
ratified. Similarly, later proposals for a Steering carmittee to
advise ministers on balance of payments issues indicate a significant
gap in the early postwar state machinery belying Morrison's "happy
and confident" remarks about the efficiency of econanic
administration as it existed fran Dalton's installation as Chancellor
in August 1945.22/
The cabinet lacked control over the econanic policy
apparatus throughout Dalton's Chancellorship. Robinson for instance
now recalls "hCMfs aIOOng all the manywere doing the thinking as
distinct from uncritically administering policies handed down to
thEm" .23/ As noted earlier, the calplexities of negotiating a
settlement which concerned Britain's internatiooal payments system
meant that the task fell largely to civil servants and expert
advisers. In the case of the Washington discussions, Keynes am
Halifax al..IoostSingle-handedly conducted negotiations and decided
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terms. Cabinet merrbersplayed little part in the proceedings and
when pressed on aspects of the agreement showedlittle understanding
of its complexity.
Thus Robbins - assigned as intermediary between the london
ministerial term (Dalton, Bevin, cripps, !ok>rrison,Attlee) and Keynes
and Halifax in washington - recalls the problems of negotiating on
two fronts simultaneously "with the Americans for terms which were
not doctrinaire and exacting, and with the cabinet for a descent fran
cloud cuckoo land and an understanding of the realities of the
situation and the choices which they had to make".24/ Jay - Attlee's
Personal Assistant - commentingon Keynes' proclivity for sending a
plethora of witty telegrams, notes that "on one occasion quoting fran
one of them Dalton said perenptorily to Bevin: 'Foreign Secretary,
have yoo got the telegram?' 'I've got 'undreds', replied Bevin, and
Bridges trotted round the table to reshuffle the cards for him".25/
In mid-Noveaber1945 Dalton was still secure in the belief that
non-discrimination and convertibility would not begin to operate
until after the transition period of several years duration despite
Keynes' clear statements dating fran July 1945 that Britain would
have to abandon this transitional period and accept both obligations
fran a fixed date of one year after VJ Day.26/
'!he Financial Agreement27/ signed between the US and the UK
together with a final settlement of lend-lease, proposals for an
International Trade Organisation, and the iDplementation of the
Bretton Woods Agreements for the setting up of an International
Monetary Fund and an International Bank for Reconstruction and
Developnent, constituted in Raynes' view a deal which in the "light
of all factors ••• is the best that could be achieved" .28/ The
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details of the Financial Agreem:mtDUst nowbe analysed.
II. Assessing the Agreenent
Details of the Loan
Firstly a line of credit was made available to the UK
governmentof $3,75Om.,plus $65Om., in final settlement of
lend-lease (canada subsequently granted a credit of $1159m.US
dollars on similar lines producing a total of $4,909m., - excluding
the lend-lease settlement - for Britain's temporary financial
easement).28/ The provision for a line of credit rather than a loan
meant that the funds would only be advanced as required, thus
securing the interests of the USif British reconstruction were to
proceed faster than estimated. Article Six of the agreement
similarly assured the interests of the Us by providing that the
credit could not be drawn on to discharge the present obligations of
the UKor allow the UKto borrow fran other Ccma:.lnwealthgovernments
before 1951 on terns lDX'efavourable to the lender than those offered
in this agreement. It was also eaphasised that in line with
its predecessors, the Atlantic Charter and the !lltual Aid Agreements,
the purpose of the line of credit was to assist the UKgovernment to
-assUDethe obligations of l1lll.tilateral trade- (Article 'lbree), if
not inmediately then no later than within one year of the agreement.
The line of credit was r1Oo1 open to be drawn upon unti 1
DecE!IIber 1951with no payment either of interest or principal to be
made for five years and thereafter the interest at 2t (but allowing
for the time delay effectively only 1.62t), with installments of
approximately £35 million to be repaid annually aver a fifty year
103
period. The interest was to be excused if in any year UKvisible and
net invisible incare fell below£866m.- the average for the years
1936-38.
It is worth noting that the amountoffered in the line of
credit closely approximatedboth the estimated transitional deficit
figure put forward by Keynesin Washingtonand Keynes' prior
assessnent of the aRDuntnecessary to aeet the Justice path of
reconstruction. In all this Dalton records, "the Americanswere very
generous".30/ Yet by far the nost significant aspect of the
agreeRSlt concernedthe four financial and ~cial obligations,
which in the view of the Economist31/were to prematurely relaunch
the British econanyinto the icy seas of Rllltilateralism.
The first such obligation (Article Seven) tied Britain to
dissolving the Sterling Area dollar pool within one year, thereby
allowing sterling receipts for the Sterling Area countries to be
oonvertible in any currency without discrimination. In Americaneyes
this obligation was significant inasmuchas they perceived the dollar
pool to seriously discriminate against USexports, since the Sterling
Area countries had agreed to deposit their earnings in ~ndon and
complywith Sterling Area regulations before spending these earnings
on USgoods. This obligation, fran the Americanperspective, would
cut British control of the dollar earnings of the sterling countries,
and lead, it was hoped, to the dissolution of the Sterling Area.
The main strictly c::amercial provision of the agreements
obliged Britain to administer quantitative inport restrictions
(Article Nine) in such a manneras not to discriminate against US
inp:>rts. This non-discrimination clause, also to be effective within
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one year, disciplined the UKto restrict importation of foreign goods
along the lines of the already mentioned Most Favoured Nation Clause
thereby applying an import limitation on the basis of equality to all
nations. The ~lications of this second obligation appeared IOOre
onerous for the British state than those concerning the dissolution
of the Sterling Area dollar pool. The non-discrimination clause
sought to prevent the goverrunentfran switching overseas sources of
supply awayfrom the US, placing the UKin a difficult trade position
since it wouldhave to cut downnot only on purchases from America,
whosecurrency it did not possess, but also from other nations whose
currencies it did possess. In this wayBritish imports would be
determined not by the overall balance of paymentswith the world at
large but by the so called 'dollar gap'32/ (the discrepancy between
Sterling Area exports to and i.qx>rts from the US) hanpering trade
diversification.
The third proposal in the agreem:mt (Article Ten) concerned
the freeing of the blocked sterling balances - accumulated British
war debts owed principally to the Sterling Area nations but also to
non-sterling meat>erssuch as Argentina.32/ It announced the
intention of the Attlee government to reduce these balances either by
releasing installments for imnediate convertibility, releasing
similar installments over a nUll'berof years beginning in 1951, and
negotiating the adjustment of the balances as part of the Sterling
Area contribution to the Allied war effort. For the USAit was
i.Dp:>rtantto have paymentsmadeon the blocked balances free for
makingpurchases in the US, whilst fran a British point of view these
arrangements were satisfactory in that they closely followed Keynes'
original suggestions made in his 1945 govermnent IllE!lh:)randwn.
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The final and nost controversial IlIlltilateral obligation
(Article Eight) stipulated the general convertibility of sterling
within one year of the agreement. This obligation stressed, with
potentially serious repercussions, that within one year of the
effective agreementneither governmentwould imposeany restriction
on paymentsand transfers for current transactions with any other
country. The signif icance of this provision was that it extended
convertibility to the nations of Western Europe and South America
whilst obliging Britain to ignore the five-year transition period for
general convertibility stated in the articles of agreement of the IMF.
Thus fran the effective date of the agreement any nation could call
upon the UKto supply it with dollars to an aItDUntrepresented by its
favourable balance of paymentswith Britain. Agreementon this
principal was clearly seen by the USas achieving a major goal of
Americaneco~c policy,34/ and despite British resistence it was a
condition that had been expected by Keynes as early as July 1945.
In addition to these obligations Britain undertook to
ratify the Bretton Woods agreements, canni. tments largely
coopleneltary to those undertaken in the Anglo-AmericanFinancial
Agreement,35/and to support the Americanproposal for an
International Trade Organisation, a proposal based on the USwish to
reduce iIrperial preference and eliminate trade discrimination. This
latter proposal was seen as an essential prerequisite for the
deve!op1Ielltof USinternational econanic policy given the views held
in the State Department, as expressed privately to Will Clayton,
Assistant Secretary of State for EconanicAffairs, that "if yoo
succeed in doing awaywith the Blpire preference and opening up the
~ire to United States ocmnerce, it maywell be that we can afford
to pay a couple of billion dollars for the privilege".36/
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Takenat face value, the Washingtonobligations were
intended to have a major ~ct on postwar British accumulation. Mr
Spence of the US Ccmnittee on Bankingand Currency told the House of
Representatives in the final debate before the loan ratification they
were fundanental to the success and realisation of American
international economicand political Objectives.37/
Theobligations concerning convertibility,
non-discrimination and, by inplication, substantial reduction of
preferences, which in Clayton's view formedthe three essential
cornerstones of world nultilateralism,38/ will be analysed in depth
in the following section. It is appropriate howeverat this point to
further the discussion begun in the previous chapter concerning
developmentsin the international monetary system by clarifying the
Americanproposal for the dissolution of the Sterling Area dollar
mechanism.
The Sterling Area MonetarySystem
An assessment of the iDpact of Article Seven dealing with
the dissolution of the Sterling Area dollar pool requires a brief
investigation into the origins of that mechanism,considered
blatantly discriminatory by the USnegotiators. Initially it is
worth distinguishing between the I1kXletaryassociation of the
'Sterling Bloe' and that of the 'Sterling Area' .39/ As stated in the
previous chapter folloong the 1931 crisis in the international
1II)[letary systemwhensterling ceased to be directly convertible into
gold, there arose a confused state of loosely defined currency bloes.
Manynations, constituting the Sterling Bloc, chose to maintain
substantial reserves in sterling given the i.op:)rtance of IoOOon as a
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centre for the financing of trade and borrowing, together with the
existence of the Gold ExchangeStandard and high rates of interest
obtainable in the City.40/ However,apart fran the fact that trade
amongSterling Bloc memberscould proceed at de facto fixed rates of
exchange, the bloc association conferred no special privileges upon
its members.
With the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 this situation was
radically altered. Underan act of mrtua), convenience a group of
nations - the UK,Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa,
Southern Rhodesia, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, British Colonies,
Iceland, Iraq, Egypt, SUdan, Palestine, Jordan, and the Faroe
Islands41/ - formed the Sterling Area, becaning exenpt fran British
ExchangeControl regulations. '!he Area arose by the force of CCIDlk:)ll
interests, convenience aOO efficiency which the pooling of reserves,
the centralisation in IDndon of the essential banking operations for
the wholeArea, the freedan of paymentswithin it, and the similarity
of exchangecontrol applied by each meatler to all transactions with
non-Areacountries conferred uponmember nations. In essence the
Sterling Area could be characterised as a voluntary association of
nations without any written constitution or central dictation within
which exchangecontrol did not operate. Amajor purpose of the
system was the lOObilisation and conservation of the meansof
pll'chasing outside the Area, particularly fran dollar area nations,
for the duration of the war. 42/ Olt of these circumstances arose the
Sterling Area dollar pooling arrangements administered throogh the
ExchangeEqualisation Account.
Thedollar pooling nachanism regulated the convertibility
of sterling within the Area (sterling of course was now generally
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inconvertible for nations outside this area) through the voluntary
agreenent that all hard currencies earned by membersof the Area were
surrendered to the pool and allocated according to the individual
requirements of membernations. This system ensured that the IOOaIlS
of purchasing in dollar countries was centralised in ea.chnation,
that any surplus of purchasing powerwas transferred into a CQ('[IOOll
reserve in exchangefor sterling rather than being held
independently, and that restraint was exercised in converting
sterling to dollars through the use of the import licensing system.
Sterling was therefore fully convertible through the dollar pool for
licensed purposes, with the regulation of this mechanismsolely
dependent on the co-operation of the govermnentsconcerned. The
informal principle of the pooling mechanismwas that the reserves of
the entire Sterling Area.rather than iooividual balance of payments
positions with the dollar nations, should serve as a guide to the
changing severity of dollar import controls of the member states.
In addition, through a combination of informal
exhortation and consultation, participating I'llIE!IIbersagreed that only
essential requirements would be procured fran outside the Sterling
Area, with drawings fran the pool allocated according to need rather
than the size of the gold/dollar contributions of each nation. '!be
effect of the dollar pooling mechanismwas thus to alter the trading
patterns of the sterling countries with the dollar area. Yet the US
state DepartmentIS interpretation of the mechanismas heavily
discriminatory against us goods and under the central control of the
UK,failed to appreciate the finer workings of the process. The
pooling system in fact increased Americanexports to dollar deficit
nations like Iooia and Australia at the expense of USexports to
dollar surplus IDeIlbersuch as ceylon and the Colonies.43/ In terms
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of trade the loss to the USwas negligible. On this point therefore
the USobjective, as stated in Article Seven, was based on a
misinterpretation of the dollar pooling aechanism. Not only was the
us diagnosis inaccurate, but the article itself was superfluous given
Article Eight stipulating the general convertibility of sterling.
This is the case inaSllUlChas Sterling Area nenDerswould have been
reluctant to maintain restrictions on their own dollar imports, less
favourable than those in force in non-Sterling Area nations.
In respect of Article Seven this brief analysis vindicates
DaltonI s view of the aechanism as a largely innocuous voluntary
agreeaent simply designed to cut the demandon reserves of gold and
dollars for the whole Area, particularly for the duration of the
war,44/ and as such the obligation had little bearing on future
British economicpolicy.
The crux of the Washingtondocumenttherefore rested on the
three principles of convertibility, non-ciiscrimination and the
implied substantial reduction of preferences. '!be ultimate objective
of USforeign econanic policy was to sweepawaythe nation state as
the basis of the EUropean political and econauic system and gradually
mergeWestern &trope into a Us-daninated world-wide structure of
aultilateral payments based on the convertibility of all currencies
into the dollar. In terms of the KeyCUrrencyapproach the aim was
premissed on the granting of the loan, which madeup 40%of the total
USdisbursements in Western EUrope between July 1945 and June 1947 -
a total calculated as $10,098 million.45/
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III. Neo-Bilateralism and the IDan
Awareof these facts manyanalysts have concluded that in
the face of such powerful obligations the British state simply
adopted an accumulation strategy in line with the dictates of the US
State Departmant. "capitulation to Americanhegeroony"writes Brett,
"was rapid and canplete", with the "Americandaninated liberal
capitalist alliance" resulting fran the loan, destructive of the
"possibility of a viable autonomouseconomicstrategy."46/ Similarly
Vander Pijl sees this as an era in which the Americanssuccessfully
developed hegemonicconcepts of control consolidating liberal
internationalism and allowing the Pax Americanato be imposed upon
the econanic ruins of the defunct Pax Britannica in &1rope,and
Coates sees the USA'snultilateralist poliey inpositions eating away
at Britain's ability to control its economicdestiny.47/ British
econanic decline, it is even suggested, can be traced to this
episode, with the state eni>racingthe tenets of US-style
nultilateralism, subordinating British capital to the wider
integrative objectives of Americaneconanic poliey. 'Ibis view,
stressing that the loan involved a restructuring of British capital
along Americanlines with the British state strongly tied to US
inspired nultilateralism, is nevertheless inaccurate. Byplacing the
washingtonagreementwithin the wider context of international trade
and paym:mtsarrangements a IOOrecmplex picture of Britain's
accunulation strategy emerges.
The 'capitulation to AmericanhegElllOnY'thesis relies upon
an overly literal interpretation of the Washingtonagreements. '!he
view that US-style multi lateral ism could s~ly be established by
relief progrananesfinanced in dollars (note the workof the United
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Nations Relief and RecoveryAgency)or straight dollar credits
secured on the basis of the KeyCurrencyproposal/Bretton Woods
alliance, disregarded both the political will of the Labour
Governmentand the international disequilibria in production and
trade. In place of the view that British postwar econanic
restructuring was carried out largely at the behest of the us and
involved a subordinated British state, this account proposes a view
of postwar accumulationas a far more complicated and unevenprocess,
involving a shifting pattern of temporary Ccnm:>nwealthand EUropean
alliances for short-tenn purposes ultimately at odds with us foreign
econanic policy interests. Specific political and econanic
contingencies strangled the US bid for hegemonyand in the course of
events enabled the British state to pursue a plan of accumulation
whichapproximatedneither the nultilateralism espoused by the
Alrericansnor the bilateralism of the critics of the loan, but a dual
strategy specifically adapted to meet the particular political and
econanic situation existing in postwar Western EUrope.
To begin the critique of the 'capitulation to .American
hegE!lOO1'lY' thesis it is necessary to chart those political and
econanic concHtions which~e to thwart US foreign eoonanic ideals.
Labour's DaDestic Progranme
In an abstract sense it is canceivahle that a British
governmentmayhave inplemented the US proposals at the cost of
substantially emaciating their danestic prograame. However the Attlee
Administration had been elected with a clear mandate to pursue
definite policies of cianestic reconstruction. At Attlee recalls
·people wanted a positive new policy· ,48/ and labour was strongly
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identified with a newsocial agenda premissed on, as Dalton records,
the sensation of "a newsociety to be built1 and we had the power to
build it" .49/ Althoughthere remains a question markover the extent
of the governmentI s radicalism, it cannot be doubted that the Labour
Party was pledged to full employmentand other policies designed to
increase the level of social welfare - policies, generated out of a
critique of the debacle of 1931, significant enoughto be described
by Milwardas the "historical imperatives" underlying the British
reconstruction programme.SOICOntrary to ~liband's cla~ that
"the experience of 1931 did not cause any major transfonnations in
the LabourParty" ,511 it is the case that an intensive reorientation
of socialist thought occurred arourXlthis period, affecting both
Labour's perception of the capitalist econany and the style and
presentation to the electorate of the Party leadership.
The extent of the theoretical revision which took place
after 1931 is shownby the formation in 1932 of the Socialist League
whoseExecutive carmittee included Cripps, Bevin, Pritt and the three
Labourtheorists of the interwar years Cole, Laski, and Tawney. This
group focused on the absence of any clear short-term policy as a
central problem. Whilst COleproclaimed the need to rebuild the
Party "on essentially different foundations",S3/ Tawney- a major
aCCCllPlicein the drafting of the 1929 party progranme- engaged in
self criticism stressing the need to clarify and order priorities.53/
The result of this perceived need for a more specific
danestic short-term programnewas the NJ!X:' s decision in December1931
to appoint a Policy Sub-Carmi.ttee which subsequently producEda
series of documents concerning, inter alia, banking and finance, arxl
daDestic and industrial reorganisation, which laid the basis, however
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incompletely, for the poliey orientation of the 1945 Election
canpaign. The poliey sub-camUttee of the NFX:, daninated by Dalton
and let>rrison, together with the Econanic Advisory Council (chaired by
Hendersonand closely involving Keynes, Cole, Bevin and eitrine) was
joined in 1931 by the Society for Socialist Inquiry and propaganda,
the NewFabian Research Bureau and in 1932 the XYZClub, all
involving future cabinet ministers with work directed towards laying
downthe political programmefor future Labour governments.541 The
sharp critique of Labour's own theoretical tradition carried out
after 1931, concerning not only the philosophy of socialism but IOOre
significantly stimulating an economicpoliey revision, paved the way
for Attlee to claim at his victorious press conference that "Labour
went into this Election on a carefully thought-out proqremre based on
very definite principles".551
The agenda for domestic reconstruction was a first priority
in the economicprogrammeof the 1945 Labour government. It was thus
essential that any aCCWllllationstrategy forgei by the postwar
British state should support these historical imperatives which
urXierlaydomestic reconstruction policies in Britain, rather than
sinply attempt to praoote USstyle III1ltilateralism in coooitions of a
maldistribution in the structure of world production, cauoodity trade
and disrupted lIDlleymarkets. A careful consideration of these
historical imperatives reveals the Tabour govermnents' llDtives for
engaging in the Washingtondiscussions. Rather than interpreting
this mve as one madeby the British state as an act of subordination
to AmericanhegEllDIlY, a stmy of the political/historical context
showsthat the Labour governmentsought the dollar creii t in an
atteJlpt to avoid abandoning labour's daDestic progranme, which in
Dalton Is view was the main justification for having a Labour
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goverI1lOOl1t.56/As Jay records57/ the blow to industrial recovery,
exports, investm:mts and full errploymentresulting fran
non-acceptance of the loan would in the end have been far worse than
"our having to undertake - under force majeure - a carmi.t:m:mtwe
probably could not honour".
A review of Cabinet documents reveals that on many
occasions Attlee, Cripps, and Dalton urged the cabinet, not only from
econanic and financial IOOtivesbut significantly on political
grounds, to accept alJoost any obligations so long as the dollar
credit was forthcaning.58/ Similarly Ellis-Rees, working in the
Overseas Finance Oivision of the Treasury, recalls "( I) never heard
any suggestion that we had even a sporting chance of makinga success
of the AgreelleIlt in its fullnessl the only question was how long we
could makethe credit last".59/ In this context therefore, as Attlee
later admitted, "the USand canadian loans were essentially measures
to buy time••60/ The British state's acceptance of the nult.ilateral
obligations was in essence a superficial act taken primarily with a
view to securing the nuch needed dollar credits and involving a wait
and see approach towards the attached c:x:oiitions. The political and
electoral IOOtiveswhich lay behind British postwar econanic
reconstruction mst not be wxierenphasised. The iDplications of this
realisation serve as a direct critique not only of the 'capitulation
to AmericanbegEm>IlY'thesis but also of functionalist state theories
which refuse in manycases to consider the inpact of political
constraints on accuml.ation and are content to identify the direction
of capitalist developaent and the actions of the state siDply by
reference to a logical deduction of the requirements of an abstractly
oonceivai capitalist mode of production.
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SUch a model cannot explain the actions of the early
postwar state, which sought to maximise the opportunities for
Dnplementing policies of domestic reconstruction, in addition to
forging an accumulation strategy which cut across the requirements of
the ideal functioning model of multilateralism. This is the
significance of the governmentsl decision to adopt a de jure
canni:brent to IIUltilateralism in order to meet the short-term
objective of alleviating the dollar shortage which would allow the
implementation of their domestic reconstruction programme. For the
British state in 1945 it was simply not politically feasible to adopt
US style multilateralism.
Trade DiSequilibrium and Multilatera1ism
A consideration of the economic obstacles preventing the
adoption of multilateralism in the early postwar years supports this
interpretation. It has already been deaalstrated that changes in the
international structure of productive, camoiity, and lOOney capital
had severely weakened the position of British capital, particularly
in relation to the rapidly internationalised US capital. Between
1945-47 Britain proceeded to accumulate increasing trade deficits
with the USA.
The deficit on mercharnise trade with the US rose fran
$764.07m. in 1946 to $950.0Sm. in 1947, with the overall deficit of
western Europe on visible trade with the US rising from $2356.1~. in
1946 (60% of which was made up of British and French .iq;)ort
surpluses) to $4742.14m. in 1947.61/ Gross capital formation
consumed 21% of OK national income in 1947 (4% more than in 1938, a
year of intensive reanaoent), with BriWn i.np)rting increased
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axoountsof building materials, steel products, and raw materials
necessary for domestic reconstruction. Coal ~rts rose from 7,000
tons in 1946 to 694,000 tons in 1947 (a total by value of £34
million) of which all but £437,000 worth camefrom the United States.
Quantities of iron-ore and send-finished steel approached record
~rt levels whilst alumdniumimports from canada rose to twice the
prewar total.62/ In 1938 only 19.25%of British ~rts arrived from
the western Hemisphere. By 1947 this proportion had increased to
over 45.5%of UKinp>rts drawn from dollar regions.63/ These trends
continued in 1948with the import of manufactured goods the highest
on record and the total for raw materials exceeded only in 1920.64/
In the short-term the deterioration in Britain's balance of
trade with the United States was the result of high and increasing
levels of inp>rts of food, construction equipment (particularly
tinDer and steel), and raw materials all essential to ensuring rapid
British dalestic economicrecovery but detrimental in the short-term
to any policy which was supposed to ease dollar dependence.
This trade pattern indicates that the Americanloan, and
subsequent Marshall Aid payments, sustained high levels of British
capital investment and maintained rising output and eDl>loyment.
~l access to trade and the other Bretton ~ nultilateral
propositions proved unworkable in the maladjusted world econanic
situation sinply because the agreements madeno provision for getting
fran the iooustry and trade pattern of the 1930's to a postwar world
in whichmultilateralism did not ~ impossible strains on
econanies pledged to increasing output and eDl>loyment. ENen in the
wake of the 1947 sterling crisis, which CC1lIIenoed well before the
agreed date for general convertibility, (in which Britain paid out
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$237m., as mien as the total deficit for 1946 in the last seven days
alone before the suspension of convertibility on the 20th August
194765/) the political and economdcobjectives of the Attlee
Administration depended for their implementation not on further cuts
in dOlteStic consumption allied to other austerity measures, but
principally upon the USmakingmore dollars available to fuel the
expanding econany. '!he 3.75 billion dollar credit, intended to last
at least three years, was consumedin just over one. Howeverit was
the success and vigour of the British recovery, not its incipient
failure, which exacerbated the balance of payments prOblem.66/ If
1lIlltilateralism ever had any potential in early postwar &trope - a
proposition I seriously doubt - all chances of the Key
currency/Bretton Woodsalliance ended with the suspension of general
convertibility in mid-1947.
This second point has E!II1;)hasisedthe significance of the
econanic condi.t.Lons existing in the early postwar years which, when
allied to the political short term policies of the Attlee
Administration, prevented the path of British accwrulation fran
falling under the sway of the USState and Treasury Departments.
Contrary to the capitulation view, it appears that the nultilateral
trade proposals could not proceed in the postwar environment witholt
a solid basis of international trade underlying them and were
objectively unworkable in an environment characterised by serious
trade and production imbalance. A view of postwar capitalist
developlleIlt seen in t.erD8 of Americanenforced l1Illtilateralism cannot
be accepted.
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ADual AcCUIIl.1l.ationStrategy
Yet, if the established view of postwar capitalist
developoont is rejected what is the alternative account of capital
accumulation in this period? This paper suggests that neither
US-style multilateralism nor the stereotypical view of bilateralism
as presented by the critics of the loan, can adequately portray the
British state's accumulation strategy. In the face of large scale
productive, trade and balance of paymentsdisequilibria between the
world's major trading areas the core of the British state's
aCCUlllllationstrategy in the early postwar years consisted of a web
of neo-bilateral nonetary, payments, and trade agreenents which
expandedinto a successful limdted network with relatively flexible
controls, consistent exchange rates and relatively non-discriminatory
payments~ha.nisms and trade practices within Western EUrope. This
networkwas a series of short-tenn arrangements which provided a
Western EUropeansolution to the IOOStpressing Western EUropean
problem - the chronic dollar shortage.
The British state's early postwar accunulation strategy
thus consisted of two principal elements. Firstly a de jure
ccmnitmentto USimposedIIlltilateralism - as outlined in the loan
agreement obligations - which released massive dollar injections into
the UKeconany, enabling the purchase of vi tal supplies, particularly
raw materials and capital goods necessary for the inl>lementation of
the sweepingdanestic reconstruction prograumes on the basis of which
the Tabour government was elected. SecxnUy, a de facto ccmnitment
to neo-bilateral 1DJI'letary,trade and payments arrangements in the
face of the unworkability of USstyle DUltilateralism - roonetary and
paynents arrangements which provided the IID8t feasible system for
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WesternEllrope in the absence of a solution to the prolonged dollar
shortage. Havingconsidered in detail the first element in this
strategy I will nowexamine the state's ~tment to
nee-bilateralism, closely analysing the developmentof British
trading agreements under Dalton's Chancellorship.
Neo-Bilateral Trade and PaymentsArrangements
We need to be aware that, contrary to Bareau's opinion,67/
this neo-bilateral network was not sinply adopted after the
convertibility crisis of summer1947, which finally laid to rest the
early postwar Americanhopes of a turn to US i.np:>sed Illlitilateralism.
Evenby April 16th 1946 (only three IOOnths after the British
ratification of the loan agreement) the UKhad secured bilateral
agreerents with fourteen EUropeannations, seven South American
nations, and twoMiddle Eastern nation states, namely, France,
Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark,Norway,Sweden,
Czechoslovakia, Italy, Portugal, Finlard, Spain, Greece, Turkey,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguayand the
nations whan the Econanist regarded as the JD:)Stinportant Middle
Eastern trading partners of Britain, Egypt and Iraq.68/ 'Ibe
importance of British trade with these nations is highlighted in that
in 1938 they (plus Germanyand British Empire nations) supplied 62%
of British ~rts and absorbed over 70%of British exports.69/
I term these arrangements ' neo-bilateral' to distinguish
them fran prewar Central &lropean bilateralism which was conducted
(usually by Germany)on lines essentially different fran these
postwar arrangements. This earlier form of bilateralism involved
both a c:.'Clqletiti ve search for export markets and a large degree of
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exploitation in which the economically stronger nation (predaninantly
Germany in prewar central &.\rope) imposed increasingly onerous terms
of trade on weaker nations (by forcing debit balances, blocking
credit balances, arbitrary supply and purchase offers, discriminatory
pricing and other such methods), leading to a significant degree of
econcmi.cand political penetration seriously uniermining governnent
policies to expand the trade of the weaker nation. Contrary to this
exploitative form of bilateralism the British postwar neo-bilateral
arrangem:mtserrergedparticularly fran the search for controlled and
balanced imports, and recognised the importance of consistent
exchangerates and prices, together with the need to avoid unadjusted
paymentsbalances.70/ The objective of these arrangements was to
seek a monetary rather than a trade balance with the respective
nation, with numerousprovisions for flexible clearing methods,
capital roovementsand for transactions with third nations clearly
stated in manyof the agreements. This was the case inasnuch as the
majority of the agreements sanctioned a widening of the trading area
beyondthe basic two nation structure. Thus Britain effectively
represented and negotiated for the entire Sterling Area whilst
agreementswith France drew in the nations of the Franc Area, those
with ft>lland drew in the Netherland's colonial areas and with Belgiwn
took into consideration UlXeldx>urgand the Belgian 8rpire.
To gain a deeper understanding of the neo-bilateral aspect
of the British state's accunulation strategy we need to look in
detail at the precise form of those arrangements and see heM apparent
contradictions between the signing of such contracts and the
strictures of the washington Agreementwere resolved.
Workbegan on neo-bilateral strategies early in sumner
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1944, culminating in the first Europeanmonetary agreement signed
with Belgiumon the 5th October 1944.71/ By the time Keynesarrived
in washington to negotiate the dollar credit, the UK had signed
bilateral agreements with all the major Western Europeangovernments
listed above (except Portugal and Switzerland, with whan discussions
were in progress). The Government,Treasury and the Bank of England
took the general view that these arrangements would serve for
Labour's entire term of office with no Lmmediateprospect of reviving
full convertibility of currencies under the leadership of sterling or
of a return to lIUltilateral world trade.
Although there existed variations, the general pattern of
the nonetary arrangements can be sunmarised from the main features of
the Anglo-Belgian agreement.72/ Firstly under this agreement each
central bank agreed to sell its currency against the currency of the
other at a fixed official rate of exchange. Secondly, except for the
Scandinavian nations who negotiated unlimited credit facilities,
these sales of currencies had a limit attached to them beyondwhich
sales would be madeagainst gold (the gold ceiling or 'gold points'
system)• Sterling paid to a resident of Belgiumcould be freely
transferred to another Belgian resident or resident of the Sterling
Area, and finally transfer could be extended beyondBelgiumand the
Sterling Area if the UK Governmentgave its approval (the system of
'administrative transferability'). In other cases, where a nation's
currency was deemed not to be of international standing, a payments
rather than a lOOlletary agreement was negotiated which was not on a
reciprocal basis since all settlements had to be made in sterling.
The IOOIletary agreements thus regularised payments reatioos with an
iDp)rtant nunber of trading countries at a time when the
disequilibria in international production am trade between the
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Westernand Eastern hemispheres ruled out the developnent of a
genuinely multilateral system. Administrative transferability
allowed sterling a moregradual resumption of its international
currency responsibilities without makingfurther inroads into the
inadequate British reserves of gold and dollars. It was therefore a
successful and ingenious strategy designed to maximisenon-dollar
trade and provide the most extensive multilateral system feasible in
the absence of a solution to the chronic dollar shortage.
Bilateralism and the !Dan <l>ligations
Nevertheless under the Washingtonagreements, Britain had
pledged to rE!llDVe"all restrictions on payments and transfers" fran
the UKto any other nation, and to make the sterling receipts of all
Sterling Area countries arising out of current transactions "freely
available for current transactions in any currency areas without
discrimination" • These articles clearly cut across the bilateral
arrangements and proopted DavidWaley, a praninent Treasury off icial
in Overseas Finance, to suggest that the time spent in negotiating
the bilateral relations had been wastsi and there was no point in
proceeding further with such strategies.73/ With the USratification
of the washington agreements on the 15th July 1946 the British state
had until the 15th July 1947 to prepare for convertibility and
non~iscrimination - a progranmeEllis-Rees recalls "for whichwe had
no relish and we did not really believe in".74/ Largely under the
influence of Cobbold, DeputyGovernorof the Bank of England, the
governmentrejected Waley's pessimism and agreed to retain the
structure of the bilateral agreements. It was decided to meet the
required IIIll.tilateral obligations not by disregarding but by
sUWlementingthe existing monetary arrangements (thus indicating how
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highly the British state, and in particular the Bank of England,
regarded the agreeroonts as part of the UKI S overall acCUl'llllation
strategy) •
Beginning therefore with Argentina on the 3rd October 1946
the goverrment negotiated supplementary monetary agreements, leaving
the basis of the existing arrangements intact, with all the major
trading nations (except France, Derunarkand Switzerland, with whom
negotiations continued, and various Iron Curtain nations given
special exemptionby the US government) by the 15th July 1947.75/
These supplem:mtaryagreements created a transferable accounts system
wherebythe area in which sterling could be freely transferred
(autanatic transferability) was extended as more nations became party
to the arrangement. The restructuring of the international money
markets therefore created a world situation consisting of American
account areas - within which sterling was freely convertible into US
dollars on demandand freely transferable to other accounts, the
Sterling Area - which as stated earlier had always allowed free
convertibility of sterling via the dollar pooling mechanism,the
Transferable accounts area - a gradually exparning area within which
sterling was fully convertible via automatic transferability, and a
miscellaneous area consisting of nations largely inconsequential to
world trade temporarily exempted fran the Washingtonconventions. 76/
In this way the British state saoewhat hesitantly fulfilled
the convertibility obligation of the Washingtonagreanents. Yet this
situation once again dramatically changed on the 20th August 1947
with the suspension of convertibility and the abrogation of the
sUR>lementaryagreements follOWing the severe drain in Britain IS
dollar reserves. With this unilateral British action breaching the
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washingtonagreem:mtthe international monetary systemwas thrown
into chaos. On the one hand the privileges of the Americanaccount
area and the Sterling Area rena.ined virtually unchanged,with all
sterling accruing to Americanaccounts freely convertible (sterling
accruing to Americanaccounts was howeverno longer automatically
transferable to bilateral account nations) and the British dollar
drain therefore continued due to the adverse position of the UK's
trade balance. On the other ham manynations of the former
Transferable account areas found their rights of automatic
transferability withdrawnand the system of administrative
transferability re-instated. '!bus the withdrawal of the autanatic
right of holders of transferable accounts to pay their sterling to
AlIericanswas the main technical change by which convertibility was
suspendei.77/
In addition a large Bilateral account area was recreated
through which the original monetary agreements with their stipulated
'gold point' system determined the degree of individual nation's
currency convertibility. The post-oanvertibility world thus
consisted of an Americanaccount area and a Sterling Area virtually
unchangedwith free sterling convertibility, a Transferable account
area regulated by administrative transferability with sterling
received by any neU:ler nation freely transferable within that
country, within the whole area on current account and to the Sterling
Area (but not of course autaDatically to the American account area) J
a Bilateral account area simtlarly regulated by ~nistrative
transferability but with sterling received by each nation only
transferable within that country or to the Sterling Area without
special Treasury permiSSion, and a residual area of nations
inoon~tial to world trade which remained unaffected by the
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entire convertibility episode (Appendix1 illustrates these canplex
changes on a nation by nation basis).
In broad outline these were the changeswrought in the
international circuits of moneycapital within the span of Dalton's
Chancellorship. 'lbe fact that the postwar British state had "no
better alternative than to rely on [these previous negotiated]
Monetaryand paymentsagreementsn,78/ highlights the significance of
the bilateral arrangements for the state's accumrlat.Ion strategy.
Themodifications fashioned in the post-oonvertibility period were
not designed to limit the transfer of sterling as an ultimate-end but
rather to preclude the loss of gold and dollars to third
countries.79/ In fact as noted previously the state encouraged the
max~ degree of transferability compatible with the preservation of
the reserves, aiming if possible to reach equilibrium in trade and
paymentsbalances by bringing the shorter side of the account up to
the larger, aptly illustrating the concept of "expansionist
bilateralism".80/
'1be realisation that the British state pursued a strategy
of accunulation heavily dependent on a system of neo-bilateral trade
and paymentsarrangements both before and after its brief flirtation
with multilateralist full convertibility invalidates an
interpretation of postwar developnent wnich focuses on a
capitulation to AmericanhegeDalY. )t)re precisely the foregoi~
analysis reveals the state pursuing a dual accunulation strategy
consisting of an expaBied network of neo-bilateral trade and ronetary
arrangements bolstered by a massive US dollar injection into the UK
econany enabling the vital purchase of supplies, rawmaterials am
capital goods necessary for econani.c recovery and the iIrplementation
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of the sweepingprogrammeof domestic reconstruction on the basis of
which the Labour governmentwas elected.
To consolidate the view that the British state adopted a
dual accunulation strategy in this period, ultimately at odds with
the early postwar wishes of the USadministration, and involving an
ambivalent attitude towards European integration, it is finally
necessary for this chapter to consider howthe two remaining
"enshrined principles of the Loan Agreement"8l1- non-discr~nation
and the el~nation of preferences - fared under Dalton's
Chancellorship.
TheApplication of Non-Discrimination and the Elimination of
Trade Preference
The suspension of convertibility presented the British
state with severe tactical problEmS, in regard both to the newly
negotiated bilateral agreements, and to the application of Article
Nine of the washington agreement - the non-discrimination clause. As
indicated above the piecemeal negotiation of the supplementary
monetary agreementsallowed manynations the right of convertibility
manyIOOIlthsbefore the official ccmnencementdate of the 15th July
1947. Thus for instance Belgium, Lmceninlrg, the NetherlaI¥1s arxl
Portugal advised exporters that they cculd invoice in convertible
sterling from the 27th February 1947.82/ Contrary therefore to Jay's
latest recollectioo831 that the ·loan began to melt away· on the
establishment of convertibility in JUly 1947, we should be aware that
convertibility had a nuch longer time span covering alnmt a six
IOOnthperiod for manynations.
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It is wrongto assumethat the 1947 balance of paymmts
crisis resulted simply from the convertibility obligation. The
dollar drain had its origin in a numberof factors. A substantial
rise in world prices affected British imports from December 1945
onwards (the US wholesale price index rising 40%betweenDeceni:>er
1945and March1947). The fuel crisis of February 1946 (estimated to
have cost £20Om.worth of exports), disappointing dateStic
agriculture production. excessively slow ~litary demobilisation and
miscellaneous but significant dollar costs in occupied Germanyall
intensified the drain on resources. The strictures of the
convertibility obligation, estimated to have cost the UKgovernment
over $SoOm.in sterling conversions, supplementedbut did not
precipitate the dollar drain. Whenconvertibility was suspendedon
the 20th August 1947only $40Om.of the UScredit remainedunirawn.
Investigations now shawthat over 70%of the drawings were to meet
liabilities incurred by the UKin its own visible and invisible
trading transactions with a further 20%to meet the needs of the rest
of the Sterling Area and only approximately 6%accounted for by third
nation sterling conversions.SS/ Nevertheless the us Treasury still
regarded the loan agreement as the basis of the postwar international
economicorder. With the failure of convertibility attention shifted
to the issue of non~scrwnation. Punphreyof the us Treasury
stressed that "the convertibility provisions had never been as
seriously taken as the non-discrimination provisions· .86/
Following the demise of convertibility, and the tElllp)rary
failure of the KeyCUrrencyapproach, the us administration
throughout the rest of Dalton IS Oumce1lorship focused increasingly
on the significance of further concessions on iq>erial preference
linked to non-discriminatory trading as ootlined under Article Nine,
';;:·ii
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even to the extent of threatening blackmail about further financial
assistance and the unfreezing of the $40Om.worth of undrawn
credit.87/
Again, to argue that these obligations imposedincreasingly
onerous pressure on the Attlee governmentultimately forcing British
capitulation is not accurate. The non-discrimination clause, which
proposed that Britain must not buy goods which could be obtained from
the USor elsewhere at slightly cheaper prices, was effectively
ignored by the British state in trade transactions. ThusAttlee
later ccmnented"with regard to non-discrimination the provisions of
the Loan Agreemanthave hardly been operative at all". 88/ Despite
publicly expressed fears that the Rdnor nuisances of the clause
(Britain had curtailed the inport of periodicals fran Australia and
revoked certain open licenses for the inp:)rt of particular fruit and
vegetables) ,89/ might becane serious hardships following the balance
of payments difficulties of 1947, the British 90vernmenthad since
April 1947 repeatedly stressed to the Americansthat Article Nine did
not precisely define non-discrimination and its interpretation
therefore was always subject to ambiguity and negotiation. gal
'Ibis recalcitrant British attitude to the agreement
ini tially led the USadministration to carefully examinethe rights
assured themunder mandateconventions, trusteeship agreements and
other international acts. Yet confrontation over the issue was
avoidej by the State Departmentwho subsequently agreed that, in
COIXlitions of a substantial i.nbalance in world trade, •a too strict
interpretation of the clause did not make sense·. 9V Indeed when in
1949 the British governmentasked for an official cancellation of
Article Nine, the USTreasury - a little bemusedat the request _
asked why Britain was raising the issue of the clause ·when we had
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so far been allowed to discriminate without objection fran them".92/
The 'under the counter' arrangements hitherto practiced in connection
with Article Ninewouldbe endangered and held up to ridicule if
international public attention became focused on the clause, as would
necessarily be the case in the circumstances of an official
cancellation.
Dalton's remark, madeto the House of CcxmDns,that "we
(the British governnent) have punctually kept our word ••• because
••• (as) part of the British wayof life ••• when we sign a document
we keep to it"93/ was a long wayfran the truth. As Playfair of the
Treasury privately admitted "we have broken our agreements right and
left ••• in substance we are very far wide of the loan agreement •••
(and the only remaining question is) how far we can prudently dress
it up to look as if we were inside it·.94/
A similar fate befell the US efforts to reduce British
trade preferences. In spite of Americanclaims that British
concessions on preferences failed to meet any legitimate
expectations,95/ it is far fran clear that the US Congresswere at
this stage willing to sanction serious tariff liberalisation.
Following the failure of the Marshall ALd integrative strategies the
US administration did not seriously atteapt to pr<m:>te&1ropean
integration via policies of trade liberalisation until 1949as the
following chapters will dsoonstrate. In the illmediate postwar years
covered by Dalton's Chancellorship, this reticence on the part of the
US over tariff concessions was met by an ani)iguousBritish response,
resulting in a virtual stalemate on the general subject of preference
reduction.
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On the one hand the widely shared views, voiced for
instance by the Federation of British Industry, that concessions
should be madeonly on receipt of a comparable value in return with
no question of unilaterally abandoning present Commonwealth
agrearents,96/ were tenpll"Erlby early British Treasury estimates that
nthere would be great advantages to us from a general clearance of
trade barriersn•97/ Indeed, despite USclaims to the contrary, close
analysis of the British Imperial Preference system established at
Ottawa in 1932 (allowing duty free status on approximately 80%of all
imports fran the Enpire) shows that altOOugh the USlost ground due
to the operation of the system in New zealand markets (the smallest
of the major Enpire markets), Americamaintained its overall share of
the UKand Indian markets whilst actually increasing its share in
carmerce with South Africa and Australia.98/ The issue of trade
preference was unresolved throughout Dalton's era with neither the US
nor the UKcertain of the consequences of early tariff rErluction, and
strong lobbies in each case preventing the realisation of the
agreenents regarding preferences signed in conjunction with the loan
agreement at washington.
The potential contradictions inherent in claiming that the
British state pursued a dual accumulation strategy consisting of a de
jure cannitment ta nultilateralism and a de facta aioption of
nee-bilateral trade and lIDnetary arrangements are therefore resolved
whenit is realised that the nultilateralist obligations of the loan
agreement were largely ignored by the UKgiven the postwar
environm:mt of a serious maldistribution in the structure of world
production and in the world's demand and supply for internationally
traded ccmoodities. Analysis of the loan agreement reveals that the
developnent of a genuinely mltilateral accunul.ation strategy
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depended less upon internationally agreed principles of currency
convertibility and non~iscrirrdnatory trade and more fundamentally on
the underlying pattern of trade arrangements and the international
structure of productive capital.
Conclusion
Given an appropriate condition of balance in world
production and trade, the ItIl1tilatera1 flow of trade and payrrents can
function as an automatic regulator to effect the constant adjustments
in production and trade throughout the world necessary to maintain
this balance. The 1914-18WorldWar had howeverthrown the
nultilateral system out of balance by disrupting the productive
capacity and the gold reserves and foreign investments of Europe,
whilst simultaneously stimulating an equally immensedevelopment of
production in the United States. In the inter-war period the USAwas
reluctant to see the balance restored via large increases in US
inp:>rts or decreases in her exports. A favourable USbalance of
paymentswas therefore maintained by reconstruction loans and private
overseas investment which sharply declinEd fran 1929 onwards as world
economicconditions deterioratEd and there was a return to
restrictive bilateral trading.
The econanic effects of the second WorldWar repeated the
pattern of 1914-18 bIt on an even IOOreimnense scale. The United
Kingdan's great need in 1945was to have a breathing space in which
to develop a strategy to meet the needs of reconstruction, in
international circumstances where a balance in world production and
trade was lacking. With the aid of dollar credits the British state
coold begin to restore equilibrium in its balance of payments and
slowly expa.rxi international trade within a neo-bi1ateral system
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protecting inconvertible sterling.
TheUS State Departmenthowever feared the discriminatory
practices which the warhad done mucrutoeooourageand attempted to
instigate policies whichwould force the UKto make an Lmmediate
contribution to the creation of full world rrultilateralism. With
apparent indifference to the i.nDal.ancedworld eoonanic situation the
USsought to force the issue on the removal of discrimdnation against
the dollar whilst amassing annual balance of payments surpluses with
the rest of the world of approximately $8 billion.
The negotiation of the Washingtonagreement thus turned
less for the Americanson supporting British econanic reconstruction
and nore on securing conditions for the rElOOValof discrimination
against the dollar.
In a situation where the future direction of British
external financial policy had not been oonclusively decided, the
Americansinsisted on sterling convertibility as the prime condition
of dollar assistance. Britain's acceptance of the terms of the loan
(and the deferment of other possible objectives of external financial
policy such as the abandonmentof sterling as an international
currency, or the oonstruction of an exclusive international system
based on sterling), was taken with the full realisation that the
oonditioos were si:nply -paper concessions- made at the time when
Britain desperately needed dollars am it was clear that the State
Department objectives for Britain were econanically and politically
-unobtainable-.99/
'!be eoonaDic chaos of the postwar period and the dollar
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shortage, of which the UK's persistent deficit was a
manifestation,lOO/ madeit impossible for the British state to
faithfully adhere to any condition for removingrestrictions from the
transferabili ty of sterling. Without Sterling Area viability, IOOre
general equilibrium between the dollar and non-dollar areas,
considerably higher foreign currency reserves, and nore concessionary
Americanfinancial policies, the British state considered
convertibility RaUtopian idea".lOl/
Nevertheless the state was aware that the international
staOOingof sterling could be used as a strong bargaining-counter to
extract Americanassistance. In the negotiations on sterling
balances for instance, the state enphasised the idea of the
international role of sterling in three ways. Firstly they opposed
any arrangement for the creation of IOOrethan one class of sterling
(sterling accunulated before a particular date, and that accunulated
after this date). 5eco00ly the state opposed the USwish to
arbitrarily cancel or block balances of foreign holders, and thirdly
they recc:mneOOedthat negotiations with foreign holders over the
anomt to be released "should be on the generous side" .102/
Althoogh the UKtherefore privately dismissed the
re-introduction of convertibility in the immediateor near-future, it
took steps to restore confidence in the international position of
sterling whilst accepting the principle that sterling in non-resident
hands could not be wholly inconvertible (hence the "transferable" and
"administrative" sterling arrangements). Exploring the tension
betweenthese principles gave Britain sufficient latitude to extract
inmediate dollar aid fran the USwhilst retaining control over the
transferability of sterling and consequenUy blocking State
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Department objectives.
In the wake of Britain's dual accumulation strategy the us
administration shelved the Key CUrrency/Bretton Woods approach.
"Convertibility", the us Treasury Informed Truman in 5epteni:>er1947
nin the old sense was dead and would remain so for sane time to
came."103/ It now began to promote a more flexible European Recovery
progranne less dependent on clauses such as non-discrimination, am
aimed more directly at British-led European integration, administered
through such agencies as the Catmittee of European Econanic
Co-operation and its descendant, the Organisation for European
Econanic co-operation. This takes the analysis beyorxl Dalton's
Chancellorship which ended ignominiously on the 13th November 1947,
towards a study of Britain's economic strategy under Cripps •
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CBAPl'ER POOR
THE MARSHALL OFFESSIVE
It is generally argued that by the Autwnnof 1947Britain
faced an irmdnent economiccollapse that was only averted by timely
Americanassistance offered in the form of Marshall aid. The view
that Britain, and nore generally Western FAlrope,faced an "impending
econanic catastrophe"l/ in late 1947was expressed by Clayton in May
1947, whoconcluded "without further prarpt and substantial aid fran
the United States, eoonanic, social and political disintegration will
overwhelmFAlropen.2/ Similarly Oliver Franks, chairman of the
carmi.ttee of FAlropeanEconanic Co-operation set up on the 15th July
1947, took the view that "in the spring of 1947 the econanic and
social state of Western&1ropewas far graver than in the
thirties",3/ whilst Dean Achesondefended foreign aid in terms of
"our duty and our privilege as humanbeings" facing "the facts of
international life ••• (which) ••• mean that the United States is
going to have to undertake further emergencyfinancing of foreign
purchases if foreign countries are to continue to buy in 1948 and
1949 the ccmoodities which they need to sustain life and at the same
time reb1ild their econanies".4/ SUbsequentinterpretations have
portrayed this "annus horrendus"5/, the "crisis year of unrelieved
disaster"6/ as a turning point forcing the Labour goverrment to yet
further levels of subordination and capitulation to American
interests.
We are led to believe that, faced with a seemingly
intractable econanic crisis, the British state eagerly grasped the
"econanic lifeline"7/ offered in the form of Marshall aid and thereby
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"accepted Americanleadership in the newworld economicand political
order ••• subordinating British interests to American, but
maintaining those roles and ccmni.tments which the Americansfound
useful" .8/ The consolidation of Americanhegemonyin the North
Atlantic area, it is clainel, went beyondBritain simply assuming
junior partner status in a Us-daninated world economicstructure, and
involved "a concrete transformation of the FAlropean class structure
along lines of the USmodeln•9/ In short "through the Marshall
offensive, the Pax Americanawas inp>sed on the econanic ruins of the
defunct Pax Britannica in EUrope".10/
The initial purpose of this chapter is to evaluate this
interpretation. Both aspects of the position, firstly that Britain
faced acute econanic disaster in 1947, and secondly that Marshall aid
involved further British capitulation to AmericanhegEllDIlY,will be
explored in detail. In keeping with the overall eqjlasis of the
thesis this acoount will begin with an analysis of the British
econany as it developed fran 1946 to the middle of 1948, before
turning to analyse the foreign policy manoeuvringsof the US
administration as they materialised in the form of the Marshall Plan.
The British state's reaction to the Marshall Plan in the context of
the dual accunulation strategy developed under Dalton's
Chancellorship will then receive attention. This will take the form
of a close study of Britain's attitude towards USintegrative
policies, developoents in the sphere of productive capital, changes
in intra-EUropean trade and payments arranganents, and an analysis of
the structure and workings of the &lropean Marshall aid agencies,
CE&: am its descendant, the OJB::. 'lbe basis and the effects of
Marshall aid will then have been sufficiently clarified to enable a
nore precise interpretation of the state' 8 econcmi.cstrategy in this
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period to emerge. Specifically this chapter will propose that far
from 1947being seen as the turning point in British recovery, with
Marshall aid halting Britain's deterioration and enabling a "great
econanic leap forward"ll/ to occur, it will be dem::mstratedthat
Marshall aid disbursements to Britain were primarily used for food
imports releasing resources to enable the already widespread domestic
reconstruction programnesto continue. By contrast it WOlldbe IOOre
accurate to view the early 1950's as a more significant turning point
in British accumulation, with a re-direction of British industry away
from an over-riding concern with exports towards the developnent of a
large scale ciarestic conSlm!I' market based on relative surplus value
productive techniques occurring under Butler's Chancellorship.
This is not to suggest that the Marshall offensive did not
aim to lay the foundations for an Atlantic econany based on the
generalised export of Americanaccunulation conditions. This clearly
was a primary aim of the USadministration. Contrary to the majority
of accounts, however, this objective was not achieved by the Marshall
Plan. Specific factors constrained the export of UScapital to the
UKin the Marshall period and the insignificant USinvestment which
did occur under Cripps' Chancellorship never carried with it the
implication that Britain bad becaIIe subordinated to an Atlantic
economy daninated by the United States. Close analysis showsthat
the IOOCbanismsof the Marshall offensive by which the USsought to
achieve hegeDalYwere continually underminedby the actions of the
British and French states which sought, as in previous negotiations,
to extract the maxiDum benefit fran the USaid whilst incurring the
minimlmloss of econaaic or political sovereignty.
Contrary to those accounts which insist on siDplifying the
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developmentof the postwar international econoadcorder by clai~ng
that the latter can either be understood in terms of the 'Bretton
WOOds system' or the 'capitulation to Americanhegemony'thesis, this
chapter further develops the alternative argumentpresented in the
previous sections. This view indicates that the Bri tish state forged
an accumulation strategy which had very little to do with the
negotiations conducted at New Hampshireand which continually sought
to thwart USforeign economicpolicy ideals involving an uneven
series of temporary alliance and short-term c::atpranisemeasures
designed to meet the specific political and economicconditions of
postwar Western EUrope.
I. The 1947Crisis
The notion that the UKfaced total econanic collapse in
1947 is not supported by a close review of the general economic
indicators of the tiDe, and oore careful study is required before the
actual 'crisis' of the year can be pinpointed. The existence of
"grave econanic distress"12/ identified in Clayton's IDe!IOOrandum,pon
whichMarshall based his Harvard address, (and largely taken at face
value by analysts since) is sillply not borne out by a review of
British capital aCClUO.llationin that year.
Production and Trade Prior to Marshall
British capital between 1946 and 1950achieved rates of
growth of industrial production which have never been sustained since.
The index of industrial production (average 1946 - 100) for all
industries, achieved a Dalthly average throuqnout 1947 of 108 points
despite the disruption experienced in February and Marchresulting
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from the coal shortage aggravated by the harsh winter.13/ By
Septeni:ler1947 - a period of inminent collapse according to many
analysts echoing Marshall's assessment - the index of industrial
production had risen to 115 points climbing in Novemberto 123,
almost a 25%increase in industrial production over the 1946 level.
This trend continued throughout 1948 and 1949which averaged indices
of industrial production of 121 and 129 respectively14/ enabling
overall industrial production levels to rise by approximately 7-8%
annually between 1946-1950.
By early 1948 (before Marshall aid payments began to reach
Britain) production targets had been reached for deep-minedcoal
extraction and had been exceeded by 9.5%in open cast coal mining.
Similarly shipbuilding exceeded its production target whilst the
output of steel ingots, sheet steel and iron castings averaged a
figure of 3.5%in excess of estimated production.15/ The production
of IOOtorvehicles had risen fran a weekly average of 1,586 in 1938 to
a figure of 10,377 per week. in Septeaber 1948. The weekly output of
passenger cars totalled 6,926 in September1948 of which 5,046 were
produced for export in addition to 1,984 ccmnercial vehicles a week
exported, producing a record level of export for the IOOtorvehicle
industry.16/
A review of the building and civil engineering industries
reveals similar trerKis. With over 1,005,000 operatives enployed in
these industries in SeptEllber 1947 a total of 460,000 banes
(including 149,000 permanent hooses, 127,000 teIlporary houses am
181,000 oonversions and repairs) had been created by autUllU'lof that
year, caiplI'ed with a total of 5,500 haDes 'fit for heroes' provided
in the two year period following Worldwar 0ne.17/ An inpressive
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progranme of capital investm:mt had also been achieved in this period
with for instance £14m. of new machine tools produced for the
re-equipment of the engineering industries and a gross capital
investment figure for 1946 as a whole, including both maintenance and
new construction, in excess of £l,30Om.18/
For British productive capital an uneven but unmistakable
increase in overall productivity and output had occurrmsince 1946
and gained momentum despite intermittent fuel shortages throughout
1947. The theory of Britain's imminent economic collapse therefore
cannot be explained in terms of industrial stagnation.
Furtherm:>re despite Clayton's view that "millions of people
in the cities are slowly starving",19/ the estimated calorific value
of daily per capita food consunption in the UK increased fran a
figure of 2,800 for the crop year 1945-46 to 2,900 for the crop year
1946-47, with the index of weekly wage rates for all industries
increasing in proportion, but not falling behind, the retail price
index for 1947.20/ When the performance of British exports is
examined a similar upward trend emerges. 'Ibedynamic nature of
productive capital was reflected in the increase in the value of
exports of UK goods in 1947 which was, apart fran 1920, the highest
on record and nearly two and a half times the 1938 figure. Allowing
for price rises since 1938 the volume of exports in JUly 1947 had
increased to 26' IOOl'ethan in 1938 with the fourth quarter volwre
index figure approximately 117 points - showing a substantial
iDprovement on the first two quarter figures of 101 and 102
respectively, which were particularly affected by the fuel crisis am
adverse weather which disrupted the transport of goods for export. 21/
Exports of machinery and electrical goods reached record levels. In
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the second half of 1947, 88%of exports were mainly manufactured
articles, 2.5%rawmaterial exports, and 6%food, drink and tobacco
article exports.22/
This vigorous upwardtrend of British exports continued
ttuoughout 1948with a 32 point upwardlOOvementin the index of the
volumeof exports recorded in the second quarter of 1948 over the
canparable 1947 figure. By July 1948 the index stood at 149 points
(1938= 100), exceeding the target figure set for export-led econ~c
recovery by the goverrunentin late 1947, without Marshall aid in any
substantial fonn having reached the UK.23/ The claLmthat Britain
faced inminent economiccollapse cannot draw support fran this second
indicator of economicdevelopnent, the level of export.
Danestic Reconstruction and the Sterling crisis
The 'crisis' of 1947 can nowbe clarified. FUll
enployment, capital reconstruction and rising danestic welfare had
been pursued with a certain indifference to the diminishing levels of
gold and dollar reserves held by the postwar state.24/ Dalton's
frequent Cabinet warnings that -we are racing through our USdollar
credit at a reckless, ever-accelerating speed-25/ illustrate this
orientation of the Attlee administration. 'l'ne decision to link
expaMing output to increased exports in an atteapt to sustain an
anbitioos dollar-fed daDestic reoonstruction programnehad
predictable, and at times severe, inplications for the level of
British foreign currency reserves in a world econanic context of
dollar shortage and near USDalopoly of vital raw materials. Pre-war
the UKhad financed large trade deficits with the USvia a high
level of invisible earnings plus the earnings of dollars in third
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markets, predaninantly in the underdevelopedworld. By 1947Ellrope
was running a cumulateddeficit on those invisibles of 0.6 billion
dollars26/ and the inconvertibility of sterling outside the Sterling
Area and the USAeffectively closed off third market dollar earnings,
intensifying British dollar demand.
The real 'crisis' of 1947 therefore had its origins not in
industrial stagnation, starving populations or restricted exports but
in the arOOitiousand successful danestic reconstruction progranm:!
pursued by the British state, that had been fuelled largely since
1945by the USand canadian loans. By 1947 this aid was allrost
exhausted. TheUKstate faced a temporary but serious problemof
foreign reserves. A survey of the direction of British exports, the
magnitudeof British inp:>rts, and the crisis in the state's currency
reserves will elucidate this interpretation.
Whilst the volumeof British exports increased
substantially throughout 1947 their destination had changedlittle
fran that of 1938. While in 193817' of UKexports went to hard
currency areas in the Western hemisphere, with 42' directed to the
Sterling Area, 36' to EUropeand approximately 4' to the rest of the
world, this pattern had changed litUe by 1947with 16' directed to
the Westernhemisphere, 47' to the Sterling Area, 30' to &1ropeand
5' to the rest of the worLd.27/ The overall regional distribution of
exports remaineds~ in favoor of the Sterling Area and Western
EUrope,drastically limiting the British state's dollar earning
capacity in hard currency markets. This problemwas caIpJWlded in
that the regional distribution of inports to the UKhad chaB1ec1
significantly since 1938with the UKdrawing in far ~re inports fran
the Western hemisphere. The pre-war figure of inports fran hard
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currency areas had totalled 30%,with the Sterling Area supplying
31.5%,Europe34%and the rest of the world approxUnately4%. By the
second quarter of 1947 45%of UKinp>rts derived fran hard US
currency areas, with 30.5%arriving fran the Sterling Area, 4%fran
the rest of the world and Europe supplying a diminished 19%.28/
Imports fran the Western hemisphere had increased fran a roonthly
average of £2S.Om.in 1938 to £83.lm. in July 1947.29/ The strain
which this pattern of trade imposed uponBritain's foreign currency
reserves (even taking into account the us and Canadiandollar
credits) substantially contributed to the econanic crisis of 1947 -
the dwindling dollar reserves of the British state. The origins of
this crisis have often been mdsunderstoodand need careful study.
The IDpact of the Convertibility Cbligatian
It is often suggested that the introduction of
convertibility in 1947markeda key episode in British economic
history leading to a major crisis and provoking a decline in UK
productive capital at the behest of the interests of the City of
London which it is claimed were victorious in preventing 'national'
industrial reconstruction and investment policies from receiving high
priority. 'Ibe interests of the national eoonany it is claimed were
scuppered by the victory of City interests forcing the acceptance of
the re-introduction of the UKinto a USdaninated liberal capitalist
alliance.30/ In all these accounts the introduction of
convertibility plays a key role in explaining the 1947 crisis. Thus
Brett maintains "without the crisis created by convertibility, the
huge reserve losses ••• woold have been avoided-. 31/ Yet the claim
that -the enforced attenpt to introduce convertibility in July •••
led to a major crisis· ,32/ is largely untrue. Close analysis reveals
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that the net monthly drain in British gold and dollar reserves
accelerated from $3~. in the first quarter of 1946 rising to $124m.
in the fourth quarter of 1946 and reaching a figure of $322m.by
March1947.33/ A significant dollar drain had therefore begun before
a single supplementarymonetary agreement enabling sterling
convertibility had been signed. With the official convertibility
date, the 15th of July 1947, sane four IOOIlthSaway, the UKhad
already experienced a substantial drain in its dollar reserves. An
examination of the UKdrawings on the us credit provides interesting
reading for those whogive a high priority to the Lmpactof the
convertibility obligation.
In the last six nonths of 1946 the UK's total paymentfor
its own ccmnitments (including those of the Sterling Area) taken out
of the UScredit anomted to $51Om. In the first six nontha of 1947
this figure stood at $1,63Om.and in the final seven or so weeks
until the 23rd August 1947 the total paymentby the UKfor its awn
conmitnents together with those of the Sterling Area taken out of the
UScredit aroountedto $97Om.34/ In allover $3,35Om.of the OS
credit had been drawnby the end of August 1947. A breaKdownof the
drawings reveals that 70%were made to meet the liabilities incurred
by the UKin its own visible and invisible trading transactions, with
a further 20%of the drawings made to meet the demands of the rest of
the Sterling Area. Contrary to popular opinion the operation of the
convertibility clause (enabling currency convertibility to be
exteOOedto sane South Americannations and the majority of Western
&lropeancountries) accounted for not lOOrethan six per cent of the
drawings of the UScredit (the conversions by Belgium, often singled
out as a major contributor to the crisis, were later established to
have been only $20Bm.).35/ Thus, whilst the convertibility clause
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drewwidespreadattention to the British dollar drain thereby
supplementingthe real crisis with a crisis of confidence in
sterling, it is not the case that the rapid exhaustion of British gold
and dollar reserves was brought about by the enforcement of the
convertibility obligation. '!be two IOOStiaportant phenarena revealed
by a study of the relevant public documents, firstly that the drain
began in a signif icant waybefore any supplementaryaonetery
agreerrents had been signed and secondly that only 6%of the drawings
on the us credit can be traced to the operation of sterling
conversion, Lndi.cateathat the real causes of the foreign reserve
crisis must be sought elsewhere.
The central explanation of the crisis in the British
state's currency reserves must be related to the expanding industrial
and danestic reconstruction programnesinitiated under Dalton. The
high demand for ~rts of raw materials, food, construction goods
and other catIOOditiesessential to sustain this expansionist strategy
coincided with the loss of dollar earnings in third markets and a
contraction of invisible trade, making the possibility of dollar
shortages ever mre likely. The failure to increase exports to the
hard currency areas together with the necessity to increase i.rcp>rts
fran the Western hemisphere in the wake of the destruction of manyof
the traditional EUropeanand Fast Ellropeansources of illplrts, began
the rapid exhaustion of UKforeign currency holdings.
'!he currency reserve problems resulting fran the industrial
and oc.mD::Xiity trade i.mbalance between the Fastern am Western
hemispheres (the UStrade balance on goods and services for instance
in 1946gathered a surplus of $1 billion increasing to $10.1 billion
in 194136/) were compounded for Britain by the substantial rise in
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the USindex of wholesale prices which rose 40%betweenDecember1946
and March1947. This reduced the buying powerof the us credits by
alnost $1 billion from the tine of the negotiation.37/ The price
paid for imports in early 1947was therefore in excess of 260%of the
1938 figures whilst the price of exports had increased to only 210%
of the 1938 figure. This deterioration in the terms of trade had a
crucial impact on British foreign currency reserves. Allied to this
major cause of the crisis it is possible, as indicated in the
previous chapter, to cite the February fuel shortages, estimated to
have cost £200min lost and disrupted exports, British dollar costs
in Germanyunder the terms of the Fusion Agreementwhich by mid-1947
was makinga demandof $150mabove UKestimates,38/ and the
disappointing levels of <ianestic agricultural production (linked to
the generalised &.1ropean failure of recovery in primary prcxiuction)
which increased world price inflation and accentuated the EUropean
dollar scarcity. To sunmarise, contrary to the claims that the
convertibility obligation led to the crisis of 1947 it can be
<ieIoonstratedthat the major cause of the rapid exhaustion of the US
credit lay in the overseas expenditure of the UKand the Sterling
Area in its own visible and invisible trading transactions in a
context of dramatically rising USwholesale prices am massive
depemence on USsources of supply which placed an undue strain on
British foreign currency holdings.
The position of British capital accumulation in 1947 has
thus been sufficiently elucidated for this study to discount the view
that Britain was in the throes of a generalised econanic paralysis
and to replace Clayton and Marshall's erroneous opinions with a IOOre
precise interpcetation of the crisis which was precipitated by
specific deve10pnents in Atlantic trade and intensified by
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expansionist domestic reconstruction policies. Although, as I will
indicate, the British state resporrled to this crisis by proposing to
cut their planned investment programmefor 1948by 18%(a proposal
whichwas never carried through) and imposinga more rigorous ~rt
policy, the fact remains that in large measure the reconstruction
strategy continued.
Far fromMarshall aid I saving' a deteriorating economyits
resources were actually used by the state to ease balance of payments
constraints enabling the econQm¥to continue expansion without a
return to the deflationary policies of the 1930's. Marshall dollars
served to release resources for capital accunulation whichotherwise
wouldhave lain idle, that is to say they acted in a capital
liberating rather than capitaltransfusing tashion.39/ Theorthodox
account that Marshall aid "presented socialist Britain with an
economiclifeline"40/ forcing the UKto new levels of subordination
to UShegem:>nycan only be refuted by close analysis of the policy
ideals of the UStogether with a study of the amountand fonn of US
aid to Britain, the structure and organisation of the EUropean aid
agencies, and the British state's objectives as they developed in
response to the Marshall offensive. It is to these issues that the
study nust turn.
II. Americanand British Attitudes to Marshall
The Key CUrrencySolutioo Discredited
With the suspension of sterling convertibility 1n AUgust
1947 and the failure of the non-discrLmination clause to be applied
in any seriousness, Clayton acknowledgedlithe entire foreign economic
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policy of the united States was in jeopardy". 41/ The intensifying
Europeandollar shortage irXiicated that the whole United States
international economicprogrammewould have to be written off as one
country after another experienced dollar difficultues. As later
recounted in a Us Ccmni.ssionon Foreign Economicpolicy report, by
the second half of 1947 it had became painfully evident that the
USA's inmediate postwar foreign economic policies grounded in the
"Bretton Woods/KeyCUrrencyproposal" alliance had been based upon
"incorrect political and economic assumptions".42/ The assumptions
that firstly in the transition phase the emergency needs left by the
war could be met by orderly assistance progranmes (by the British
loan, credits exteOOed in connection with other lend-lease
settlements, loans from the Export-]mport Bank, credits from the
Bretton Woods institutions) and secondly that after the transition
phase private foreign investment would revive and together with the
apparatus of the International Bank for Reconstruction am
Developnent furnish an international IlDletary network suitable for an
expaOO.ed world econany, proved a grossly inadequate appraisal of the
international eoonanic and political postwar situation. Yet the
achievement of a system of nul.tilateral world trade based on the twin
pillars of sterling convertibility and non-discrLmination in trade
remained the driving force behind USforeign econanic policy
theorising. Althoogh the 'KeyOlrrency/Bretton bxls approach to
achieving these aims had been thoroughly discred1 ted by the sumner of
1947 the aims thatLselves remained intact with the Us Treasury
continually pressing the British state for an outline of the methods
by which the UKhoped to attain the agreed objectives - particularly
that of oonvertibility.43/
The need for a new approach to attain these objectives and
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simultaneously safeguard ~ica' s strategic political and military
interests in Western Europe was intensifed in 1947 not only by the
extension of Soviet mdlitary power into Eastern Europe but also by
the need of the us to maintain its colossal export surplus in the
face of a predicted domestic recession. The lack of available
international credit, the planned tapering off of us aid progranmes,
and the depletion of foreign currency reserves madea sharp decline
in us exports look inevitable.44/ Tbmanyin the adRdnistration,
including Walter salant and John Snyder of the President's Council of
EconomicAdvisors, the us export trade - $14.7 billion in 1946 rising
to $19.7 billion in 194745/ - was muchmore than a cushion for any
minor recession. Rather they saw exports as a er i tical prop to the
entire domestic econany. 46/ Likewise the State-War-Navy
Co-ordinating Coomittee under General Hilldring (instructed by
Achesonto investigate the world's need for further military and
econanic aid, in conjunction with State Departmentrepresentatives)
concluded that any substantial decline in the us export surplus would
have a depressing effect on business activity and enployment in the
US, with any significant drop in European purchases having serious
implications for both world recovery and political stability.47/ The
withdrawal of the UKfran Greece and Turkey in February 1947 had also
iooicated to the USthat military experXiiturewould have to be
increased in the postwar period as the US, via the Truman doctrine,
replaced Britain as the key defeIXier of world liberal (and in many
cases not so liberal) capitalist relations.
The USA'sresponse to this crisis in foreign political and
econanic policy was to switch eR{)hasisaway fran a focus on Britain
as the sole key to econanic recovery for the rest of the world
towards a view that the integrated d.evelopDentof FAlrope as a whole
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was vital to world recovery and a prerequisite to achieving the
general aims of us coemercfal,and financial policy. Stressing the
role of the economicrecovery of WestGermany,the substitution of a
regional for a nation by nation approach to Europe's problems, aOO
that there should be no substantial diversion of European resources
from recovery to rearmament, the Americanadministration sought to
sweepawaythe nation state as the basis of the Europeanpolitical
and economicsystem in attempting a total integrative reconstruction
of Western EUrope under the benign auspices of a •recovery prograRm:!'•
The turn towards the policy of European integration as a method of
solving the Germanproblem, maintaining capitalist relations in
Europe, sustaining the us export surplus, halting Soviet advance and
promotingus style multilateralism under the apparently politically
neutral guise of aid for increasing productivity and prosperity, had
strong support in the us administration, echoing the mich earlier
co-operative internationalist schemesof Wbodrow Wilson.48/
This orientation of US foreign econanic policy had been
dormantduring the Second WorldWar whenit was believed that a
regional grouping in Western&!rope could possibly destroy the
universalism that was the objective of Americanpostwar policy and
that constituted the basis for Americaninsistence on the creation of
the United Nations.49/ In January 1947 however it received a new
.iq)etus when John Foster Dulles called for the reconstruction of
FAlrope along faieral lines, including a decentralised German
confederation, under Americanleadership.501 The notentum for this
type of solution gathered pace throughout 1947 aOO was consolidated
by Acheson' s speech, that became the precursor to Marshall' s Harvard
address, in which he asserted that -&!rope's recovery cannot be
catplete until the various parts of &!rope's eoonany are all working
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together in a harrooniouswhole ••• the achieveJlelt of a coordinated
Europeaneconomyremains a fundamental objective of our foreign
policy".5l/
Thus by early June (prior to the Harvard address of the 5th
of June) Achesonand Clayton had infome::i the British state that lithe
piecemeal approach of fixing up one country after another will not
receive political support a.OO nust be abandoned".52/ The Bretton
Woods/KeyCUrrencysolution had been "thoroughly discredited" and
Achesonand Clayton admitted that in the present situation they now
"had to eat practically every word that they had uttered before
congressional Committeesduring the past three years".53/ The future
lay in an integral plan of econanic co-operation workedout for
Europe as a whole, even if a temporary consequence of such
integration in the context of a world dollar shortage would be
discriminatory against the United States. The key to restoring
Fm'opeanproductivity, it was claimed, lay in a massive recovery
progranmetranscerXling national bouOOariesand founded on the
principles of collective action, maximJmEUropean self-help and
mutual aid, the pooling of information and resources, and the
re-integration of Germany,which it was ~ised even in defeat "is
still the potential heart of EUrope-.54/
The USadministration therefore advocated a form of free
trcde cust.aos union in which the restrictions on the m::wementof
capital wwld be renw;,vedfran a particular area thereby maximising
efficiency, output, and incane allowing EUrope to reach similar
leyels of productivity and prosperity to that already attained in the
US, ultimately restoring the equilibrium in world trade without which
US-style IlUltilateralism was inpossible. 'Ibe Marshall offensive, it
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was claiIred, would improveWestern Fllrope's capacity to earn dollars
both through increased exports and by an expanded inflow of US
invest:.aent. This would create a situation in which the restoration
of multilateralism, price stability and the recovery of production
could be achieved whilst also realising the close link between the
eoonondcintegration of Western Fllrope into one large market and the
achievement of a stable, loyal political bloc.55/
Before analysing the role planned for Britain in this new
Americanapproach it is Lmportant to consider the immediateBritish
response to Marshall.
Britain's Strategy of Non-ccmnittal co-ordination
Manyanalysts report Bevin's initial reaction to the
Marshall offer - -it was like a lifeline to sinking men ••• we
grabbed the lifeline with both hands- 56/ - as an indication that the
British state wholeheartedly accepted the co-operative integrationist
Americanterms and thereby allowed the USto synchronise ruling class
hegE!lOODYin the North Atlantic area.57/ But the interpretation
outlined for instance by Bob IDvett, USUnder Secretary of State,
that -the special wartime position for Britain ••• (was) now
inconsistent with the concept of Western &lropean integration arxl the
other objectives of the Fm'opean Recovery Programne-,58/ simply was
not accepted by the British state and was a position by no means
taken for granted in the USadministration. The often invoked but
little understood notion of 'special relationship' could not be
abandoned in the wake of the Marshall offensive (even if successful),
principally because it had a material foondation which rested upon
the USA'scontinued reluctance to assume the role of the world's
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financial centre. Convertibility and the position of sterling as the
worlds' premier currency were issues which remained unresolved in the
Marshall aid schemeand therefore termination of the special
relationship seemedpremature to manyparticipants. The fact that
the Overseas Finance Division of the Treasury were studiously
contercplating "haameringout the basis for aUK/USeconcmic
partnership" in March195059/ clearly indicates that the economic
integrationist aspect of the Marshall offensive was never considered
a viable proposition by the British state.
Britain's position on integration was clarified immediately
after Marshall's June 5th offer in a memorandumwhich explained
"there are special considerations affecting the United Kingdan, as a
world trading power, in any conception of this kind not only because
we maybe pressed to contribute towards the needs of Continental
FAlrope gocxlswhich it is in our better interest to export elsewhere,
but also because the whole conception of &1ropeanI integration I needs
to be reconciled, if it can be, with our stated objective of a return
to nultilateral trade". 60/ If pressed on the issue the UKdelegation
was inforned to take the line that there is no time, at least in the
early stages, for nore than a roogh and ready co-ordination of
FAlropean requirements. In the context of the view that "it is not
the policy of His MajestyIs governmentto participate in a federal
regime in Western &trope am in forms of integration leading up to
such a system"61, the British state approached the Marshall offensive
with an attitude of obtaining max~ dollar aid whilst at the same
time sufficiently safeguarding the I1l1ltiple interests and
responsibilities which the OKhad established worldwide. Although
fully aware that by accepting Marshall aid "we udght find ourselves
involved in a subordination of our econanic policy to the United
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Statesn62/, the British state avoided any such eventuality by a
series of manoeuvresdesigned to save face with the Americans (thus
ensuring dollar aid) whilst relinquishing no control, either to a
Europeanunion or trans-Atlantic ruling class alliance, of any major
aspect of econanic policy. Bevin's rather off the cuff Foreign
Office view - nowthe receiVed wisdom- whichmaintains that Britain
simply grabbed with bot.h hands Marshall's offer and was drawn, albeit
reluctantly, into an integrationist position does not stand close
scrutiny. Rather, the strategy adopted by the British state in
response to Marshall is best characterised as one of non-coomittal
co-ordination. This was a policy developed by Britain in response to
us charges of obstructionism. TObenefit from USaid the UKtook the
initiative in Europeanco-ordination gaining key positions in both
the CEECand the 0Ea:: and thereby preventing the implementation of
someof the wider USstrategies whilst retaining full control of
domestic policy making. A consideration of how the state viewed
Marshall's offer in the context of the crisis in Britain's currency
reserve levels further supports this interpretation.
The State's Search for Dollars
As outlined above the crisis in the state's reserve
ooldings did not reflect an overall crisis in production or
distribution. '!be crisis arose, the cabinet had deciphered by
October 1947, Rnot because we cannot produce enough in the UKto pay
for the supplies we need but because we cannot sell oor goods in the
market fran which our supplies alone can cane-. 63/ The large
proportion of foodstuffs and raw materials iqx>rted fran the Western
hemisphere could not be matched by a Sufficient export of UKgoods to
dollar markets to bring abalt a dollar balance. ~reover in the
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context of the world shortage of dollars and the inconvertibility of
sterling, the earning of dollars via UKsurpluses in third markets
was an avenue nowlargely blocked. The cabinet therefore concluded
"whateverwe do to maximiseour production and so our exports, even
if we greatly exceed our target, we shall be met by the same, for us,
insuperable difficultyn.64/ In this situation the British state
welccm:rldollar aid fran any quarter so long as it did not violate
two essential corditions. The debacle of the Anglo-American
Financial Agreenent led the governmentto privately VOtI "we shall
never again accept a commitmentwhich we do not honestly believe that
we can carry out a.OO maintain", a.OO seccn:ily "we shall not accept any
conmitmmt to ccmeinto operation at sane particular date in the
future. Circumstances can change and 1947 taught us (and one hopes
the USA)a bitter lesson in this respect".65/ The state's acceptance
of Americanaid "ImlStdepend on the form in which it maybe given,
and the condt tiona whichmaybe attached to it". 66/ Given such
provisos the flexible Marshall aid scheme, with its vague and
ambiguousnotion of integration, its grant-in-aid rather than loan
status, and its wide ranging general nature appealed to the
governmentas a wayof gaining dollars in the wakeof the rigid,
rapidly timetabled precisely conditioned loan previously secured fran
the US.
We shoold recognise that the Marshall offer represented
only one avenue that the state explored in late 1947 in an attempt to
ease the foreign currency crisis. In a series of manoeuvres,
including investigating the possibility of enlisting the services of
private financier Sir Clarence sadd to arrange a dollar credit
between a consortium of British am New Yorkbanks,67/ the UK
Treasury unofficially assessm how the foreign reserve balance could
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be improved. In addition to attempting to amend the regulations of
the IMFto enable two years I drawings to be made in one luap sum, the
Treasury pronouncedon various measures of "subterfuge"68/
principally involving the Reconstruction Bank, in a complexeffort to
gain dollars whilst maintaining a finely balanced tactical position
both in regard to the Marshall proposals and the application of
Article Nine (non-discrimination) "so as to give no legitimate excuse
to the Americangovernment for arguing that we had not fulfilled the
assurances we had given them". 69/ This tactical strategy included
the ploy of drawing heavily upon British foreign currency reserves to
re-sensitise washington to the British crisis, thereby creating a
situation in which the plain evidence that the UK was downon its
reserves might jerk the State Department into a more rapid time-table
for Marshall.
Whilst the cabinet was aware that there would be no further
substantial aid to anyone except within the ambit of the Marshall
Plan, and that this would be given to each country as a result of
bilateral negotiations which themselves would form part of a more
general plan, the open-ended nature of this general plan was easily
reconciled both with the continuation of I.abour' s daDestic
reconstruction programmeand with the provisos underlying the British
state's financial policy. USdollar aid, it was assumed, would flow
lOOreeasily to Britain as part of a general plan than through a
separate re-negotiation. This assuaption proved accurate. To chart
how the British state refashioned the US understar¥iing of Marshall
into a less threatening dollar aid scheme incapable of inp:>sing OS
hegemony on the UK we need to analyse haw the vague Marshall
proposals evolved into a series of fact gathering, dollar
distributing, technical co-ordinating oc:mui. ttees largely daninated by
157
UKrepresentatives.
III. TheAdministrative Apparatus
Setting up the CEEX:
The notion that upon hearing Marshall's June 5th offer
Bevin "IIDVed into action ••• with zest a.OO speed" creating a "new
basis for the political and economicdevelo~t of the North
Atlantic world"70/ is a pleasant enoughmyth for those whobelieve in
history as a succession of events enacted by 'great individuals of
the era', but nevertheless is an entirely false interpretation. In
late Maythe Attlee administration had been informed of a us aid
progranmefor an integrated Western &lrope71/ and by the 2nd of June
Acheson and Clayton had made it clear that Britain should take "a
IIDrevigorous lead in trying to bring Western &lropeancountries
together".72/ In view of the British state's opinion that "the UK
cannot participate in any wide expansion of preferential tariff
systems orin any European integration fund",73/ the motivation
behind the British initiative lay in gaining control of any
'integrative movement'in order to defuse the most disagreeable
aspects of such a scheme.
A second related myth which should be dispelled is the
opinion that Marshall inteOOedhis offer to extend to the Soviet
Unionam Eastern Europe. Marshall's statement that "our policy is
directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger,
poverty, desperatioo and chaos", 74/ is often taken at face value to
infer that "the offer was IDI!Ide to Europe, not just to Western Europe.
They did not wish to divide &!rope: responsibility for that mst lie
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with the Russians".75/ Yet the insistence that USaid dependedon a
co-ordinated Fm'opeanresponse leading to Fm'opeaneconanic
integration obviously prevented Soviet acceptance. This was
eminently clear (and eminently acceptable) to the Attlee government
whorecognised on the 6th of June that "Marshall's 'new plan' is
explicitly anti-Russian". Howeverfor publicity purposes "we
presumablywant to makethe 'new plan' look as Pan-Europeanand as
little anti-Russian as we can".76/ The Soviet Union's view that
Europeancountries should put up their requirements individually
without a co-ordinated progranmewas madethe point of great
contention by the British and French states, eventually leading to
~lotov' s withdrawal and the Soviets objecting that the preparation
of an overall programDemeant that smaller European states were being
subject to big power danination which would threaten national
sovereignty. '!he British and French insistence on a co-ordinated,
progranme, ~lotov prophesied, would result not in the unification or
reconstruction of Europe but rather beget divisiveness.77/ It is
clear fran this episode that neither Bevin nor Bidault wanted Soviet
participation. The fact that Britain and France eventually presented
a series of iooividual 'shopping lists' under a weak guise of
co-ordination to the USadministration for the distribution of aid
(on a basis hardly inconsistent with the original Soviet proposal),
showswithout doubt that the Soviet union was excluded fran
participation in the Marshall plan on political growns at every
level of its execution. MJreover a primary reason for setting up the
cannittee of European Econanic Co-operation (~) as the EUropean
counterpart to the USEooncmicCo-operation 1dninistration (EX:A)
(headed by Hoffmanwho saw bis PJrpoSe as "saving the world fran the
gang in the Politburo· oarplred to whan ·Hitler was a baby·78/)
rather than working through tbe UN's Fconcmiccatmi.ssion for Europe,
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was that the Soviet Union had six out of the seventeen votes in this
latter body and it would therefore have been difficult to marginalise
the Soviet Unionor draw up the necessary co-ordinated programme
without the formation of a newbody.791
Following a series of Bevin/Bidault discussions it was
decided to set up a "temporary organisation-801 for co-ordinating US
aid in the form of a 'carmi ttee of Assistance' which would regulate
the work of technical sub-comnittees dealing with subjects such as
food and agriculture1 fuel and power1 iron and stee11 transport and
manpc:1olier.Sixteen nations - Austria, Belgium, Denmark,France,
Greece, the Netherlands, Eire, Italy, Imceni:x:>urg,Norway,Iceland,
Portugal, SWitzerland, SWeden,Turkey, am the UK- convened the am:
under the chairmanship of Oliver Franks. Fach IDeIIt>er nation could
contribute to the work of the sub-ccmnittees which aimed at
collecting am collating technical data on the basis of lengthy
questionnaires. The supervision of these committees eventually fell
to an Executive cannittee of no IOOrethan five nations chaired by the
UK,which, together with France, 'hand picked' the other EKecutive
ne:nbers (Italy, Holland, Norway). O'lly Italy chose a representative
of ministerial status for the Executive canni.ttee. Contrary to the
view that the CEEX:: -was a major step on the road to &.1ropean recovery
and unity-,8l1 analysis of the CEEC'sconstitution reveals that the
low level of national representation together with the firm
orientation to focus on technical data and leave untouched wider
questions of &lropean integration, set the stage for a fundamental
opposition between the far reaching objecti vee of the Un1ted States
and the machinery of the CEEX:! which had been fashioned to OCIIplywith
the conditions for dollar assistance whilst resisting these wider us
ambitions.821 The significant divisions between the us and Europe
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(and betweenEuropeannations themselves) on such key issues as the
future political and econanic position of Gennany, the mechanismsof
intra-European trade, and the specific eoonoadcproblems of Italy,
meant that none of the rnenilercountries fully supported Americanaims
for the eEOC. 'Ibe concept of integration therefore remained
unexplored as national transient alliances developed on specific
policy issues amongthe member nations who each hoped to use elements
in the newUS strategy to further national reconstruction programres.
The glib official assessment that, in response to the
Americanwish that the CEECshould makerecarmeOOationsconcerning
the size and distribution of dollar aid to Western Europe, the CEEX::
simply "recognising that their economicsystems are inter-related and
that the prosperity of each ••• depends on the prosperity of all •••
completed its task at the end of September",831 hides a multitude of
tensions, ambiguities and machinations which characterised the body
and which served to illustrate both the extent of national divisions
aroongstmeai:>ersand the international obstacles thwarting the
political and economicaims of the US. 'Ibe history of the 'September
report' illustrates this last point. An advance draft of the report
infuriated the State Department since the &lropean bid for $29,200m.
over a four year period contained no provision for any 'continuing
organisation' or any reccmuendations for achieving &lropean
integration.84/ Bob Lovett explained to Marshall on receipt of the
draft, "progress so far is disappointing in that all that has care
out is sixteen shopping lists which may be dressed up by sane large
scale but very long term projects such as Alpine poIIIIer". 851 After
frenzied meetings between Clayton (plus other high officials of the
USadministration) and the Executive camli.ttee, the bid for aid was
reducEd to $17 billion of which $S30Om.would be available in the
161
first year. The report was substantially re-written under US
pressure and by the t~ of publication included a proposal that
participating nations would take effective steps to create internal
monetary and financial stability along with the reduction of trade
barriers, and, despite British opposition until very late in the day,
also included the clause that a permanent organisation expressing the
"common objectives and joint responsibility" of western Europe would
be created.86/
AUdd such diplomatic rhetoric the Convention of the
Organisation for European Econanic Ccroperation (QEEX:) was thus
signEd on the 16th April 1948. Whilst the agreement, dubbed by
Bidault "unique in the history of our Continent" ,87/ pledgEd the
sixteen signatories to ·close and lasting ~peration·, it
nevertheless carriEd over the tensions and divisions which had marked
the CEEC into the new organisation. Before analysing how the British
state subverted this second US attempt at providing effective
machinery for European ~c integration it is instructive to
consider the British state's management of the bilateral treaty
signEd with the US which ensured the continuity of dollar assistance
beyooo the first quarter payment which had begun on the 3rd of April
1948. Such an analysis will demonstrate firstly how the Americans
attenpted to use Marshall as a political lever and secordly how the
UK state successfully resisted such manoeuvring.
British Besistance to the Ecooanic Co-operation Agreement
Whilst many have interpreted the Marshall episode as a
clear case of British capitulation to American hegemony, others have
focused upon Marshall's key sentence that •it woold be neither
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fitting nor officious for this governmentto undertake to draw up
unilaterally a programmedesigned to place Europe on its feet·,881
and concluded that "the Americansdid not assert daninance over
Europeby the formulation of the Marshall Plan".891 This chapter
denies the validity of either of these interpretations and has
stzessed that, although the USclearly sought to impose their 'new
plan' to restructure the Western Ellropeaneconanies in the interest
of ext.eOOingAmericandaninance, this strategy was successfully
resistoo by the European (and especially British) states whosought
their awn solutions based on programres whichwould enable the
retention of econanic sovereignty and the expansion of domestic
reconstruction. A review of the negotiations surrounding the British
acceptance of the EconanicCo-operation Agreement901signed between
the UKand the USon the 26th June 1948 supports this latter
interpretation •
The view that USaid was founded on the principle of
non-interference in national sovereignty of the recipient nation is
quickly dispelled by studying the draft us agreement circulated in
May1948which as the Treasury recognised gave "the United States
very wide possibilities of interference in our econanic and financial
policy" .911 As a whole the draft version threatened to limit the
British state's econanic policy-making in the areas of external
conmercial policy (including i.nperial preference am
non-discrimination), export policy, exchange policy, and industrial
policy including nationalisation and the ending of subsidies to
production. Oltside of econani.c policy the draft contained articles
effectively transferring aspects of British law to the International
Court of Justice which Rowan described as "unprecedented and
undesirable".92/ Specifically Article Vof the draft agreement,
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dealing with trade poliey, attempted to infringe British economic
freedOOlin a manner beyond the aabit of the recovery proqraame, It
required the UK to accord US trade IOOstfavoured nation treatment
running until mid-1953with an undertaking not to increase
Commonwealthpreferences above their existing level nor to
discriminate in import restrictions against US goods beyond.the
extent penni tted in the International Trade Organisation Charter. At
the same ti.n'e the USA 'WOUld remain free to reject the Charter
obligations reverting to higher tariff policy at will.93/ In
addition the UK would be called upon to accept a similar roost
favoured nation obligation for trade with Germany,Japan, Trieste,
am Korea. Finally the article required the UK to prevent trade am
business practices which were considered detrimental to EUropean
recovery, in a waywhich "condemnedall restrictive practices as
harmful unless proved otherwise and obliging us to prevent any
particular practices the US mayspecify".94/ These provisos
threatened to considerably extend the existing UK comni tments
established under the tcan agreement which the UK had so far failed
to observe without penalty, and under the ITO Olarter and the General
Agreementon Tariffs am Trade which had failed to produce the
results requi.red by the USand fran which the UK could withdraw at
sixty days notice. Balancing provisions present in the ITO Charter
which enabled nations to waive the Olarter rules in the event of
severe inflationary pressure in 'IOrld trade, and outlined that tariff
reduction and export subsidisation llUSt be by negotiation only, were
moreover anitted in the draft USagreement.
In addition, Article X atteapted to weaken national control
of gold and excl'laBJepolicy by enabling the United States to put
severe pressure on the UK to alter the exchange rate whenever deemed
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desirable. It thus appeared to the Treasury that as a reaction to
the unilateral British decision to end convertibility in 1947 the USA
nowwished to bend the existing rules of the IMFmore completely to
its ownpurposes aod "to use it to intervene in crucial areas of
national econ~c poliCY~ing".95/
TheBritish state's resistance to these measures was
unfaltering. Since without the UKany "continuing organisation"
wouldhave been totally ineffective, the USAwere forced to delete
these provisions whilst gaining a ~tment from the UKta discuss
the question of most favoured nation treatment for Germanyand Japan
in a mannerwhichwould not involve its being linked to the bilateral
agreement.96/ For its part the UKmademinor carpranises. Private
Americaninvestments in Britain under the EX::A could be converted back
inta dollars and offset against recovery programmegrants whilst 5%
of the total appropriation would be set aside for the purchase of
strategic materials for the Americaneconany (a clause was also
inserted requiring 50%of the goods shipped under ERPto be carried
in Americanbottoms at USfreight rates).97/ Nevertheless the draft
agreement episode indicates that the political leverage of the USA
via Marshall was severly restricted and whilst minor concessions were
granted the British state managedto resist (and thereby help other
recipient nations to resist) the roore significant USincursions into
areas of national econanic policy-making. The view that Britain
capitulated to 1m&ican interests via Marshall is sinply not borne
out by a study of the esse or the bilateral Econanic Co-operation
Agreement. ~ver it is only by analysing the final form in which
Marshall aid cameto be organised in EUrope - that of the DE&:: - that
a definite position can be established.
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British Daninanceof the OBEX::
Americaninflexibility over the concept of a "continuing
organisation" measured the importance the State Depart.ne1tattached
to the OEEC as a final attempt to achieve their multilateral ideals
via the integration approach. Whilst manyUS officials involved with
the OEOC recollect that it was "a real force tending to pull national
policies constantly into a moreEuropeanpattern",98/ its
organisation markedthe limits rather than the extension of US
influence. The US attempt to co-ordinate the national econanic
policies of furope floundered on the sane series of obstacles
encountered by the CEEX:, notably the wide differences in danestic
econanic recovery policies reflecting fundamental differences of
econanic situation. Although dollar aid attenpted to solve the
financial aspect of the crisis inasmuchas the paymentscrisis was
temporarily eased allowing further daDestic expansion, the vague
nature of the Americanconcept of integration enabled nations to gain
dollars under the guise of co-ordination whilst in reality remaining
fundamentally divided.
Despite Americanhopes, shared by Sean MacBride- Eire
Minister for Econoni.cAffairs - that the O~ would lead the econanic
integration of Western Europe, becaning an "Fconomicgovernmentfor
WesternEurope",991 the British state's position was unoompranisingly
outlined by Cripps in that "we do not envisage the OBEX: should assume
any authoritative control over any nations' plans" .1001 To ensure
that the British view prevailed steps were taken to maintain tight
control over the constitutional structure of the organisation in a
manner practiced by the UK in its handling of the CEEC. As in the
earlier body, the OEFX: functioned via an Executive carmittee ~
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of representatives fran seven nations (the UK,France, Italy, SWeden,
SWitzerland, Turkey, the Netherlands) under which a nuni:>erof
technical ccmnittees were classified either as 'horizontal' (handling
general subjects over a wide field such as Prograrames , Balance of
Payments, Trade and Paynents, Manpc::Mer) or 'vertical' (dealing with
specific commoditiessuch as oil, steel, coal, textiles).
Constitutionally the Executive ~ttee was responsible to the
supremebody of the O~, the council, on which all sixteen ItIeI'OOer
nations were represented. Howeverin practice the Executive
Oommitteeheld the real power of the organisation partly for the
reason that it was the only section to sit in fairly continuous
session. lOll
The UK's position of daninance within this overall
structure rested not only on the fact that Britain held the
chairmanship of the Executive oammdtteein the person of Hall-Patch
(a devotee of Bevin am a continual source of annoyanceparticularly
to Averell Harriman, the Special AllDassadorof the ~, whan
Hall-Patch dismissed as a superficial careerist sinply using the B:A
appointment to foster his personal publicity both in FAlrope and the
usl02/) but also in that Britain invariably had key representatives
in each of the different bodies set up to deal with specific tasks.
For instance the UKalso held the chair of the Progranmescaonittee,
had a decisive representative in the 'Group of Four' (UK,France,
Netherlands, Italy) which worked out the first allocation of American
aid, chaired the 'oammdtteeof Five' (UK,France, Belgiwn, Greece,
Norway> which supervised the balance of payments negotiations
surrounding intra-Fm'opean payments scbemes, and held the
chairmanship of the Balance of Payments Omnittee. In addition, for
work on the OEEX:' s long term progranme the UKheld the JOOSt
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influential position since the central decision makingunit fell
under the guidance of the chairmanof the Executive Coomi.ttee,
disappointing the French whowere increasingly suspicious (and
rightly so according to Hall-Patch) that Britain "also have the
Swedishvice-chairman of the Executive carmittee in their
pocket".1031
To the continual chagrin of the Americansthe British state
displayed a remarkable ability to "produce the right man for whatever
task was roost in'portant at the nment", 1041 thereby side-stepping any
proposal whichwouldeither threaten UK econanic sovereignty or
reduce UK dollar aid. The UK willingly endorsed benign 0EmC
objectives such as that which stated that "in developing the meansof
co-operation between them the individual nations shall retain their
freedan to adopt techniques of econanic administration that are
appropriate to their general econanic and political objectives".
Howeverspecific suggestions that national investment pro;ranmes
should be collectively examinedwere forthrightly rejected by the UK,
on the grourxis that "the scale and direction of our investment
pro;ramne is a central feature of our full enploymentand general
econanic recovery policies and we cannot thus accept any appreciable
loss of control OYer it".lOSI Given the British state's high level
of activity in and substantial influence over the QEIOC; as a whole, it
is hardly surprising that in response to Americancriticism Bevin
would not consider enlargit9 its scope or amendingits COllstitution
(except in the direction of Clarke's suggestion106/ that whilst it
was essential for the UK to retain the chairmanship of the Executive
camdttee it might after all be advantagews to have the chair of any
oannittee the Americanssought fit to propose, such as that of a new
Econanic Policy camu.ttee).
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Low-level British-d~nated inter-governmental
co-ordination thereby characterised the UKstate's strategy in
response to the Americanwish to achieve USstyle multilaterlism via
Europeanintegration. The precise methods by which the USAsought to
fashion an OBEX::-ledEllropeaneconanic integration, adamantly deciding
that the OEECshould recommendthe allocation and distribution of
dollar aid and forcing the DEBe to produce a commonlong term
progranmefor Ellropean econanic recovery, failed to achieve this aim.
Not only did the Americansmeet strong British resistance to any
extension of the scope of the organisation in a 'supra-national'
fashion, but the OBEX::as a mechanismcould not overccma the barr iers
thrCllm up by the other nation states in regard to such fuOOamental
issues as the role of Germany,the operation of the ftt>nnetplan in
France, the apprehensiveness of the Italian governmentwith regard to
a free capital market, the gross Dutch international def ici ts, and
the preparedness of the Belgians to allow a direction of investment
shaped by international patterns of catparative advantage.1Q7/
Themultilateral world aLn of the UScould not be sought via a
vehicle which, whilst left in the hands of the &1ropeans, eventually
managed only to strengthen individual econanies (by easing foreign
currency reserve problE!llL9)thereby reinforcing a world economic
structure fundamentally based on the nation state.
It has thus been argued that firstly in 1947British
capital was not in the grip of a general malaise but rather the
British state was experiencing specific difficulties in its foreign
currency reserve managementbecause of the widespread dollar shortage.
The dollar problemwas intensified by the government's plrsui t of
expansionist daDestic progranmes in the context of a maldistribution
in the world's resources further aggravating balance of payments
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problemscaused by the superior productive structure of the USA. The
Marshall Plan eased the British dollar position. Yet the European
agencies set up to adadnister USaid could not produce the
integrated Europeancapital which the Americansneeded to further
their own export surplus and wider multilateralist aims. COntrary to
popular opinion UShegemonywas not established over the British
state or economyby the Marshall offensive. Despite the application
of considerable political pressure, the British state refused to
relinquish any meaningful aspect of ~c sovereignty, replacing
the us wish for integration with a muchmore benign version of
non-comndttalEuropeanco-ordination within which the principle of
national econcmicand political decision-making autonomywas duly
inscribed. The constitutional structures of the CEEX: and the OEEX:
together with the proposals informing the bilateral Econanic
co-operation Agreementreflected the successful application of the
British state's strategy. Britain did not accept Americanleadership
in a newworld economicorder via the Marshall offensive. 'Ibe
account of the British state slowly sinking to new depths of
capitulation to us interests sinply does not stand close scrutiny.
It would however be foolish to leave an appreciation of the
i.rtpact of the Marshall offensive on British accuIII.1l.ationat this
level. ~ilst we can discard the grand 'capitulation' thesis it
remains for this chapter to assess the precise affect of the Marshall
offensive - USaid disbursauents, direct Anglo-Americangovernment
and industrial links, USpolicy for sterling - on the developnent of
the British econany in the context of Cripps' austerity
Chancellorship up until sterling devaluation (whichwill be
considered in the following chapter). To acca1plish this task the
remaimer of this chapter will assess the key developnents which took
170
place in the British economyunder the auspices of the Marshall
offensive, whilst charting the precise role played by dollar aid in
the overall accumulation process.
IV. Assessing the IDpact of the Marshall Plan
Industrial Restructuring am the Marshall Plan
The UK's national progranmefor economicrecovery submitted
to the OEECin December 1948108/ outlined the intention of the
governmentto bring about a rapid recovery in the general econanic
situation by meansof an increase in production, the elLmination of
inflation, the expansion of exports and invisible earnings, the
diversion of purchases away from the Western hemisphere arxi the
adjustment of iIIports to a level consistent with the expected long
term capacity to pay for them. The success of this progranme
depended on the continued expansion of industrial production to meet
the priorities outlined by Cripps whereby "first are exports, second
is capital investment in industry, and last are the needs, canforts
and amenities of the family".l09/
The British state's concern to increase production struck. a
deep chord not only with the USadministrators of Marshall but also
with the USChaIdJer of ccmnerce and key Americanindustrialists.
with sinplistic political aOO econanic reasoning the USposition was
exenplified by the likes of Ray Gifford, Olairman of the Borq-warner
International Corporation and adviser to the USDepartment of
canoerce, whoconcluded, "the spread of Marxian ~nes may be
stopped (in Western !Drape) by bettering the world's standard of
living through the direct application of many of the samemethods
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that have been so conspicuously successful in the world's most
productive free society - the United Statesn•llO/ The American
belief that the greatest service the USAcould render to Britain
(outside of dollar aid) would be Ato give them our industrial
managementand technical aid in the modernization of their plants and
methods and processesn,lll/ prompted Hoffmanand others of the US
administration to attempt a restructuring of British productive
capital along fordist lines.
But the claim that the Marshall plan laid the material
fourxlations for an Atlantic econany based on the generalisation of
fordism by injecting purchasing power for innovative production in
Western Ellrope,ll2/ cannot be accepted as an accurate interpretation.
Although the USundoubtedly wished to carry the dollar-led Marshall
offensive further by the widespread export of American aCClllllllation
conditions in 1948, private US investment did not materialise in the
Marshall era. The narrowness of markets, exchange control obstacles,
non-convertibility of sterling, ineffective Anglo-American
productivity meetings and the very low level of dollar aid received
by Britain (together with the inappropriateness of manyof the
USA'sproductive techniques to a British econany geared to export
rather than mass consumerdanestic markets) all constrained American
attempts to restructure British productive capital. An analysis of
two praninent atteapts to refashion the UK industrial sector - one on
an inter-governmental basis, the other on an industry to irxiustry
basis - will highlight the validity of these remarks.
'Ibe Anglo-AmericanProductivity cameil
The US interest in exporting Amer iean accuaulation
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conditions to Europe is often seen as a political moveeffectively
disguised behind the facade of the supposedly apolitical politics of
productivity.ll3/ This interpretation holds that the theme of
productivity acted as a substitute for the harsher questions of
allocation stressing that by enhancing productive efficiency, whether
through scientific management,business planning, industrial
co-operation or other corporatist tendencies, the Americanstrategy
could transcend the class conflicts that arose fran scarcity. Whilst
great store was set by movingEUropefran the I realm of material
necessi ty' to the 'realm of abundance' it is inaccurate to claim that
the us adDdnistration "viewed the transition to a SOCietyof
abundanceas a problem of engineering, not of politics".114/ The
political justification for increasing productivity - to prevent the
'lure of camumism' - was always prcminent in the productivity
rhetoric with the more perceptive US officials acutely aware that
class conflict arose fran the process of production itself and was
not therefore simply a question of distribution. Hoffmanfor
instance objected to any State encroacllnent on private capital,
claiming in the wakeof proposals for steel nationalisation, "they
should oot use our dollars to engage in social experimentation ••• if
they start playing ducks and drakes with their econany ••• we are
going to holdup the investment".ll5/
'nlis line of thought led to the establish.nent of the main
inter-governmental agency by which the US, uOOer the auspices of
Marshall, sought to restructure British productive capital - that of
the Anglo-AmericanProductivity Council. Hoffman's allegations that
British managementrequired a new attitude to technical efficiency,
new Americanproducti Ye techniques, a worker acceptance of new
methods, greater output per manand lIklbility of labour, "otherwise
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Congressmaybe reluctant to provide funds",116/ prompteda swift
response fran Cripps. With Board of Trade backing he agreed to set
up a Council "to exchange views on the question as to whether there
are ways in which the United States industry could ~perate in
assisting increased productivity and to take such steps as are
consistent with this programneand with similar objectives of the
EconondcCo-operation Adrrdnistrationn•117/ A series of initial
meetings began in wIldon on the 25th of October 1948 during the
course of which various sub-camri.ttees dealing with standardisation
of productivity, specialisation of industry, economic information,
the maintenance of productive plant and power, plant visits, and the
exchangeof production techniques were appointed. The TUChad
eaphasised its support for the Council by stating "it cannot be too
clearly brought before the membersof affiliated organisations that
the only meansof carrying these national overhead charges (brought
aboUtby the shorter working week, a weeks holiday with pay,
increasing old age pensions, raising the school leaving age,
consolidating the NHS)is by greater production .•• and by rEJOOVing
the chief obstacle to the inprovement of productivity ••• the
attitude of suspicion and hostility of the workers concerned".118/
Yet, although these sub-cannittees were staffed with Trade Union
leaders such as Deakin aId Lawther it is a mistake to assume that
Americanassistance was inmediately forthcoming or that the UK
industrial sector welcaned such a strategy.
'Ibe Board of Trade and the Ministry of Laboor had
identified factors which would contribute towards increasing
productivity. 'Ibey cited an increase in technical efficiency
involving the use of inproved materials, machinery, processes and an
ample am continuous supply of power as well as iDprovementsin the
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efficiency of managenentand the labour force. Nonetheless specific
constraints halted the British adoption of fordist accumulation
strategies in 1948. Worktowards laying the basis for such
oondi,tions had been taken via the establishment of the Departmentof
Scientific and Industrial Research, via the support given to the
British Standards Institution, the British Institute of Management
and the Regional bodies fostering Joint Production canni. ttees. Yet
these steps were largely cosmetic throughout the life of cripps'
Chancellorship and were mainly promptedby the British realisation
that "there will urrloubtedly be trouble if the Americansthink that
we are not sufficiently interested in productivity or that we are not
makinguse of the assistance which they can give us·.ll9/ Stressing
that "the relation betweenworkers and employers in this country is
quite different from that in the United States· the real Treasury
viewwas that "it is essential to avoid an unregulated stream of
Americanscaning over here, either individually or in groups, making
superficial investigations and ill-considered reports".l20/
Constraints an the Adoptionof Fordism in 1948
While the British state was pledged to increasing
productivity the position of the British econany in the Marshall
period was not conducive to the widespread adoption of Anerican
fordist strategies. '!be problems facing manufacturing in the two
countries were by no meansidentical. In particular the vast USbane
markets calling for mass prcx1uoedconsumergoodswere absent in the
UKwheremanypotentially haDe based industries were handicapped
because their product was considered inessential whilst their export
potential was limited by foreign i.np)rt restrictions. In addition,
shortages of rawmaterials (particularly steel) and the need for
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restraint in capital expenditure (in line with Cripps' priorities)
all acted to hold dovmtotal output below the level whichwould
justify planning for mass production. Furthermore it waswidely
believed that any large scale attempt to impose Americannethods of
time and motion study would result in hostility leading to industrial
stoppage rather than increased output. While the British econany
remainedgeared to an export-led recovery in the context of exchange
control obstacles, inconvertibility of sterling, raw material
scarcity, and low homemarket demand, the application of fordist
accumulation techniques was s~ly not a viable proposition.
AmericanCouncil of Aid to Fm'opean Industry
Energetic attempts to establish USproductive techniques on
an iooustry to iooustry basis, rather than relying on government
initiative, ran up against the sameobstacles whilst also
encountering the British industrial sectors' distrust am disapproval
of Americanenforced restructuring. An approach by Charles Davis -
President of Borg-warner (one of America's largest producers of
autaoobile parts am equir;mentwhose officials were actively
identified with both the USNational Association of Manufacturers and
governmentcxmnerceagencies) - canvassed by RayGifford on the basis
that "governmentloans are about the poorest form of risk, whereas
advances on an industry to industry basis if handled properly are
generally rapid" ,121/ is worth reviewing in this cootext. Gifford's
principal reccm:nendationwas to set up an "AmericanCouncil of Aid to
FAlropean Industry" to provide the services of the USA'stop
industrial executives, sub-executives, engineers, production and
marketing experts alXl technical specialists to the sixteen &1ropean
nations whichwere beneficiaries of Marshall aid. The purpose of the
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plan was the raising of living standards "to resist the lure of
cammunism",122/ and it attempted to combine sections of the
Federation of British Industry with the US National Association of
Manufacturers to render a real service to the ECA.
Yet by the 16th November 1948 Gifford's initiative had
failed, alroost entirely due to FBI lack of interest and distrust.
The only material manifestation of the negotiations was the
suggestion by Gifford that Borg-warner open a plant in the UK to
concentrate on the production of standardised gear boxes .123/ To the
UK manufacturers specialising in the production of a variety of gear
types the suggestion was an anathema and raised thoughts that Gifford
was angling to set up a UK factory without new plant to simply
aBSE!!lDle~ican made parts - a lOO\7e which woold have brought little
benef it to UK industry (a fear which continues to haunt the minds of
British industrialists). Norman Ripping - Director General of the
FBI from 1946-1965 bemoaned Gifford's ·patronising attitude"
throughout the negotiations and decided that British industry should
not entertain ·visits of American professional business consultants
of whan the FBI had no very high regard- .124/
Alongside the accumulation conditions of British productive
capital which precluded large scale inpn"t aOO adoption of American
fordist strategies in the Marshall period, DUst also therefore be
added the UK industrial sectors' iDplicit distrust of such techniques.
The claim that the Marshall offensive laid the material fo.uXlations
for an Atlantic economy based on the generalisation of fordism
appears to be inaccurate in the case of Britain. The agencies
designed to acoc1IPlish a restructuring of British productive capital
appeasei the American demands for action on productivity (ard thus
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maintained the flow of dollar aid to the UK) yet were considered
cosmetic operations by the British state having little tangible
effect upon industry for the variety of reasons outlined above.
Furthenrore, while the UK's net receipt of aid for 1948-49 totalled
$935m., this represented a percentage of national incane of only 2.4%
of which only 8.3% was allocated to the import of machinery and
vehicles - the latter category accounting for only 0.4% of all 1949
tmports.125/ Specific constraints worked against the export of
fordism and the miniscule funds allocated from Marshall to machinery
and vehicle ~rts had no significant effect on the structure of
British productive capital. Before offering a conclusion on the
precise effect which dollar aid had overall on the British economy it
remains for this chapter to investigate the key developments which
took place in trade and finance under the Marshall offensive in this
first stage (that is up until devaluation) of Cripps' Chancellorship.
EUropean Perspectivas on 'l'rade and Payments
It is often overlooked, even by those who wish lJk)St
strongly to emphasise the hegemonic d~sions of the Marshall Plan,
that the Americans sought to achieve their integrative ideal not only
by insisting on &1ropean co-operative agencies, bilateral
negotiations and incursions into the industrial sectors of recipient
nations but also by close inspection and direction of EUropean trade
and paynents arrangements. 'My lOOVeS that facilitated intra-&1ropean
trade and payments were welcaned by the US as a step tcMards a
regional I1llltila.teral system based on the lOOdel of a &1ropean
clearing union. The leverage Marshall aid gave the US in directing
such issues warrants close scrutiny.
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With the terndnation of sterling convertibility the
limdtations on intra-European trading promptedmanynations,
particularly Belgium, whowere net creditors to Europe but debtors
with extra-European nations, to seek a solution whichwould enable
them to mobilise their credits in Europe to discharge their debts
with the Western hemisphere. The interests of nations in this
position, together with the British state's realisation that in the
wakeof Marshall's offer "the Americanswould never be content with a
schene which enlarged, say, Europeandemands for Americansteel if
those samecountries were unable for financial reasons to purchase
Belgian steel",126/ led to the canvassing of four proposals aimed at
exparrling intra-European trade and payments. The UKproposal centred
on enlarging the credit margins of the existing agreements to aid the
movenentof goods between the participatory nations. Yet this
proposal was specifically turned down by the creditor countries who
shCMedthemselves afraid of unrequited exports. Alternative schemes
such as that of a US dollar stabilisation fund and a dollar aid
transferability schemewere indefinitely shelved whilst a solution
based on the IOltual transferability of European currencies took
shape.
'Ibis latter scheme, established by Benelux, Italy, and
France, became the First Agreementon M.1ltilateral M:xletary
Ccltpmsation signed on the 18th Nc:weIJt)er 1947. '!be signatories
agreed to a system of autanatic DUltilateral offset of balances where
this was possible without increasing anyone's liability of gold
payments. For exanple if France owed Italy $3m., Italy awed Belgium
$5m., and Belgium0Wf.d France $4m., a central office (the Bank for
International SetUements (BIS) at Basle was named as agent) could
cancel France's debt to Italy, reduce Italy's to Belgiumto $2m., and
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Belgium's to France to $lm. Autanatically offsetting debts in this
way (called "first category carpensa.tions") would expand trade whilst
reducing the need for gold and dollar payments in trade anongst
participatory nations.127/ Eight other nations including the UK
joined as "occasional nent>ers"of the agreem:mtsince they were not
at this stage prepared to agree to third country transfers without
their consent. Althoughthe British state had adopted a system of
automatic transferability within the Sterling Area and the American
account nations and administrative transferability over a muchwider
area, the UKwas not prepared to relinquish administrative control
within FAlropefor the sake, as the Treasury saw it, of i.rlproving
Belgium's overall dollar position. The UKinterest, the IDndon
camtittee on FAlropeanEconanicCo-operation clarified, "lies not so
muchin tight and rather artificial obligations of convertibility to
a group - arbitrarily chosen fran the econani.cpoint of view - of
countries inside the Marshall FAlrope, but in exparning the
international use of sterling throughout the world as a whole", when
Sterling Area viability, dollar and non-dollar area equilibrium, and
higher reserve levels could be established.l28/
After the convertibility debacle the British state,
although camdtted to convertibility in the long run, was not going
to entertain a premature general re-introduction of autanatic
transferability (in however limited a form). The UKdiagnosis that
no financial panacea could cure miscellaneous deep seated econanic
ills proved correct and the initial Benelux aqreauent managed to
c::aIpensateonly $1.7m., out of a bilateral debit balance total of the
participating countries amountingto $762.~.129/ The limdted
obligations of occasional l1IIE!IDbers,the frequent need for specific
consent before transactions could be carried out, the attractions of
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bilateral bargaining, the fear of losing gold through the workings of
the clearing mechanism, and the tendency for a handful of nations to
emerge as creditors or debtors to the group as a whole all prevented
this simplistic agreement from accomplishing a European clearing
arrangement on the multilateral lines sought by the US
a~nistration.130/
J\merican Hopes of a Trade and PaymentsRalte to
!'I.lltilateralism
Nevertheless the Americans had viewed the Benelux
initiative as "an encouraging indication of greater economic
co-operation"131/ in EUrope, and decided to link the Marshall aid
paymentswith a new trade arrangement in the form of the First and
Revised Intra-EUropean Paym:mtsand catpensations Agreements of
October 16th 1948 and Septeniler 7th 1949. These arrangements were
modelled on the idea of re-distributing Marshall aid on the basis of
"drawing rights".
Belgium had expressed the opinion "we do not want Marshall
aid for ourselvesJ we want it to cover our needs by our own exports,
therefore we want our custaners to receive Marshall aid and pay us
the dollars we need".132/ Influenced by this suggestion it was
decided that any expected difference in the balance of paynwants
between a specific pair of countries walld becaDe the debtor
countries drawing rights on the creditor. For instance if as a
result of negotiation it was agreed that Italy expected to export to
France $llm. mre in goods and services than Prance would export to
Italy, then under the payments agreement Italy would grant France
drawing rights of $llm., deducted fran the Italian Marshall aid
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allocation.l33/ In effect the drawing rights represented dollar
gifts fran one OBEX:nation to another. Britain therefore, having a
large trade surplus with France, embarkedon tough bargaining
sessions to save dollars which would escape via the operation of
drawing rights.
Seventy-eight sets of bilateral negotiations were finally
concluded on this basis which had the result of cutting Britain's
dollar aid from $1,239m., to $935m. for 1948-49 representing a 25%
loss due to the operation of drawing rights.134/ By freeing sterling
balances held by OEEX::nations Britain contributed a total of over
$50Om.to financing intra-~opean trade in this one year alone
whilst the UK' surplus exports both visible and invisible, amounted
to not IOOrethan one fourth of this figure.l35/ AltOOUghBritain
thus viewed the arrangements as less than equitable the state was
consoled by the fact that the new agreement did not in any sense
eliminate the ~bilateral basis upon which Dalton had constructed
the UK's accunulation strategy. The ~ dubbed the arrangements "a
superstructure" resting upon bilateralism with the systems of gold
ceilings and dollar points together with other provisions of the
bilateral agreements remaining in foroe.l36/
OVerall the operation of the First Agreeaent was
constrained by manyof the factors which had blocked the original
Benelux initiative, and continued to thwart the Revised arrangement
from achieving a Jlk)renultilateral &.u:opean trade and payments system.
Drawingrights financed only approximately 8' of trade among ~
meni:>ersduring the twelve months eOOingJune 1949 and 8utcmatic first
category calp!Ilsations as a means of settlement remained extremely
DOiest with ~ meatJer turnover reaching only $16Om.fran October
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1948to June 1950 - less than 2%of the gross surpluses incurred
during that perioo.137/ As the British Treasury had foreseen, the
calculation of the amountof aid needed by each nation an this basis
surpassed the wit of man.138/ Despite complexrevisions, $260m.of
the drawing rights "finally established" remainedunused at the
expiration of the agreements with the proportion of the bilateral
deficits financed by drawing rights ranging from 0%for Italy to 89%
for Austria and the proportion of the bilateral surpluses from 0%for
Greece to 68%for Belgium.l39/ Faulty forecasting produced arbitrary
financial results. In addition, a system calculated on a purely
bilateral basis disregarding the developmentof each nation's overall
creditor or debtor position in Fllrope, produced unstable and
paradoxical consequences, adding for instance $30Om.to France's net
surplus and shifting the UK from a small surplus of $30m.to a large
deficit of $29Om.
Moreover the agreements in SCJDe cases fostered a
contraction of trade since once the drawing rights had been
established the beneficiary countries had a definite incentive to
make use of them even if better or mre essential iqlorts became
obtainable at lower prices from other sources. The danger of losing
the benefit could act as a deterrent to the re-adjustment of policies
whichmight reduce the nation's dei ici t belC7tlthe level of the
drawing rights which had been allocated.l40/ To the chagrin of the
PeA it slC7tllybecame clear that far fran Marshall aid forging a new
&u:opean nultilateralism, Americawas actually providing dollars to
increase the flexibility of the neo-bilateral frameworkDalton and
others had established in opposition to USwishes.
Despite the fact. that the Revised PaymentsAgreementof
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SepteaDer1949 included, after fierce resistance fromCripps, a
clause providing for transferability of drawing rights up to 25%-
that is to say one fourth of the total drawing rights could in
principle be used to settle deficits with other participating
countries as well as with the grantor itself - the operation of this
Rdnormultilateral ising aspect in the context of the continuing
nec-bilateral frameworkproved demonstrably ineffective. Since the
bilateral portion of the drawing rights <75%)had to be fully used
before tapping the multilateral portion, the system tended to remain
conspicuously bilateral for the entirety of the Revised agreement.
The use of drawing rights against countries other than the initial
grantor aIOOuntedto only 9%of the total drawing rights used under
the Revised arrangement,l4l/ whilst the sudden flood of devaluations
experienced before the end of Septent>er added to the confusion and
unreliability of the system.
Whilst the UStherefore applied immensepressure to alter
the trade and paymentsarrangements of Western &lrope - "never before
had Mr Harrimanand his expert advisers taken such a direct and
active part in a decision under the Marshall Plan that the &1ropean
leaders were obliged to make"142/- the neo-bilateral 8CCURUlation
strategies proved resilient to this latest multilateralist onslaught.
The British state had no intention of seeing convertibility
re-introduced by the circuitous route of a &lropean payments
agreenent143/ yet was obliged to join the arranganents to benefit
fran dollar aid. By taking the initiative in organising the
institutional machinerywhich decided the form of the arrangements,
the UKmanagedto resist the main 8Jli)itions PrA had for restructuring
the &lroepan trade and payments system whilst benefitting, albeit not
to the sameextent as France, fran Marshall dollars. Nevertheless
184
the price paid by the British state for this stubborn resistance to
the USdemandsfor backdoor convertibility was a calculated campaign
focussing upon trade liberalisation which laid the basis for the next
thrust of USforeign econanic policy.
Trade Liberalisation as a Counter Measure
As early as March1949Cripps realised that the wayto
resist us pressure successfully was to makeconstructive counter-
proposals to distract the EX::A fran pushing through maximum
transferability of drawing rights whichwould involve further dollar
loss to FAlropeanations given the UK's trading pattern. Cripps
therefore put before the cabinet a proposal for "a general relaxation
of import controls in Western &lrope with a view to diverting us
pressure for new&lropean payments arrangements which would involve
us in a loss of dollars" .144/ 'Ibis would take the fom of Open
General Licences (permitting any person to i.np)rt the goods in
question withcut limit - thereby amendingthe Import of Goods
(Control) Order of the 4th June 1940) for inports of specifiai goods
from specified nations.
Whilst proposing to take the lead in Lmportrelaxations
Cripps stressed that Britain could not continue them on the initial
scale unless other countries follONed the principle. 'Ibis resolve
was consolidated in mid-June with the cabinet recoomeniation that
"OEEX: nations should take steps to progressively eliminate
quantitative inplrt restrictions between one another, to achieve a
complete liberalisation of intra-European trade by 1951".145/ This
proposal, taken up by the 0Ea: and developed in the form of the
&1ropeanPaymentsUnion, will be analysed in the fol1CMingchapter.
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Howeverwithin the context of the Marshall offensive it has been
necessary to introduce the subject of trade liberalisation since it
was clearly a compr~se action taken by the British state to avert
further demandsfor sterling convertibility being pressed on the UK.
In the event it was a successful manoeuvre. Rapid British growth
experienced after devaluation put British capital on a footing from
which a cautious European-led multilateralisation of intra-European
trade and payments was judged to be warranted and beneficial to the
UKeooncmy.
The graOO.designs the EX::A has fostered for a rapid
achievementof their integrative Marshall-led ideals through a
manipulation of intra-&1ropean trade aoo. payments had met with the
samefailure that characterised their other schemes involving the
structure of the Europeanaid agencies, the bilateral agreenents and
the incursion into the sphere of productive capital. Yet the
pressure the USbrought to bear had opened up a newroote throogh
which their multilateral ideal could be sought, that of trade
liberalisation. Anyassessment of the Marshall offensive rust
recognise this point amid the generalised failures of the US
administration on IOOStother fronts. It remains for this account of
the inpact. of the Marshall offensive on British aCCUl1lllationto
analyse the precise role playEd by dollar aid in the overall process
of capital accunulation and thereby mve t.aArds an assessment of the
claim that "it is inconceivable that the econanic and social policies
of the Attlee governmentcould have survived without this massive
platform".l46/
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Cripps I Danestic Measures to ReduceDollar Spending
The central priorities for dealing with the drain in
foreign currency reserves had been established by Dalton long before
the chaos of August 1947. By March 1947 Dalton had stated that an
export target of 140% of the 1938 volumewas to be reached by the
second quarter of 1948 and a diversified ~rt programmefor 1947/48
was to reduce food imports fran hard currency sources by at least
£.8Om.1471 In the wakeof the rapid exhaustion of the USdollar
credit Cripps consolidated and expanded these priorities, proposing
that physical output be increased to a third above its pre-war level,
whilst exports were to be expanded alJoost 40% above the 1947 level
(150' of the 1938 volume) and ~rts would receive muchmore drastic
cuts than envisaged under Dalton.1481 To these basic measures Cripps
announcedthat, in order to rapidly increase the volumeof exports in
the near future, labour, coal, steel and other materials would have
to be switched fran manufacture for the hane market to manufacture
for exp:>rt and this would result in the -postponement of certain
investment projectsw•1491
This proposed cut in capital investment wouldmainly fall
on construction, and investment in plant a.OO machinery, reducing the
gross anomt of daoestic investment fran a projected figure of
£l60Om.for 1948 to £l32Om. (an overall reduction of 18' in the
forecast for fixed investment for 1948) .1501 Finally, with regard to
budgetary practice, Cripps developed the notion of -disinflation-
which he defined as -the reduction of an undesirable degree of
inflation-, as opposed to deflation which -is not merely the rEIIDVal
of undesirable inflation but is the creation of a positive degree of
deflation below the normal in order to aoca1plish sane particular
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end" (in terms of Cripps' motor tyre analogy "if it is pumped up too
hard you disinflate it to the right level, but whenyou get a
puncture you deflate it altogether").15l/ Although such explanations
amusedcontemporaryccmnentators, the reasoning behind the rhetoric
was clear in that since inflationary pressure would be increased as
exports expanded consumpt.Lon had to be limited and a policy of wage
restraint (linked to increased prcxiuctivity) was essential if
Britain's relative cost and price structure was not to movetoo far
out of line with those of the US and other foreign eoooamies.152/
Cripps thus took steps to prevent the developnent of a dangerously
inflationary situation by combininghigh direct taxation on personal
incooes and distributed profits (applying equally to the lower earned
incateS via the intrcxiuction of PAYE tax and indirect taxation
increases) with a TOC-backed policy of wagerestraint consolidated by
announcementsproclaiming that -there is no justification at the
present time for any rise in incanes fran profits, rent, or other
like sources and rises in wages or salaries should only be asked for
and agreed upon in exceptional cases- .153/
A def ini te structure had therefore been established under
Cripps for expaOOingcapital accunul.ation whilst reducing the strain
on the British dollar deficit. yet despite these measures the
cabinet decided on the 23rd June 1948 that further drastic action
would have to be taken to reduce the dollar drain if Britain received
no Marshall aid .154/ The econanic consequences of receiving no aid,
it was clai.mai, would be manifest in no further purchases of US
tobacco, abolition of standard petrol, reduction of the dollar food
i.np>rt progranmeto canadian wheat only, reductions in general food
rationing to a level 10' below the pre-war average, reductions in
consumergoods, industrial dislocation, and a 12' cut in the raw
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material import programme.
Marshall Aid - An Econanic Lifeline?
It has been on the basis of these assessnents that many
analysts have claimed Marshall aid "presented socialist Britain with
an econoadc lifeline".155/ Pointing to the indispensability of
Marshall aid it is assumedthat Britain "tied herself - with ever
increasing servitude - to the USA",lS6/with low rates of investment
a key aspect of the British 'decline'. The Attlee government, it is
clainsl, in the context of the dollar drain and Marshall credits,
failed "to create the kind of climate [necessary] for large scale
investment and rapid increases in productivity".157/ This
interpretation howeverdoes not give an accurate picture of the role
of Marshall aid in British econanic reconstruction.
To understand the weakness of the "econanic lifeline" view
two points IIllst be emphasised. Firstly it is not adequate for an
analysis of actual econanic developnent to rely either on government
conmand papers or upon unpublished state documents which merely
attenpt to estimate future trends or consequences. In this context
both Cripps' 1948 pronouncementsand cabinet future trend estimations
are unreliable and insufficient as sources for an assessment of the
inportance of Marshall aid. For instance while Cripps was proposing
an increase in physical ootPlt over foor years to a third above its
pre-war level, in actual fact output in late 1948 already exceeded
20%of its pre-war volume. Similarly Cripps' "aabitious· aim to
expand exports was in fact very IOOdestsince they already stood in
1948 27%higher than the 1947 level. Fixed investment provides
another exanple in that Cripps expected an increase of only 17.
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between1947 and 1953 but, unknown to the Treasury, investment in
1948 was already considerably higher than that attained in 1947.158/
Althoughthese state papers give a view of the British ~ as one
requiring general overall improvement, in reality capital was in the
early stages of near boon conditions and the only econanic crisis
facing accunulation in general was that of the dollar shortage. The
unreliability of the governmentestllnates indicates that the Treasury
had not perceived the underlying strengths of the British economyand
their premature assessment of the econanic consequences of receiving
no aid must be read with a critical eye.
The second area of weakness in the "econanic lifeline" view
concerns the position of the British state with regard to capital
invesbnent cuts. Despite the fact that the Investment progranmes
Ocmmitteedrew meticulous statistical tables proposing firstly an 11'
cut and then, after the FBI suggested a 25' cut, deciding on an
overall 18' reduction for fixed investment in 1948,159/ no cuts in
capital investment occurred in that year. The fact remains
(apparently unknown to those who ba'ooan investment cuts, lack of
productivity and neglect of re-equipment) that as 1948 progressed the
progranmeoutlined in the ccmnand paper 'Capital Investment in 1948'
was rendered obsolete and the volumeof fixed investment rose £20Om.
between 1947-48, climbing to higher levels throughout 1948-49.160/
While !t>rgan states that "not until 1953 did new capital investment
in Britain reach the level of 1938·, a close review of the actual
figures demonstrates that whilst there was a shortfall on the 1938
level of nearly 20\ in 1946 (even though that year saw a 150' rate of.
increase over 1945) the pre-war level was regained in 1948 and
continued to rise throughout the life of the Attlee administration to
a level rooghly twice that of 1938 by the end of 1949.161/ Contrary
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to those whoargue that the British state failed to create a climate
conducive to productive investment, it was a cardinal principle of
the investment programneto reduce, should reductions prove necessary
(and in 1948 they did not), ·elements in the programmeswhich
contribute to the aaenities or the dcmestic standard of life, rather
than on productive industryn.l62/
These two facts - firstly that the government in early 1948
was by no means fully aware of the underlying strengths of the
British economyand was therefore subject to major errors of
judgementregarding projected consequences, and secondly that fixed
capital investment actually rose in 1948 by approximately 8' whilst
there had been a planned reduction of 18%for the sameyear -
although interesting in themselves, transfo~ the estLmation of the
i.qx>rtance of Marshall aid to Britain when seen in the context of the
composition of aid received by the UK.
calculating the ratio of Marshall aid received by Britain
(which between 1948am 1951 totalled approximately $2695m.)to gross
dauestic capital formation reveals that the dollar aid could
potentially contribute no IIDre than 10' of capital formation in the
first two years of receipt falling to 6%in the final period of
receipt (suspended fran the 1st January 1951whenit was phased into
Mutual Security Assistance) .163/ The claim, that .Ei1rope would have
been Communistic if it had not been for the Marshall Plan·164/ is
bizarre indeed in the light of the above calculation which showsthat
the washington assistance was capital-liberating rather than
capital-transfusing, ·like the lubricant in an engine, not the
fuel· ,165/ enabling the existing structure of UKcapital to continue
expansion, investment and reconstruction withalt a return to the
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deflationary policies which characterised the 1930's. The percentage
of national income represented by the net dollar aid after the
operation of drawing rights amounted to less than 2.4% for the
'crisis' period from July 1948 to June 1949, with ~rts funded by
Marshall dollars only 11.3% of all British ~rts in 1949 falling to
7.5% in 1950.166/ With regard to the constitution of these imports,
over 42% of all imports were food imports (machinery and vehicle
imports accounting for only 0.4% of the total by comparison) with
over 32% of Marshall dollars allocated in 1949 to the import of
food.167/
It is quite plain that the UK used Marshall aid to bolster
food imports thereby releasing other furxls to enable dcm!stic
reconstruction, investment and industrial productivity to continue
expansion in line with the 'historical inperatives' which underlay
the postwar governoents' general accunulation strategy. 'Ihe planned
reduction of capital investment - premissed on the need to reduce
i.np>rtsof tiDiJer, steel and other materials - never materialised and
the raw material i.qx>rtprogranme increased throughout 1948 rising
again 17% by value the following year (initially calculated to
support at least a 7% increase above 1948 in industrial
production) .168/ A large raw material margin was thus left for
danestic investment and consunption, since the aroount of raw
materials going into exports in 1949/50 did not overly exceed that of
1948, contrary to the gcwerrnent estimates made in late 1947 and
early 1948. capital investment therefore proceeied apace because
Marshall aid helped support a large dollar food inport programne
easing balance of payments constraints (particularly in the first
year of receipt) am loosening bottlenecks which otherwise would have
slowed the recovery process.
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That many analysts incorrectly see the British state
introducing capital investment cuts whilst relying on Marshall
dollars to support a generally ailing econQm¥ leads them to over-rate
the contribution of the Marshall Plan to British accumulation. In
reality the Marshall Plan was not indispensable to the Attlee
government's economic objectives. By restraining food supply to the
calorific intake of 1947 there would theoretically have been no need
to expend massive dollar reserves on food Lmports.169/ Yet Marshall
enabled the ambitious eoonomdc and social policies of the British
state to proceed without undue alteration and without requiring
politically unacceptable levels of austerity to be ~ on the
British population. Whilst it is inaccurate to asswne that Marshall
aid had no beneficial effect on British accumulation (a position
which with sane qualification could be advanced with regard to Sweden
or Be19iwn) it is wron9 to claim that it actei as an eoonanic
lifeline for the UK~. The British state employed Marshall aid
(in ItIlchthe same way as they expenc8i the US dollar loan) to ease
balance of payments constraints, selectively bolstering the food
import programne, enabling the expansionist reconstruction policies
to continue without having to risk an unacceptable political price
being paid at the next General Election.
Conclusions
'1b! conclusions of this chapter are three-fold. Firstly
the British econcmy was not 'saved' fran total collapse by Marshall
in 1947. No overall state of econanic paralysis existed. capital
was lIDYing towards record levels of expansion. The 'crisis' of 1947
was a crisis in British foreign currency reserves which had its
ori9ins not in a general econani.c malaise but in the expansionist
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domestic reconstruction programmeson the basis of which the Attlee
administration had been elected. These proqrensres were premissed on
maintaining full employment,capital investm:mt, reconstruction, and
rising levels of domestic welfare. In the context of a world dollar
shortage, which reflected the United States near roonopolyof raw
material aOO food supplies, they had the predictable consequence of
rapidly exhausting the us dollar loan. In conditions of tight
exchange control and inconvertibility of sterling Britain could not
return to pre-war patterns of trade and was thus unable to finance
large trade deficits with the us via a high level of invisible
earnings or the earning of dollars in third markets. With a
substantial rise in us wholesale prices in 1946 and other
miscellaneous events (outflow of dollars to Germany,February fuel
crisis) the foreign currency drain was intensified. Whilst in the
popular imagination the balance of payments crisis came to be blamed
on the convertibility obligation, in reality the working of this
obligation accounted for not mre than 6%of the drawings on the us
credit. The receipt of Marshall aid, when it arrived in April 1948,
sufficiently eased the dollar drain to enable the government to
abandon its proposed capital investment cuts and continue its
expansionist program:newithout significantly cutting cianestic food.
consunption. By using the USdollars principally to bolster focxi
iIIports, Marshall aid benefitted the Attlee governmentmre on a
political than an econani.c level. Whilst releasing dollars for use
elsewhere, Marshall aid was not indispensable for the continuation of
the government's econani.c policies since a tighter cootrol am
rationing of food. iq;)orts and consunptioo would have obviated the
need for dollar expenditure precisely in the region where Marshall
dollars were expended. Aminor capital investment cut together with
a major restraint of food i.qlorts would in other words have eased the
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dollar drain in a waysirndlar to that achieved by the actual receipt
of Marshall aid. Yet the political consequences of such action would
have been significant for this first majority Labour adaUnistration,
particularly with the MacDonalditedebacle of 1931 still alive in the
memoriesof the cabinet and the electorate, and still serving as a
benchmarkfromwhich the actions of the Attlee governmentwere
judgerl.
Secondly, the British governmentI s receipt of Marshall aid
cannot be oonstrued as an act which subordinated the British state to
Americaninterests. Americanhegsoonywas not established over the
UK,neither did the Marshall offensive tie Britain to junior partner
status in a newUs-daninated world econanic order, or lead to a
concrete transformation of the British class structure along the
lines of the USIOOdel. 'lhe idea of an Americandaninated
lIUltilateral world trading system based on the twin pillars of
sterling oonvertibility and non-discr~nation remained the driving
force behind USforeign ~c policy despite the discrediting of
the State DepartmentIS original IBretton Woocis/KeyCUrrencyI strategy.
Yet the revised programnespearheaded by the !X:!A of an integrated
regional multilateral clearing system fusing Western Europe into one
large market achieving the econanic and political stability necessary
for later insertion into a world IIl1ltilateral structure, met strong
nation state resistance at every stage and was ultimately transformed
(largely on British initiative) into a EUropean notion of
non-ocmni.ttal co-ordination which was coaxed into displayi~
sufficient signs of co-operation to enable us dollar aid to flow.
British danination of the oonsti tutional structure of the CEB: and
the 0EEl: thwarted the aggressive integrative ideals the USsought to
i.np:)se via these organisations. The position of Britain in the world
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economy (its policy to take the initiative in Europeanaffairs and
its strong Sterling Area base) lent the UKstate sufficient power to
severely restrict any political leverage the UShoped to employvia
Marshall. Concerted Americanattempts, for instance via the
bilateral EconanicCo-operation Agreement, to makeincursions into
areas of British economicpolicy-making met with a resolute British
refusal to ~ly, forcing the USto abarrlon this approach and accept
the morebenign British version of non-oammittal co-ordination within
which the principle of national economicand political
decision-making autonany was inscribed. This chapter dismisses the
Marshall offensive version of the grand 'capitulation' thesis as
confidently as the previous section discarded the Anglo-Americanloan
capitulation thesis.
Thirdly an assessment of the i.nplct of Marshall aid on the
British state's accunulation strategy denalstrates the inaccuracy of
the cla~ that the Marshall offensive began a significant export of
Americanaccunulation corXiitions to Britain by injecting purchasing
power for innovative production, restructuring British productive
capital along USfordist lines. Whilst the USgovernmentaOO
industrialists sought to "halt the spread of Marxiandoctrine" by
raising British living standards via an export of fordist
accunulation techniques, specific constraints workedagainst such an
export. Private USinvestment in the UKfailed to materialise in the
Marshall era since the narrowness of markets, exchange control
obstacles, inconvertibility of sterling and the UKirnustrial
sector's distrust of the aims and methods of Americanprofessional
business consultants all constrained large scale export of US
industrial machinery. '!be overall orientation of the British econany
UBier cripps' Olancellorship, towards production for controlled
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export and domestic austerity policies, madethe export of American
acCUIllllationcondi,tions largely unnecessary. In contrast to
manufacturing in America, the vast UShate markets calling for mass
produced consumergocxiswere absent in the UKwheremanypotentially
hane-based industries were handicapped because their product was
considered inessential and the continued shortage of rawmaterials
together with the need to reconstruct factory premises (plus the need
for restraint in capital expenditure in line with Cripps' econoadc
priorities) all served to hold down output below a level which would
have justified planning for datestic mass ~roduction. Manyof these
constraints had lifted by the add 1950's when fordist strategies
became relevant with a r~irection of productive capital awayfrom
an overriding concern with exports to the developnent of a large
scale domestic consumermarket based on relative surplus value
prcxiuction techniques. '!be accuracy of this assessment is confirmed
by an analysis of the use of the Marshall dollars which showsthe UK
employingMarshall aid for food imports whilst in 1949 only 8.3%of
dollar aid was allocated to machinery and vehicle imports - with this
latter grwp accounting for only 0.4%of all 1949 i.qx>rts. No
significant export of Americanaccunul.ation coooitions resulted in
this first stage of Cripps' Chancellorship whether in the guise of
Marshall aid or otherwise.
Finally a study of the leverage the Marshall offensive gave
the USin restructuring the British state's financial and cormniity
policies indicated that the grand designs the EX:A fostered for a
rapid achievement of their integrative Marshall-led ideals through a
manipulation of intra-EUropean trade and paymentsmechanismsmet with
the sameoverall failure that characterised their other incursive
strategies. Far fran Marshall aid forging a new&1ropean
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nultilateralism, ~ican dollars ended up strengthening and adding
longevity to the nee-bilateral framework of trade and payments
arrangements set up in opposition to State Department wishes by the
British state under Dalton's guidance. Nevertheless the pressure
brought to bear on this framework - and the Treasury's realisation
that America was attempting to re-introduce convertibility under the
guise of transferable payments agreements with ever widening
jurisdiction - prompted the British state to pre-empt ECA action by
offering a programme of co-ordinated trade liberalisation. Tb
understand the importance of this proposal both to the expansion of
British accumulation and the l~ted achievement of specific US
policyideals it is necessary to place it within the context of
sterling devaluation and the formation of the European Payments Union
- both subjects dealt with in the following chapter.
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CHAPrER FIVE
THE REVISlOO IN STATE STRATEX;Y
The final phase of Cripps' Chancellorship from late 1948 to
~d-1950l/ sawa fundamental re-orientation of the British state's
accunulation strategy - a re-orientation which is often obscured by
analysts whosimply equate the period with devaluation.2/ Whilst a
discussion of devaluation is indispensable in disclosing Cripps'
short-term policy alternatives, the state's overall accumulation
ojecti ves cannot be revealed by so narrow a focus. As in the
preceding sections this chapter will therefore elucidate the state's
relation to accumulation by charting the political and ~c
constraints on state action via an analysis of economicdevelopments
from~d-1948 to the end of the first quarter of 1950. This reveals
that whereas Dalton's dual accunulation strategy had successfully
nutured capital accunulation through the trials at the inmediate
post war years, a revision of state policy was essential in the final
phase of Cripps' Chancellorship if capital expansion was to be
ensured.
This revision occurred principally in the area of trade and
finance and took the form of a re-appraisal of future multilateral
international econanic co-operation involving fundamental discussions
on the cardinal issues of convertibility, discrimination, trade
liberalisation, UIVus relations, and the plausibility of alternative
currency areas in the wake of continental plans (custans unions,
Finebel> to exclude the UKfran a &lropean trading systEm. The trade
and payments structure established to supercede the nec-bilateral
frameworkerected under Dalton represented a concession by the UK
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towards Europeanmultilateralism which reflected both the pressure
brought to bear on Britain by the ECA and other Americanagencies
and, the growth of UK foreign currency reserves experienced after the
third quarter of 1949. It will be shownthat this period marked the
end of the US attempt to subordinate the UK into a single large
Europeanmarket and brought the realisation that although the UK
wouldremain committedto a single world multilateral system,
Britain's global associations meant that the UK would continue its
position of international ani:>ivalencetowards Europe and the US. In
Americaneyes the most satisfactory option nowlay in the pursuit of
FAlropeanintegrative schemeswhich could be fashioned Wlthout the
participation of the UK. In terms of US capital expansion this
policy had two distinct advantages. Firstly, the retention of
Britain within a single world system (finally laying to rest US fears
of an autonaoous Sterling Area soft currency bloc) meant that the
major obstacles preventing New York financial markets fran becaning
the world financial centre could be circumvented in the short-term by
using the Londonfinancial system while continually pressing for
general convertibility. Secondly, a Dk)reintegrated FAlropean
structure (even without the UK) would relax manyof the constralnts
immediatelypresent on US capital export whilst reinforcing Western
FAlrope against the 'westward thrust of camunism' which even at this
late stage threatened, particularly in Italy, to undermine vital US
interests.
Detailed analysis of major changes in British state policy,
and Americanpolicy as it affected British accunulation, rust proceed
initially on the basis of a clearly charted account of developoents
in the UK econcmy fran the close ot 1948 to the balance of payments
crisis of the first half of 1949.
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I. A New Sterling Crisis
Econanic Growth Under CripPS
The last chapter identified the events which fuelled the
economiccris1s of 1947 and concluded that the crisis did not reflect
a fundaneltal weakness of British productive capital. '!be expansion
of UK industrial production continued throughout 1948 reaching a new
peak in October of that year 27% above the 1946 monthly average.3!
Although the industrial population increased by only 2%, industrial
production as a whole rose 12% above the 1947 figure, 16% above
prewar.4! Manufacturing industry as a whole expanded its output by
over 13% above 1947 with steel production reaching a record level of
14.9 «dllion tons, 17% above 1947. Increased supplies of steel
enabled the engineering industries to raise output by 16% over 1947,
to a volumeover 50% greater than prewar. Likewise production of
bread grains was nearly 40' more than prewar and other grains
increased 20' over 1947. Textile production s~ a marked
increase in output with the production of cotton rising to 20' above
1947 and rayon output registering a figure 24' greater than 1947.5/
The maintenance of nearly full employmentcontributed to this rising
trend of industrial production, with \lnE!III>loymentaroong the total
industrial popllation never reaching 2%, as did the notable decline
in industrial stoppages which reduced the n\llli)erof working days lost
awing to trade disputes by 20' in CXJJplr i800 with the previous
year.6!
GrOSS danestic investment in fixed capital rose by 5' in
real terms i.n 1948 above the previous year am Cripps was now in a
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position not only to increase expenditure on housing and social
services but also to "place primary emphasis on investment in the
basic and manufacturing industries where lower costs or increased
production will contribute directly to our recovery".7/ Overall
gross fixed Investnent; represented 13% of the gross national
product in 1948 canpared to a figure of 10% in 1946.8/ Close
analysis of productive capital in 1948 reveals a vigorous pattern of
expansion which rather belies the assessment that "low investment was
the key problem, and ~t was the failure of British governments to
create the kind of climate for large seale investment and rapid
increases in productivity that was most striking".9/ Despite the
popularity of this interpretation of British 'decline', it is simply
untrue to claim that "whenever satW:!thing~t wrong with the balance
of payments, domestic investment was hit on the head".lO/ As I will
later demonstrate, industrial expansion continued throughout 1949 (a
year of acute balance of payments crisis), exceeding the 1948 levels
of industrial production by Sate 7% and enabling gross fixed
investment to continue to increase to a figure of 13.5% of gross
national product in that year.
This expansion was reflected in the volume of British
exports, which increased fran 9% above 1938 in 1947 to 30% above in
the first half of 1948 and 50% in the second half.ll/ This overall
increase of 39% above 1947 was principally accounted for by the
substantial inprovement in metal goods and textile exports, with
exports of vehicles (including locomotives, ships, and aircraft) 45%
above the previous year and exp:>rts of cotton yarns and manufactures
achieving a 68% improvement over 1947. Nevertheless the regional
distribution of exports failed to show any significant alteration
fran the previous pattern with 50\ of UK produce still being directed
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to the Sterling Area, 16%to Western hemisphere nations and 34%to
other countries. The policy of switching purchases from dollar to
non-dollar sources of supply had howeverbegun to have an effect on
imports in 1948. Whereasalmost, one half of UKimports derived from
the Western hemisphere in 1947, this proportion had been reduced by
1948 to only 30%with imports fran the Sterling Area and other
nations equally makingup the balance. 'llie level of iap:>rts,
although increasing three points in terms of the volwre index,
continued to shawchanges which had been apparent since 1946. Focxi,
drink and tobacco imports had fallen fran 47%to 42%of the total
matchedby an increase in the percentage of rawmaterial imports fran
27%to 33%with the remaining 25%of total imports consisting almost
wholly of machinery and processed materials for industry, with only a
negligible proportion of articles ready for direct domestic
consumption. 'Ibis slaw re-orientation of i.np>rts had been an
essential condition for higher levels of production and had
contributed towards balancing overseas payments.
With regard to the state's currency reserves the UKhad
reduced the gold and dollar deficit, which stood for the whole
Sterling Area at approximately £1024m.in 1947 to a net deficit of
£423m.by the end of 1948.12/ The drain in currency reserves had
apparently diminished (via financing by US/Canadiancredits, IMF
purchases, the South African gold loan, and Marshall Aid) to a third
of that experienced in 1947, and in the first ~ter of 1949 the
reserves stood at a figure of £47lm. catpared to a low of £437m.
calculated for the third quarter of 1948. Mcvesta4rds the
restoration of the dollar balance of payments and the attainment of
'viability' by 1952, independent of dollar aid, had howeverbeen roost
inparceptib1e. Nevertheless the British state had defined the first
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priority of eoon~c policy as the restitution of dollar viability
before the end of Marshall aid, with Cripps constantly reaffirming
that unless an external balance was achieved there could be lino
prospect of a firmly based iooepeooent econanic life" .13/ Towards
this end the state had promotedpolicies to expand production,
increase visible exports, restore invisible earnings, regulate the
volumeand constitution of imports, and select markets frcm which
dollar savings would accrue.
UKtrade with Western Ellropeproduced an overall average
annual trade surplus of approximately $57.8m. between 1946-50.
HCMever,trade with the United States in the sameperiod amassed
annual deficits of over $60Om.l4/ Cripps' ·positive and
expansive·1S/ methodsof solving the dollar deficits - expanSionof
trade with the dollar world~ acquisition of gold and dollars frcm
trade with the gold-producing areas ot the Ccmoonweal th and
gold-earning COlonies~and the developner1tof alternative sources of
supply in the UKitself, in the caraoonweal.thand in the rest of the
non-dollar world - could only attain precarious advances in an
unbalanced structure of international trade and production. The
scale of the problem in 1948 is starkly illustrated by the fact that
less than half of UKiDp>rts fran the Western hemispherewere covered
by British and Sterling Area earnings in that region.16/
'1lleResistance to Early Devaluation
Thenost pressing task facing the British state in late
1948was that of finding an effective meansof reducing the dollar
deficit (whose proportions, even with ERP, threatened to sink the
British econt::mj at every turn), if possible by using the soft
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currency surpluses continuously gathered since 1946whilst
maintaining full employmentand a high level of public expenditure,
both seen as indispensible by the Attlee administration. In a
prescient paper Richard Clarke - of the Overseas Finance Division of
the Treasury - outlined one, at the time unorthodox, methodof
achieving this aim via price manipulation.
Recognising the futility of mere exhoration to buy in
non-dol.Lar markets Clarke noted that, whilst rawmaterials and food
fromWesternFllropewere 50-100%dearer than materials fran the USA,
"the workingof the price calculus gives us all the wronganswers in
relation to our Objectives".17/ Efforts to establish dollar-saving
in the UK, find soft currency supply sources, and guide exports to
dollar markets, merely had the effect of ·swiIrmingagainst the
stream" asking people on patriotic grounds to abstain fromaction
whichwas in their financial interest. Clarke thereby proposed in
February 1948a sterling devaluation to reach a sterling/dollar
parity of between$2.5-3.0 to produce a situation where, in terms of
sterling, dollar iDlx>rtswouldbe dearer than those fran any other
source and exports to the dollar area wouldbecane financially
attractive. A fall in the sterling-dollar rate wouldhelp to adjust
UK consumption,production and trade patterns whilst having a
beneficial effect (if other EUropean nations followed suit) on the
relative prices of sources of supply and the diversion of exports for
EUrope as a whole. Without this action Clarke prophesised "I would
expect another instalment of dollar crisis (even with ERP) sane time
in 1949".18/
Whilst few argued with Clarke's prognosis there was at this
stage general disagreement on the efficacy of his solution. George
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Bolton, a Director of the Bank of England, took the view that no
adjustment of the rate of exchange could have any substantial effect
on the dollar shortage nwhichis the expression of a production
problem" reflected in the persistent large favourable balance of
paymentsof the USA.19/ Price manipulation, the Bank argued, would
have little effect on the breakdownof channels of trade and the
comparative lack of production outside of the USA,and could even
nprecipitate an exchange crisis of unpredictable magnitude"20/whilst
turning the terms of trade further against the British economy.
z.t:>stTreasury officials and cabinet nenbers took a similar
view. Cripps for instance, as late as June 1949, was adamantthat
"you cannot possibly find any solution to our present problems by
juggling with lOOneyincanes or finances or fiscal neasuresn .21/ The
only wayto meet the dollar shortage, Cripps maintained, was to
increase the efficiency of production without lowering wagesor
lengthening hours of work. With ~roved salesmanship UKgoods would
becane IOOrecarpeti ti ve in dollar and bane markets, "we want our
IOOCleyto be worth IOOrein plXchasing power and not less ••• that is
our policy for solving this difficult problem".22/ Clarke's
diagnosis, and the support of Herbert ~rrison whorepeatedly argued
that the ntenptation to defer action until it is publicly dictated to
us by events should be resisted if we are to retain and maintain
confidence",23/ failed to convince Cripps or the Bank of England. In
1948 it was generally agreed that it was premature to devalue when
exports had not lost oanentumand whenthere was consequently little
in hand to permit a re-direction of exports to dollar areas.
Nevertheless, as cairncross, Econanic advisor to the Board of Trade,
points out,24/ it was obvious that at sane point in the postwar years
it wouldbe necessary to reconsider the sterling-dollar exchange rate
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and this point was rapidly approaching in early 1949whenexports
began to lose rocmentumand the prime requirerent was not siIrply to
expand the total but to effect a re-distribution of exports between
dollar and non-dollar markets.
Havingreviewed the expansion of acCUItD.llationthroughout
1948and examinedthe early controversies surrouming state
managenentof sterling, we can chart the econanic and political
developtents which led to the "markedchange of view" aroongststate
officials whoby ~d-July 1949 had "cameround to the position that
devaluation wouldmakea valuable contribution towards easing dollar
difficulties·.25/ The tmportance of this discussion lies less in
bringing to light the technical process of policy makingand more in
tracing the constraints on the state's econanic policy, whilst
oontextualising the British decision to devalue, which became a vital
componentin later trans-Atlantic discussions concerningthe future of
multi lateral ism.
II. Devaluation and loUltilateralism
causes of the Sterling Crisis
Despite continued expansion of industrial production
throughout the first quarter of 1949, with the index of industrial
prcxluction for all industries reaching a record level of 131 in M&rch
of that year (a clear 8 point increase over the Decel1i)er 1948
level) ,26/ it was becaning evident that, in contrast to the overall
progress madein 1948, exports were now losing nonentumwhilst
iqlorts maintained a steady increase. By April the m:mthlyaverage
of UKexported produce had fallen fran a figure of £l59.2m. for
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January to £137.4m. with the UKnowexporting a smaller proportion of
produce to North America than before the war. This last point was
the most significant. In the first four months of 1949 the rate of
exports to the USAfell 14% lower than the rate for the last quarter
of 1948 while British exports to the entire dollar-earning markets of
the Western hemisphere fell from a figure of 16% of total UKexports
in January to 12% by April 1949.27/ Retained imports nevertheless
continued to rise with the volume index, which stood at 81 points in
1948, increasing to the add-nineties by the end of the second quarter
of 1949 (93 in June, 96 in August), and the proportion of iIrports
from the Western hemisphere continuing to constitute approximately
28% of all UKiIrports. 28/
This deterioration in the UKbalance of trade, particularly
with the dollar area, contributed to a balance of payments crisis
which posed a threat to the British econany IOOreserious than that
experienced in 1947. The drain in British gold and dollar reserves,
which stood at £47lm. in March 1949, was accelerated by the IOOUnting
trade deficit of the Sterling Area with the United States, which
alltOst doubled in the secood quarter of 1949, increasing from a
deficit of $159m. to $28Om.29/ The dollar reserves proportionately
decreased to £406m. in June, £368m. in July, and £348m. by August - a
fall of 26% in just over five IOOnths.30/
Throughout the convertibility crisis the Treasury had been
of the opinion that "it is unsafe to allow the reserves to be drawn
down to below £SOOm".31/ Yet with the reserves down to £33Om. by the
18th Septerltler 1949 it was little womer that Cripps believed if the
problem could not be solved "then it does mean a division of the
Western world into two econanic groups and very likely collapse of
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the econcmyof Ellrope, which is balanced on a knife-edge". 32/ The
gravity of Cripps' prediction demandsthat we review the origins of
this decline in detail.
Manyanalysts pointed to the newsterling crisis as the
manifestation of the "contradictory uneconanic objectives" pursued by
the Labour administration involving high public expenditure and full
employmentwithout deflationary policies - "whichcannot be madeto
workat all except at the height of a world boom and only then with
the aid of a dollar subsidy".33/ Amore cogent explanation however
mustmake reference to the inventory recession which took place in
the United States during the first half of 1949. American~rts
fran OBEX: nations declined more or less continuously fran January
1949, whenthey stood at $85m.to July 1949, whenthey anounted to
$sOm.with the share of ilIports fran the UKonly 62%of the
comparablefigure for July 1948.34/ This decline co-incided with a
significant fall in the us industrial production index fran 191 in
January to 161 points by July - a parallelism similar to that
experienced in the teap:>rary us business decline of 1938. '!he most
clearly identifiable aspect of the 1949 recession was the fall in
inventories, with manufacturing output suffering an 8.5%decline
betweenJuly 1948 and May1949 largely because goods were supplied by
running down existing inventories.3S/ Although in respect of the
total value of Western&lrope' s foreign trade the decline in exports
to the us was only marginally iDportant in absolute terms, for the UK
the decline had a devastating effect. This irdicates inp)rtant
differences between the trade of the UKand the rest of Western
Europewhich are worth elaborating.
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Britain's Exclusion fran the Intra-EUropean Trade Boom
The total value of Europe's extra-European trade in 1949
had failed to increase beyond the level of the last quarter of 1948,
with the Sterling Area continuing to absorb over half of UKexports
and the nations of Western EUropeless than one quarter. By contrast
intra-European trade amongst the developed Western Europeannations
(excluding the UK)accounted in 1948 for 55%of the total exports of
France, Italy, Germanyand Benelux (hereafter referred to as 'Little
Europe') with the value of intra-western Europeanexports in 1949
increasing 28%above the 1948 level. By 1949 intra-European trade
was boaning, with France experiencing an increase in the value of its
intra-European exports of 42%. Exports to Western Europe as a
percentage of all exports sh~ a si.mi.larly high level for Derunark
79%,W.Germany76%,Benelux 61%,and SWeden 60%,whilst in the same
period British exports to this market experienced an increase of only
4.9%.36/ The fact that the traditional structure of British trade
left Britain supplying a wide variety of markets with very different
requirements, densities and low absorption rates for higher
producti vi ty manufactured exports rrust be considered by any study
reviewing British 'decline'. Yet within the context of the present
discussion it is highly relevant in explaining whyWestern &!rope as
a wholewas largely sheltered fran the effects of the USrecession
whilst Britain experienced a severe sterling crisis.
With the UKexcluded fran the intra-&1ropean export bean,
United States i.np>rts by value fran the Sterling Area fell by 17%
between 1948-49with the sales of five key Sterling Area caloooities
(rubber, tin, cocoa, dicuoonds,and wool) suffering a serious
depression as their sales dropped by half over the period J)eceItt)er
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1948 to June 1949.37/ This sharp fall in the earnings of Sterling
Area primary products, plus the reduction in UKexports to both the
USand Canada and a 38%increase above the 1948 level in UKimport
expeIXiiture in the US (and to a lesser extent attempts to rove
capital fran sterling holdings by running downworking balances) made
a significant contribution to the exhaustion of UKgold and dollar
reserves. To these factors rust be added, firstly, the loss in
dollar incomeattributable to the declining efficiency of the
sterling exchangemechanism- whereby the use of 'cheap sterling' in
New Yorkto finance Sterling Area comoodities had deprived the
Sterling Area of dollar incate - and, secondly, the effect of
speculation whenthe expectation of devaluation led to the deferm:mt
of purchases payable in sterling and of actual disbursements in
sterling. In addition to the internal British debate on devaluation,
formalised as early as the beginning of 1949, SWedenhad approached
the UKin the OElOC:concerning currency re-alignment in Novemberof
that year, whilst the USTreasury, the ~, and the Federal Reserve
Boardmadenumerousreferences to the efficacy of the nove in various
~lic hearings. By June 1949 the Banker was reporting "the alroost
universal belief in the City that devaluation was inevitable". The
resultant two-waypressure on sterling (deferment of purcbaees and
sterling conversions) could have accounted for allrost half of the
deterioration in the net dollar def ici t between the first and second
quarters of 1949. Cri{:ps came to this conclusion when he realised
that the loss of reserves up to the 18th Sept.elriJerwas higher than in
the second quarter, and in the last thirty days before devaluation
aIOOUllted to £42m., C'ODparedto £6Sm.for the whole of the second
quarter.38/
The 1949 sterling crisis demonstrated the fragility of
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Britain's postwar economicrecovery and indicated the possible
long-term drawbacksof concentrating caurodity export in the
traditional trade markets of the Sterling Area to the detr~t of
intra-European trade expansion. In contrast to 1947 this latest
crisis was almost entirely a British affair with manyof the other
WesternEuropeannations increasing hard currency foreign reserves
over the crisis period. This led the EX:A to consider what had been
inconceivable up until that point, Western&1ropea.n integration
without a British initiative or even without British participation.
Before analysing the developmentof USpolicy on the future of
WesternEurope in the context of achieving USmultilateral ideals
before the exhaustion of Marshall aid, it is essential for this
chapter to detail the British state's changing response to the
sterling crisis. This response focussed not only upon the narrowbut
important issue of stenming the dollar drain but enCCllpaSsedmuch
morewide ranging discussion concerning Britain's commitmento
multilateralism and its accunulation strategy with regard to Europe,
the Sterling Area, and the United States.
The IIIplications of Devaluation
The state's decision to devalue, taken in Cripps' absence
(while the Chancellor atteOOeda SWisssanatorium) am camunicated
to the latter on the 8th August 1949, was mre than a sinple "step
towards currency stability· or a "natural and proper" re-adjustment
to the markets of the world.39/ It represented the consolidation of
the British carmitment to find a ·way towards a one world econany"40/
and a final rejection of the notion that the UKshould establish an
international system of its own based upon sterling. Whilst careful
discussion on the feasibility of a sterling soft currency bloc was
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carried out by the cabinet as a course of action if all else should
fail, the decision to devalue reinforced the economic,political and
strategic considerations which favoured convertibility as a final
objective.
Since the signing of the Americanloan in December 1945the
viability of a "t~rld trading structure· had increasingly
declined with the Treasury now arguing "\\1e favour convertibility as
an objective for the basic reason that one cannot insulate our
international system based on inconvertible sterling from the rest of
the world's system based on gold and dollars. '!he two trading
systems are inextricably tangled, and there DUstbe sane meansof
settling paymentsbet\\1eenthe two".41/ '!his was an argumentthat had
been advancedby Cripps in various public debates since 1947. '!bus
in October 1948cripps stated that the progressive restoration of
nultilateral trade "is an essential condition of world prosperity and
the only satisfactory long-term solution to Britain's own trade
problems".42/ Similary, in his keynote speech to the lIrp!rial
DefenceCollege one IOOnthlater, Cripps stressed that the UK"cannot
operate in isolation ••• for a nation with an open econany like ours
success dependson the maintenanceof a high level of activity
throughout the world leading to a high level of demandfor our
exports especially in the Western hemisphere ••• and in the
progressive expansion of III1ltilateral practices in overseas trade as
rapidly as cirCWlL9tancesallow·.43/
But it was not until the catpletion of the debate around
the 1949sterling crisis that the spectre of a soft currency sterling
bloc was finally banished fran the agenda of the Attlee
administration. Devaluation itself was recaunendedby Gaitskell (in
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the companyof Wilson and Jay) on the grounds that exchangecontrol
had not prevented the drain whilst the controls over dollar
expenditure exercised by the carm::mwealthnations were ineffective.
Since no special UShelp wouldbe forthcoadng there was a real danger
of currency collapse if the reserves continued to fall. 44/ Cripps
and Bevin in the final stages of the crisis displayed an unusual
fluctuation of opinion on devaluation with Cripps "muchmoredoubtful
about the value of the step at all, at first, but later appeared
strongly to support it", and Bevin's line "changing as he talked".45/
Nevertheless the increasing speculative pressure on sterling swayed
the cabinet in favour of Gaitskell's reccmnendation, with Cripps
believing that the argumentbased on the need to create more
confidence in the pound was morevalid than the argument that
devaluation wouldenable Britain to earn moredollars. On the
psychological side, he claimed, "there is no doubt whatever that
since last Spring a very wide expectation has grownup that sterling
wouldbe devalued and this has Rdlitated against the stability of
sterling and has caused a certain degree of strain uponour
reserves" .46/ Yet it was not at all clear that the effect of
devaluation, while it Rdght increase the volumeof the country's
exports to the dollar area, wouldbe sufficiently great (in view of
the smaller nunber of dollars whichwouldbe earned) to help close
the gap. "It wouldbe quite illpracticable", Cripps advised, "to give
any indication of what extent devaluation would assist exports, and
any guess could soon be checked against published trade figures".47/
By late July therefore the cabinet was agreed that sterling (largely
because of the atm;)spherecreated in the United States) could not
achieve stability without devaluation. However,as Cripps explained
to a meeting of canadian and USministers, "we do not regard
devaluation as a miracle working device which can plt matters right
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by the waveof a Wand",48/only as part of a joint trans-Atlantic
pacKage'WOuldevaluation be an advantage to the UK.
State Action to Halt the Dollar Drain
The overall state strategy developed in response to the
sterling crisis turned not only upon a 30%fall in the parity of
sterling fran $4.03 to $2.80 announcedon the 18th Septenber, after
consultation with the USon the 7th Septentler. It also involved
specific internal and external manoeuvresdesigned both to halt the
dollar drain and, as ltbrrison pointed out, to re-affirm "confidence
in the goverl'lIleIlt's leadership which would autanatically inl>rovethe
chances of the USadministration accepting unpalatable measures on
their part to ease our difficulties".49/ This, it was also hoped,
would renew the British public's confidence in the Attlee
administration with the General Election imninent.
Although the cabinet absolutely rejected the suggestion
that "our external difficulties could be directly related to high
levels of public expenditure and taxation at hane", Attlee agreed, at
cripps and ~rrison's behest, to a review of governmentexpenditure
"with the object of securing such econanies as can be obtained
without prejudice to major governmentpolicy".50/ Attlee thus issued
a directive calling for Beads of Civil Departments to curtail
services not essential to major governmentpolicy and to begin a lOOre
economicadministration of the policies whichmust be retained.
!obrrison had calculated that public expeniiture was now running at an
annual figure of £3,oOOm., and concluded that ..it does not make sense
that in such an i11mense total we cannot find say, 5%worth of
expenditure which could either be pruned off or spread over a longer
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period without serious consequencesII .51/ A reduction in the rate of
net expeooiture by 5%was thereby proposed in conjunction with a
study of the reductions which could be madein the gover1'llOOl1t's
investnent programne.
The principal rationale for this proposed internal measure
of reducing public expeodi.ture consisted of three elements. Firstly,
the publicly announcedccmnitmentto counter any inflationary
teooencies which could develop in the near future. Secorrlly, am
rather rooresignificantly, to deoonstrate to the USAthat "the UK
were ready to help themselves to get out of their difficulties am
were not merely waiting for assistance from others",52/ or as
~rrison more revealingly expressed it, "to look as if we know where
we are going and howto get there".53/ Finally, the proposal was
intended to re-new domestic support for the governmentin the wakeof
the on-caning General Election since the cabinet agreed "if there is
one thing the British will not easily forgive it is a 'mess'''.54/
proopt and convincing action was thereby prescribed as a remedyto
sweeten both the forthcaning washington negotiations and prepare for
the domestic Election under the off icial guise of taking steps to
curtail inflationary ternencies. In an att.eq;>t to dissociate these
three aspects the cabinet concluded that the reductions in state
experxiiture should not be discussed as a comition of any assistance
offered by the USgovernnent and that "in any public announcement
that might be madecuts in public experniture should not be presented
as connected with any agreements reached in those talks" .55/ The
blatant political intentions behind this seemingly internal econanic
manoeuvre(contrast for instance the strong econanic rationale behioo
the Healey/Jenkins state expenditure reductions of 197656/) can be
further clarified by a review of the fate of the proposed reductions.
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Political Considerations Influencing Internal Measures
Firstly with regard to the planned cuts in the government's
investment programnethe following points are noteworthy. As
derronstrated in the last chapter it is camon for analysts to argue
that 'British decline' is predominantly the result of low levels of
investment in dcmestic manufacturing industry. It is largely beyond
the scope of this thesis to address in detail that proposal.57/
Howeverwe can showthe weaknessof those accounts which cite the
1947, 1948, and 1949proposed capital expenditure cuts as examplesof
the suggestion that "wheneversarething went wrongwith the balance
of payments, danestic investment was hit on the head".58/ Fatwell
for instance notes the government's plblic statenent that "investment
at bane in engineering products should in 1950 be slightly less than
in 1949" and concludes that investment fell significantly between
those dates. Yet close study of state policy over that period shC7ttlS
howmisleading an out of context quote can be and howit can bring
an analysis to a patently false conclusion. After a report fran the
InvestDent Progranmescarmi.ttee in August 1949Harold Wilson (at the
Board of Trade) concluded, "there is no easy wayof reducing
inflationary pressure by cuts in investment without major changes in
governmentpolicy·, changes affecting for instance full enployment
and the re-organisation and re-equipnent plans for the socialised
industries whichwould not wxier any circumstances be sanctioned by
the Attlee administration.59/ The opinion of the Investment
camuttee was that the investmant progranmemadea valuable
contribution to econani.c recovery and the reduction of costs, and
should consequently be affected as little as possible. The cabinet
agreed with this suggestion and as a result total fixed investment
for 1950did not decline but, as in previous years, increased, in
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this instance by £lOOm.,with gross fixed investment reaching a
record figure of 14% of gross national product by the early
1950's.60/
With regard to the public expenditure cuts in general, the
views of Thorneycroft and Eden6l/ that they represented "make-shift
arrangementsgot together ••• by ••• harrassed men", "scratched
together" and still "sketchy and indefinite", were nearer the mark
than the official pronouncements. '!he final total for expenditure
cuts fell short of its target, reaching only a proposed £l22.5m., of
which£79m.was to be gathered by reducing feeding stuffs, defence,
and additional profits taxJ £28m.accounted for by admdnistrative
econoadesJand £lOm.for the levy of one shilling on prescriptions
(later revoked in April 1950).62/
A review of the internal econanic measures proposed by the
state to acoampanydevaluation leaves little doubt that the official
stance that the measureswere enployed to counter inflationary
tendencies conveyedless than the true justification for the strategy.
As an attenpt to reduce inflation (whichposed little problemuntil
the effects of the outbreak of the Koreanhostilities began to be
manifest in late 1950) the final foen of the state expenditure
reductions was plainly inadequate. The cabinet wouldnot entertain
discussion of deflation since it was perceived that such measures
wouldthreaten the very basis of the government(principally its
fuOOamentalobjectives of maintaining full enploymentand rising
living standards), and thus they decided UBier the banner of
disinflation to announceproposed cuts the effect of whichwas
calculated to be nore political than econanic. The extent of the
political success of this manoeuvre,particularly its effect on the
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Americanadministration can be judged by considering the development
of the external strategies adopted by the state in the face of the
dollar drain, strategies directed not only towards the British
CoIIIOOnwealth but also designed to reduce the large USbalance of
payments surplus and to effect an increase in trade discrtmination.
External Poliey Negotiation
Following the state's initial measures to check the dollar
drain by reducing the total value of dollar imports by 25%over the
twelve months to July 1950 (fran a proposed figure of £160Om.to
£l20Om.)the first moveto consolidate this strategy via external
policy was madeafter a meeting of CcmoonwealthFinance Ministers
eooing on the 18th July 1949. Stressing that the UKand the Sterling
Area's primary objective nust be ftthe achievnvmtof a pattern of
world trade in which the dollar and non-dollar countries can operate
together within one single multilateral system-,63/ the meeting
decided on a variety of emergencymeasures to stem the current drain.
These included pledges to increase efficiency in production,
co-operation in the use of resources, expanSionof sales in dollar
markets, and the decision that Canoonwealthnations would follow the
exanple of the UKby instituting a cooparable 25%reduction in their
dollar expenditure. 'Ibis measure proved beneficial to the UK,
particularly when seen in the context of the decrease in the extent
of trade control (via trade liberalisation prograumesand reversion
to private trade practices carried out in 1949) in the non-dollar
world, significantly reducing i.np)rts fran the dollar area by
commodityclass from a figure of 22' for 1949 to a record low for the
1940's and 1950's of 18%in 1950.64/ Evidence of public expenditure
cuts and reductions in dollar imports also had a political payoff
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for the British negotiators who were now able to seek the assistance
of the USA and canada in supporting these remedies and, Rin taking
others in the external field which are not wholly within our
~r" .65/ The study will now review these other measures in the
external field since, as I will demonstrate, the September Tripartite
discussions led to important policy developments on both sides of the
Atlantic, having major repercussions for Britain's accumulation
strategy which persisted well bevond the life of the Attlee
administration.
A cursory reading of the joint British, American/Canadian
discussions held in washington on the 7th September 1949 is apt to
disclose little of their real significance. At face value the
discussions appear to have been siRply concerned with issues such as
oil production in the US, a commodity agreement for tin, joint
discussion on shipping, and US agriculture support prices. Hc::Mever
closer analysis reveals that the tripartite talks clarified many of
the most significant topics concerning the world economy, including
the British position on convertibility, non-discrLmination and dollar
viability, and the American response to Britain's camid assessment
of its relation to FAlrope.
British External Financial Policy
The British state delegation arrived remarkably well
prepared for the washington consultations. In addition to being able
to point to the proposed danestic expenditure cuts and dollar i.np:)rt
reductions the announcement by Cripps that -the best pol icy for us to
pursue in the interest of the solution of our carm::Xl problem is to
eai,:)arkforthwith on a sterling devaluation- ,66/ clearly gave the
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British the initiative in the discussions (Bevin earlier had advised
Cripps "you can use this as a bargaining counter"67/), which
llnpressed upon the Americans the nature of the British resolve and
even suggested a new basis for Atlantic co-operation.
The Treasury's view that the UK Irllst"attain viability and
freedom from dollar aid at the earliest possible moment"681 was
translated by Cripps in the discussions into the precise statement
that the UK saw no solution in "more aid for Britain" and iOOeed the
UK now required that the sterling system increase its dollar earnings
"so as to pay its way by 1952". Whilst recognising, as Hall-Patch
later confirmed, "for sane time Washington has been in one of those
periods of gestation in which the policy makers are debating arrongst
themselves fundamental issues",691 the British team expressed its
considered opinion on the basic topics of convertibility and
non-discrLmination in an effort to gain "the establishment of the
greatest identity of views possible between the three
governments".701
Cripps forthrightly rejected the popular American claim
that British dollar difficulties could be related to internal UK
policy. 'Ibe provision of full employment and inproved social
services "was essential if fundamental social upheavals were to be
avoided"7l/ and to lay undue stress on UK internal policies missed
the more primary point that "an approximate corxiition of balance in
world production and trade is lacking". 72/ This iIIbalance, due in
considerable part to the failure of the US to adopt a sufficiently
liberal i.up>rt policy, had a serious inpact in the UK because of its
position as the repository of the main monetary reserves of the
non-dollar world. FOllOWing this diagnosis the British position on
221
the "agreed objectives" of external financial policy was relatively
clear.
Firstly it was stressed that convertibility and greater
nultilateral trade nust be the results of equilibrium in trade am
not be seen as steps towards it. Consequently, if the UK could not
convert its favourable balances, "we must spend them where they are
spendable", that is to say in an absence of world prcxiuction and
trade balance resulting in inconvertible sterling, the UK IlUlst
conduct the majority of its trade in sterling markets and this
"inevitably meansmorediscr~nation".73/ Non-discr~nation in
present conditions was ajudged to be "nonsense" and could only in the
future follow convertibility not precede it. As liberalisation
proceeds, the British state had diagnosed, UK i.rrp)rt policy would
necessarily became morediscr~natory against the us.
Discr~nation against US imports wouldbe vital "for this is how the
world structure of consunption and trade is lOOUldedfor
dollar-saving".74/ The agreed direction of external financial policy
was clear - "the question is not whether we makesterling convertible
into gold or dollars, but how uuch and under what conditions". Yet
moves towards this objective couLd only in the visible future proceed
on the basis of organising IOOrediscr~nation, particularly in
EUrope where "the need for dollar-saving structural change is not
realised enough".75/
COnsequences of the Tripartite Talks
This frank assessment on the part of the British state had
three principal consequences, one of whichwas clearly uninteOOedby
the Cripps Ddssion. Firstly, the realistic exchangeof views yielded
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sometangible benefits for the UKin terms of alteration in USand
canadian external econanic policy. The joint conmuniqueissued at
the end of the tripartite discussions stressed that the consultations
had -resulted in a clear uOOerstarrlingof the character of the
difficulties to be faced and an increasing realisation that a fully
satisfactory solution will necessitate continuing efforts in many
directions" .76/ As part of such an effort the USAand Canada agreed
to reduce obstacles to the entry of goods and services fran debtor
nations, realising that high tariff rates were -clearly inconsistent"
with the present position of creditor countries. A resumption and
acceleration of stockpiling was also agreed upon, particularly with
reference to rubber and tin purchases, and a revision of USpolicy on
drawings fran the IMFand the Export lnp:>rt Bank was also instituted.
Finally, by the wayof tangible benefit, the USAagreed to broaden
the use of ERPfunds allocated to the UK,specifically allowing ERP
financing to be used for purchases of canadian wheat and they agreed
to a review of governmentmeasures to encourage USand Canadian
invest.uent in the UK. Althoughmanyof these points appear rather
technical and perhaps peripheral to the praootion of British recovery
they were urXioubtedlyconcessions on the part of the US
administration and reinforced the second major consequence, that of
re-establishing the basis of the •special relationship' bet~ the
UKand the USAoutside the aubit of the <>EEX:.
State documents reveal that the UKvialed the tripartite
talks as a major step t.aerds consolidating UK!USeconanic tles, to
the exclusion of further intra-EUropean links. Whilst prior to the
discussions close Americanlinks had been forged mainly via foreign
policy, with Bevin feeling -morally ccamitted to Achesonto take no
strong unilateral action-, 77/ following the tripartite consultations
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the British state was led "to favour the idea of a US partnership in
the sense of having a common objective and conducting econORdc policy
in order to reach it".78/ Recognising the suspicion generated in
Europe concerning the status of the washington talks Gaitskell
suggested that continuing meetings "must be kept as informal as
possible" since the UK "lD.lStresist any proposal for enlarging the
tripartite talks by inclusion of other OEEC countries".79/ The
discussions had thus consolidated the Cabinet view that the UK "by
reason of its geographical position and of its political and economic
relations with the Commonwealth and the United States could not enter
into any exclusive political or economic association with Continental
countries".80/ There can be little doubt that by this stage the
British state had rejected any scheme for UK participation in
European integration. Whilst opinion remained divided in the US (as
I will shortly clarify) the washington talks represented for the US
Treasury in particular a significant nanent in the evolution of US
integrative poliey, in terms of the realisation that the UK was now
fully camri.tted to independent viability within a one-world econanic
system. AlIbiguity however remained in the overall American
assessment of Britain and &lropean integration until the
establishment of the Fm"opean Payments Union, which, as I will later
shaw, was created only after major poliey concessions by the US,
concessions which had their origins in the Washington consultations.
'ftlefinal consequence of the talks lay in the discussions
concerning non-discrimination. The persuasive British argument for
more discrimination was accepted by the US and then plShed to a
conclusion which the British negotiators never anticipated. The
British state had suggested ·we are ready to lOOVe away fran
bilateralism in certain conditions· .81/ When allied to the argument
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for discrindnation this proposal presented the US ~nistration with
a gilt-edged opportunity to press the UK for closer collaboration
with the non-dollar world in forndng a regional multilateral system.
This aspect of the developoont of state strategy forms the second
part of this chapter and thus it suffices at this stage merely to
point out that Cripps' reluctance to sanction the terms of the EPU
was constantly ~ned by American reference to this aspect of the
Washington declaration.
The Revival of Sterling
The state's response to the 1949 sterling crisis had thus
been protracted and complicated, involving an analysis of issues
which related not only to the dollar drain but concerned the very
fuOOamentals of UK accunulation strategy. By the final quarter of
1949 it was clear that the deterioration in dollar reserves had been
reversed with a steady accunul.ation discernable fran October onwards.
By January of 1950 the reserves had cli.med to approximately £45Om.
(£648m. in new rates), and April registered a figure of sate £525m.
(£759), the first time the reserves had risen above the Treasury
"ndnimum safety level" since March 1948.82/ While the increase was
clear the causes of the amelioration were rather less so.
The govermnent of course claimed success for its measures,
particularly that of devaluation, yet the restoration of exports
approximately to the 1948 level in the first half of 1950, is
attributable in large part to the recovery in the US econany rather
than si.q>ly to the devaluations. Polak notes that the devaluations
increased the volume of exports to the US by an aroount little roore
than enough to offset the fall of about 15' in dollar export prices,
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whilst causing a 10%increase in the dollar value of western Europe's
exports to other markets in the Western hemisphere, and concludes
that •only an inprovemant of 5%in the devaluing countries' exports
to the UScan be attributed to the devaluations". 83/
Furtherrrore, whilst the 25%reduction in dollar illpOrts
lessened the pressure on the British dollar reserves, it should also
be recognised that the return of Western Europe, particularly
W.Germany,to prewar levels of output had improved the :&lropean
supply position. Dollar economies, which t<?the chagrin of the USA
continued after the period of crisis, and improved :&lropeansources
of supply turned the Sterling Area deficit on dollar account from
$3lm. in the final quarter of 1949 to a small surplus of $4Om.by
March1950, increasing to $18Om.for April - June quarter.84/ By
April 1950 the amelioration was so oamplete that in addition to the
f\ll'ldam3ntalobjectives of full eaployment and higher living
standards, Gaitskell added a new objective "the aCCURlllationof gold
and dollar reserves at the expense of the USA".85/ OUr "great
achievemant since the devaluation" the Treasury boasted, "has been to
put the whole of our ERPassistance to reserve", 86/ Recognising that
the AmericansllllSt soon end a situation in which the UStaxpayer was
contributing $7SOm.to British reserves, the Treasury concluded that
assistance was no longer required since "bankruptcy was alIoost
definitely behind us" (it was with such a realisation that ERPto
Britain ended on the 13th December 1950).
III. ARevision in State Strategy
The resolution of the 1949 sterling crisis had created a
nUl1"berof ccnii.tions which, although largely unintemed by the
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British state, were conducive to the development of a substantially
revised UK accumulation strategy. Devaluation made a major
re-building of the already unsatisfactory European trade and payments
arrangements arrived at in early September almost inevitable. A
nee-bilateral scheme whereby balance of paynents forecasts were the
basis on which drawing rights were established was now irreconcilable
with the econanic changes which characterised Western Europe
following devaluation and the sterling crisis. The growth of British
foreign currency reserves called into question the framework.of
nee-bilateralism~hich by early 1950 was shown to be insufficiently
elastic, absorbing far IOOre credit than was desirable if each
nation's debits and credits could have been offset against one
another. Maxi.m.un transferability, the Treasury now argued, was nin
our furXiamental long-term interest - it enables us to match deficits
with surpluses and it removes fetters from the use of sterling
without which the whole of our external policy remains an uphill
struggle-.87/
Whilst the nec-bilateralism established under Dalton had
nurtured and facilitated the recovery of European trade, and had been
of especial benef it to the UK whose dollar reserves required the
CCIIPlexprotective mechanisms characteristic of nec-bilateralism, a
turning point had been reached by 1950 when the British state
recognised -transferability and trade liberalisation make it
progressively IOOremeaningless to seek to deal with trade and
payments problems by bilateral negotiation. We need a nultilateral
solution in anyevent".88/
The amelioration of the British position had not been lost
on the United States who now took the view, with increasing
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justification following the Washingtontalks, that unless the UK
could give sameindications of positive future action, Britain's
"chances of obtaining Treasury co-operation in modifying us policies
will be mich reduced".89/ William~esney Martin, Assistant
Secretary of the us Treasury, specifically cited the exampleof the
25%reduction in Sterling Area dollar imports introduced as "an
emergency meaeurethat had nowbecore permanentpolicy" and called
upon the British state to "make experiments" to iooicate that British
actions were "directed towards our agreed aim". TheUKTreasury had
decided that "both on merits aOO tactically in relation to the us we
must showwilling"90/ and for that purpose believed that a gradual
and controlled introduction of a degree of convertibility in Europe
represented the IOOStfruitful form of progress in the financial
field, allied to progressive action in the trade field which had been
initiated via the programmeof trade liberalisation. A combination
of factors - European dissatisfaction with a restrictive bilateralism
now thrCkm into confusion by devaluation, British acknowledgement
that increased reserves of foreign currency could sanction exparrled
accunulation; and Americanpressure - prCl1ptedthe British state to
re-assess future econanic strategy. Whilst the expansion of currency
reserves following the sterling crisis had laid the necessary
objective conditions for a revision of state econanic strategy,
varying political iDperati ves made it unclear what foon this
re-direction would take. To assess this realignment of state policy
the remainder of this chapter needs to focus on the struggles which
characterised the British and Americanadministrations, indicating
the opportunities for British and UScapital expansion which resulted
fran the final ccupranise.
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A New ECA Poliey Approach to ~ltilateralism
The uneven adjustment of the American administration to the
rapid political and economic developments in Western Europe in the
closing half of 1949 produced a series of often contradictory
strategies for the attainment of the common goal of US foreign
econanic policy. The establishIrent of a US dominated world econcmy,
capable of sustaining domestic demand and a large export surplus,
characterised by non-discrtminatory multilateral trade based on the
general convertibility of sterling remained the constant long-term
objective. Nevertheless the thorough discrediting of the Bretton
Woods/Key CUrrency proposals for achieving this objective had now
been followed by the discrediting of the ECA proposal to move towards
the camen goal via an OEEX: led Western European integration. The
SeptenDer washington discussions had further convinced the US
Treasury that the UK and the Sterling Area had an iDp>rtance for US
strategy which went beyond that of sinply leading Western EUropean
integration - a route which it was quite clear the UK would not in
any case pursue. Arguing that the ECA integrative strategy was based
upon a serious contradiction in that it assumed a high level of US
business activity whilst oo-terminously sanctioning a sharp reduction
in EUropean inports fran the US, the Treasury's strategy was to press
the UK on a 'dash for freedan' progranme involving an imnediate
restoration of sterling convertibility and an abandonement of trade
restrictions and protections in a bold effort to achieve early
viabili ty • The Treasury 'solution' was hc.Mever blocked by the state
Department and the ECA who both recognised its iq>racticality and had
drawn rather different conclusions fran the washington discussions
concerning future policy.
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Whilst the EO\ acknowledgedthat &lropean integration could
not be achieved on an institutional OEECbasis using Marshall aid as
leverage, the Administration, encouragedby UKinitiatives to
liberalise trade, nowfocussed upon a strategy of harm:mising
national trade and paymentspolicies with a view to the creation of a
regional multilateral paymentsunion and authority whichwould
ult~tely meet the IDeA goal of &lropean integration but via a rather
nore subtle route than approached earlier. The belief that &lropean
viability could only be premissed on the creation of a large domestic
market with no internal trade barriers had nowled the ECAtowards
analysis of the ltOSteffective paymentsmechanismwhichwouldpermit
"full autanatic transferability of Europeancurrencies (not just
drawing rights) and controlled convertibility of net surpluses on
intra-European accounts into dollars· .911 This revised ECAstrategy
for Europeanintegration via manipulation of trade and payments
arrangements nevertheless still embodieda Simplistic evolutionary
schemefor the achievement of Americanaims.
B¥ multilateralising trade on a regional basis Europewould
have abandoned bilateralism whilst retaining discrimination and trade
control towards the rest of the world, particularly the dollar area.
The gradual liberalisation of intra-European trade and payments, the
&:A believed, would exert a downwardpressure on Europeancosts and
prices in at least four ways.
Initially the introduction of full multilateral settlement
within Ellrope would result in price reductions by enabling the
cheapest iqx)rt source to predaninate, thus eliminating the
generation of unCXJlpetitive 'abnormal' profits. Trade liberalisation
would lead to the gradual elimination of high cost marginal firms due
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to exposure fran outside catpetition, whilst the rem:>valof trade
restrictions wouldal..nost certainly affect the pattern of new
investment resulting in a more economical allocation of resources.
The establishment of· industrial plant incapable of sustaining
'unprotected' production 'IK>\lldbe guarded against whilst the
introduction of low cost plants at present unbuilt because of
inadequate markets 'IK>Uldbe significantly encouraged. Finally, to
the extent that import restrictions vary amongstEuropean nations,
manycountries maybecome exposed to UScanpetition as a result of
trade and payments liberalisation creating a less sheltered European
environnent.92/
Trade liberalisation under the auspices of a European
PaymentsUnion (EP{J) would, the EX:A claimed, operate to lower
EUropeancosts and prices, increasing catpetitiveness and lOOVingthe
continent to a situation of viability wherebythere would be an eoo
to trade discrimination in toto, a subsequent restoration of sterling
convertibility and the introduction of full world multi lateral ism.
The accanplistunent of this plan, Hoffmanhad assessed, dependedon
the creation not only of a European Clearing Unionwhose actions to
liberalise trade and RUltilateralise payments wouldbe necessary
within the time-span of Marshall aid, but also upon the establishment
of -really effective machinery for direct co-ordination of national
policies by agreement or by some international control over actions
of governmentsand central banka", 93/ This machinerywas proposed in
the form of a European MonetaryAuthority which ultimately "should be
transformed from a co-ordinator of the monetary policies of its
meni:lercountries to a central bank ••• [Wklerlining1 ••• its
supra-national character". 94/
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While the ECA solution obtained Congressional approval the
American adrrdnistration could not obscure the controversy surrounding
the strategy. The us Treasury maintained that a FAlropean Payments
Union would increase the difficulty of the dollar problem diminishing
the prospects for an early return to full sterling convertibility.
For the EPU to succeed, trade discrimination with the Western
hendsphere would have to be increased to prevent the liberalisation
of intra-European trade resulting in an unwanted increase in Fllropean
tmports from outside sources.95/ Following visits to the Treasury
and the State Departnelt Hall-Patch detected the "weakness" of the us
~nistration as regards foreign ~c policy noting that whilst
"there is no support for integration outside Washington among the
people we saw", even within the Washington circles, "there are strong
sections inside and outside the Administration who recognise our
special position and wish to buttress it".96/ The fact that the
original ECA integrative strategy had in even more propitious
circumstances resulted in failure did not augur well for the success
of this revised effort, particularly since it ignored the 'problem of
Germany' within FJ.lropean reconstruction and the obvious confrontation
which would ensue with the UK over the position of the Sterling Area
in a regional lIUltilateral structure. '!be limitations of the ECA
strategy can be assessed only in the context of the negotiations over
liberalisation and the EPU, particularly as they affected the British
state, to which this study DIlSt now turn.
British and American Assessments of the EPU
'!be initial step towards the formation of the EPU was taken
in December 1949 with discussion of the ECA proposals for full
intra-iiestern EUropean currency transferability in payments
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settlements on current account, with settlements to be madein
gold.97/ All participants recognised the freeing of a wide range of
invisible paymentsin addition to paymentson commodityaccount,
together with a clause further reducing quantitative restrictions by
the date set for Europeantransferability - the 1st July 1950.
Despite Hoffman's initial enthusiasm that a clearing union would be
in operation within ninety days981 the British state's early
assessnent; of the proposals threatened serious deadlock.
TheUKposition that Britian should not involve itself in
the econ~c affairs of EUrope"beyondthe point at whichwe could,
if we so wished, dis-engage ourselves, and we should therefore treat
with strict reserve any schemesfor the pooling of sovereignty or for
the establishm:mt of :&1ropeansupra-national machinery",991 had not
been nodif ied since the washington talks. In fact the Cabinet's
position over this issue had become IOOreinflexible as a result of
the consultations, since the UKcould see no attraction in long-term
econanic co-operation with :&1ropein the face of the traditional
uK/canoonwealthtrading partnership which had been considerably
enhancedvia the new-foundpolitical and econanic understanding
reached with the USA. ByJanuary, Bevin and Cripps had decided that
Britain could not surrender its sole responsibility for budgetary
poliey or the level of foreign currency reserves. Action could not
be undertaken whichmight sacrifice opportunities for dollar saving
or earning in order, as Cripps saw it, to make it easier for other
:&1ropeanations to aCCUDUlatedollars.1001 UnderstaOOablefear of
another sterling crisis had led the British state to re-affirm
Dalton's dual accunulation poliey as the optimal strategy in
coOOitionsof dollar scarcity. By the end of January 1950Britain's
position was clear. "It is a cardinal point in the poliey of the
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UK",Cripps declared, "that the multilateral facilities offered by
sterling shall not only be maintained but increased", however"it is
essential that any newschene that maybe evolved should leave
undi sturbed the existing oonetary arrangements entered into by the
UK,and we could not agree that they should be subordinated to, or
superceded by the EPU".lOll
TheBritish conception of the EPUtherefore differed
significantly from that ot the ECAinasmuchas the UKviewed any
union as a lender of last resort so that settlements through it would
relate only to those deficits and surpluses which could not be
settled by recourse to the paymentsarrangements already in existence
betweenEuropeannations. The Americaninterpretation of the Union
as the sole lender, involving the supercession of the credit
facili ties available under the bilateral arrangements, would, cripps
stressed, have to be established ·without the participation of the
Sterling Area".1021 To gain the inclusion of the United Kingdanthe
ECAproposals required modification in three principal areas.
Firstly, it wouldbe necessary to concede the right of the
UKto restore quantitative restrictions without prior consultation
with the EPUsince, Cripps had decided, "while the application of
inport restrictions should be restricted to the mininun required on
balance of paymentsgrounds, sane breach in the liberalisation of
trade is a lesser evil than a correspoOOingbreach in the maintenance
of full eaployment".1031 Secondly, the 8:A would have to acknowleige
the special position of sterling in the world currency markets and
agree to minimise the obligation to make gold settlanents with the
Continent. Finally the proposals nust leave umisturbed the existing
system of n~bilateralism established under Dalton's Chancellorship.
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TheBritish state's attempt to gain a ·privileged position
for sterlingn and to defuse the more radical implications of the EPU
rested upon two familiar arguments, both derived fran the problemof
reconciling the requirements of the sterling systemwith that of the
closed Europeantrade and paym:mtsproposal. The caq;>lex,
international character of Britain's moneymarkets and the role of
sterling precluded any easy harmonisation and the lack of ECA
analysis on this point forced the USto major policy concessions.
With over 36%of visible world trade conducted in sterling
in 1948and over 50%of visible and invisible transactions carried
out in sterling the maintenanceof the neo-bilateral system was
ajudged essential by Cripps in his memorandato the 0EEC.l04/
Moreoversterling's role as a world reserve currency led to special
difficulties for the UK,since large tx>ldingsof sterling by
individual nations subjected the pound to wider variations than the
generally small holdings of the other currencies of ~ope. Given
the special role of sterling in world markets the British state was
afraid that the EPUwouldseverely damagethe international status of
sterling, affecting monetary stability in &.1ropeand thus precipitate
another bout of UKdollar drain. Secordly, Britain's trading pattern
differed significantly fran that of Western&lrope, which by this
time had begun to develop more intensive intra-&1ropean trade. The
largely inflexible capacity of the Sterling Area to supply exports to
the unitai States, including rawmaterials such as rubber, and
manufacturedgoods fran the UK- both highly sensitive to
fluctuations in USbusiness activity - had the result that sterling
was particularly sensitive to adverse m:wements in world trade. Both
these considerations had the effect, the cabinet decided, that
·changes in conditions in the USand other parts of the world strike
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the UKhard, and can very rapidly set up pressures uponour reserves
- especially whentransferability is permitted. The nature, speed
and order of magnitudeof these pressures are entirely different from
those experienced by other participants".105/ In addition the
existence of the large UKsterling balances posed the threat that
British liability could be increased if such balances found their way
into the clearing mechanism.
To resolve these difficulties Cripps proposed that all
sterling claims and debts should continue to be financed under
bilateral arrangements, whilst automatic compensationswouldapply
only to intra-continental countries' surpluses and deficits.106/
Sterling claims wouldbe brought into the compensationsonly insofar
as this would, firstly, reduce a Continental nations' net
indebtedness to the clearing system or, secondly, if such cla~
exceeded the credit margins granted to the UK,nonnally entitling the
creditor country to demandgold paymentfran Britain. UK
indebtedness to the clearing systemwould thus theoretically be
settled fully in gold, but only after it had been reduced by a
similar transfer to the clearing system of all British claims on
EUropeannations in excess of the paymentagreements credit
margins.107/
European and AmericanDissatisfaction with British Poliey
The bargaining strength of the British state on this issue
howeverwas declining, as the first quarter figures for 1950
indicated the substantial aCCWlUl.ationof British foreign currency
reserves and the expansion of British production and ccmoodity trade.
The strong rec.avery of Western &lrope as a whole led to growing
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Europeandissatisfaction with the position adopted by the UK,
particularly in France and Belgiwn. Britain's unilateral decision to
devalue, its participation in exclusive USdiscussions and its
attempt to delay and modify France's proposed solution to the German
problem (in the shape of the Schuman-ltt:>nnetplan) pranpted a posi ti ve
change in French opinion regarding the benefits of a closer
multilateralised Ellrope. '!be resurrection of the Finebel (Little
EuropeanCUStexnsUnion) proposals in late February exenplified this
general WesternEuropeandissatisfaction with the developmentof
British policy. The ECAhad perceived that British negotiators
wished "to secure for themselves canplete freedom to pursue the
dcm3stic policies they want on purely national grourxis and the
complete freedomto exploit all the benefits of their present
bilateral trading arrangements".108/ Under canbined Fm'opeanand
Americanscrutiny the British attempt to secure a position in which
import controls could be maintained whilst chances of gold
aCCURDllationwere enhanced and the opportunities of dollar loss were
constantly guarded against was seen as increasingly unjust.
Furthenoore Britain's stance was seen as unnecessarily
restrictive and even injurious to the expansion of British
accunulation itself. Eventhough the UKhad in the previous three
years been in current surplus with the nations of ~tern FAlrope as a
whole, the operation of the neo-bilateral system had resulted in the
UKmaking dollar payments to Continental nations. This situation
\f01ld not arise under the proposed clearing union since if there were
a net surplus with the participants no loss of reserves would occur
and even in deficit conditions the EPUwould provide a cushioning
credit facility calculated with regard to the UK's £379m.quota. Any
debit the UKmayincur with the Unionup to £76m. (20%of the quota)
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would involve no loss of gold at all, but be carried as a credit by
the EPU. Acceptanceof the Union terms therefore meant the UKcould
exchangea breathing space of approximately £39m.before gold
paym:mtsbegan under the nee-bilateral arrangements, for a breathing
space of £76m.under the EPU. t-t:>reover,unl ixe the bilateral
arrangements wherebydebits in excess of £39m.were payable entirely
in gold, under the terms of the EPUafter the 20%(£76m.) figure was
reached only half of the remaining 80%was payable in gold.109/
British J\cceptance of the Modified EPUProposals
Theweight of these considerations, the replacement of
cripps by Gaitskell in the later stages of the negotiation, and three
substantial concessions on the part of the ECA,finally induced the
UKto enter the EPU. The USdecision to eannark $60Om.of ERPfunds
to support the EPUregardless of British participation led the UKto
quickly re-assess its position and its inportance (until this date
largely unquestioned) to FAlropeanviability. Further JOC:A roovesto
concede that beyondan agreed point the UKwould be allowed to
re-inp:>se quantitative restrictions and also that the JOC:A would
re-imburse the UKfor any gold which it lost to the Unionas a result
of a Continental clatm against sterling balances proved decisive in
gaining British participation on the 7th July 1950with the EPU
retro--actively established from the 1st July 1950.
The final EPUagreenent was therefore signed to meet three
principal objectives. FirsUy, it aimed to eliminate all monetary
incentives to neo-bilateralism in trade and paymentswhilst effecting
a maxinuneconomy of resources in intra-&lropean settlements .110/
This was to be achieved through a fully autanatic Dllltilateral
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compensation system clearing residual surpluses or deficits amongst
the participants as a whole. Secorxlly the EPU was designed to induce
the participants to accept the risks involved in a regional
aultilateral schere (and those inherent in the concanitant trade
liberalisation programme) by providing cushioning credits with
adequate guarantees against default and exchange risks in
circumstances of moderate disequilibria in intra-European payments.
Finally, the Union was conceived as a method of stinulating the
re-adjustment policies necessary to check any development of
excessive or permanent disequilibria amongst the participants. In
addition the multilateralisation of European payments theoretically
carried the commercial implication that there could be no
justification for continued trade discimdnation amongst EPU members.
However the oft-quoted figures indicating that by March
31st 1950 Europe's trade had becalIe remarkably liberalised, for
instance showing that Britain had renoved 54% of its quotas on
private iIlp:>rts(rising to 86% by December 1950) as a result of the
liberalisation programme,lll/ cannot be taken at face value.
Official OEEC reports indicating a high success rate for
liberalisation across Europe as a whole fail to emphasise two
inportant aspects of the programne. Firstly, liberalisation only
affected private inports (the proportion of private to goverment
varying enonoously anongst &lropean nations) and secorxUy the
liberalisation· rules applied only to i.qlorts fran other O~
nations.112/ Whilst the British state emphasised its role in
pralDting trade liberalisation as an exanple of its l1Ill.tilateralist
orientation, the significance of the prograome varied widely amongst
am: members and failed to have the major impact which Hoffman
expected in late 1949. The fact that the proportion of imports
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affected by liberalisation to total imports differed considerably
anongst nations meant that whereas by the Spring of 1950catpliance
with the liberalisation proposals led to the removal of quotas on
about 40%of the total imports of Belgium, the figure for Britain was
below10%. Similarly liberalised imports axoountedto 12%of
Belgium's gross national product whereas the changed significance of
these liberalised private imports in the total British economymeant
that in Britain they amounted to approximately only 2%of gross
national product.113/ Moreoverthe fact that under OEEC statistical
procedure the removalof an ineffective quota (a quota large enough
initially that its removalmadeno quantitative difference to
imports) was included in the overall count as a greater measure of
liberalisation, clearly demonstrates that liberalisation was by no
meanssynonynouswith trade expansion.
The Lessons of the EPU EPisode
Although the British state's accumulation strategy had
undergonea faltering re-alignment, involving the de facta
abandonmantof Dalton's dual aCCWIUlationp::>licyand the acceptance
of a regional nultilateralist trade and payments arrangement, the
final form of this revision remained indeterminate and far fran
satisfactory in Americaneyes. Whilst the British state was keen to
instance the EPUas a step towards convertibility, the us Treasury
stressed that "the schEmewas very different fran that originally
proposed by the United Statesnl14/ and apart fran the introduction of
gold payments they doubted its contribution towards agreed objectives.
The 1OC:A had acknowledgedthat politically organised schemesfor
supra-nationality could not be relied upon aM thus they abandoned
plans to follow the EPUwith a European ~tary Authority.
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Concessions made to the UK with regard to ~rt restrictions and the
sterling balances plus the fact that (in contrast to those accounts
which suggest that the EPU was "a purely Western European
creationnI15/) the very existence of the EPU had depended upon US
financial injections, all signalled to the American administration
that the revised ECA proposals for European integration were to share
the fate of their discredited forbears.
The United States had achieved the preservation of a
one-world economic system ideally committed in the future to full
multilateralism, yet at a price of intensified trade discrimdnation
and an acceptance that Britain and the Sterling Area could not be
integrated or forced to harmonise their national policies with those
of Western Europe. Nevertheless fran the American viewpoint the
events leading up to the signing of the EPU had been significant.
The vigorous intra-European trade bcx:m centred arour¥.iLittle Europe
(and largely excluding the UK), together with Schuman's proposals for
a harmnisation of French and German reconstruction dealing
specifically with the vexed issue of coal and steel resources (in
which of course Britain refused to participate), had iDiicated that
future American policy in Western Europe could viably be developei
without reference to the UK, focussing on the definition of a
custans union in terms of a CCI1I1kXl market of strategic coom:xUties.
SUch a direct approach, disregarding the prior establishment of a
caoplex political superstructure, held out new hope for American
capital expansion.
Whilst the EPU episode had forced the United States to a
more realistic appraisal of its capacity to restructure the Western
EUropean econanic system it had revealed particular strengths and
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weaknesses in the British state's economic strategy. Cripps'
protracted attempt to maintain the nee-bilateral framework in
conditions which clearly merited their abandonment, indicated not
only personal limitations but highlighted the intimate way in which
British policy in this period was directly related to the level of UK
foreign currency reserves. The justifiable fear of national
bankruptcy haunted the British cabinet throughout the negotiations
and it is no exaggeration to suggest that the UK would not have
entered the EPU had not its currency reserves significantly increased
during the first half of 1950. Nevertheless British reticence to
endorse the EPU proposals given the rising level of reserves in 1950
indicated that the UK did not seriously envisage the United States
setting up a regional multilateral system which excluded the UK. On
this point the UK was seriously misinformed. The strength of the UK
lay not (as Attlee and others believed) in the traditional role of
Britain as a major world power but resided more specifically in the
maintenance of sterling as the prUnary international currency,
reflecting the efficient and unrivalled development of the City of
Ialdon. 'IbelOOSt valuable asset in the hands of the British
negotiators therefore remained the UK canni.tment to worldwide
convertibility. 'Iberevision of state policy away fran the
established nee-bilateral framework did not ~iately threaten this
asset. 'Ibere-introduction of full convertibility still depended
upon mre general equilibrium between the dollar and non-dollar
areas, considerably higher foreign currency reserves, and the
negotiation of ccaplementary policies to be wnertaken by the USA
which would ensure the security of any steps taken towards full
convertibility. Nevertheless the EPa would assist general Sterling
Area viability with the non-dollar world, and, via the supercession
of the bilateral trade and payments arrangements, rE!l1DVean
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appreciable support to the British postwar system of exchangecontrol
and inconvertibility. The Treasury retrospectively cited the
importanceof the EPUagreenent in this sense in early 1952whenit
was becaning apparent that Britain had "reached a point wherewe rust
recognise that inconvertibility of sterling in non-resident hands is
not a policy whichcan long be sustained-.116/
Conclusion
The accunulation strategy par sued by the state within the
frameworkof neo-bilateralism proved to be a highly successful policy
in conditions of dollar scarcity immediately following the 1947
sterling crisis. By the end of the first quarter of 1950 industrial
production had increased to a level 32%above that achieved in 1947
whilst exports registered an increase of 96%over the ~
period.117/ The sterling crisis of 1949 had indicated the precarious
trading structure of the UK,52%of whoseexports went to the
Sterling Area, 16%to dollar markets and 32%to the rest of the world.
This pattern left Britain supplying a wide variety of markets with
very different requirements, densities and low absorption rates for
higher productivity manufacturedgoods. The close correlation
betweenbusiness acti vi ty in the USand the econanic performanceof
the Sterling Area, particularly its sales of primary products,
illustrated the increasing inadequacyof the UKtrading position,
particularly whenthe widespread international use of sterling and
its role as a reserve currency intensified econanic instability. 'Ibe
restoration of sterling viability by 1952clearly depended upon
rising levels of foreign currency reserves. Disregarding the
fuOOamentalobjectives of the state which remained the maintenanceof
full enploynent am the increase of daDeStic living standards, it is
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no over-estimation to suggest that the state's actions throughout
this period were dominated by fluctuations in the level of those
reserves. Although it was obvious to many officials that a
reconsideration of the sterling/dollar exchange rate would be a
necessary aspect in the re-adjustment of postwar economic relations,
Cripps only sanctioned such a trovewhen the declining currency
reserves demanded Dnrnediateaction. Similarly British acceptance of
the EPU proposals was only sanctioned by the state after the level of
reserves had recovered to their highest point for two years. Whilst
the state had therefore defined the maintenance of full employment
and rising living standards as a necessary element - "essential if
furXiamental social upheavals were to be avoided n118/ - the
development of a strategy to expand accumulation was constrained in
this period by the Treasury's holdings of foreign currency.
The measures taken to resolve the 1949 crisis highlight
many facets of the state beyond the received accounts which merely
indict Cripps for lack of forethought and sluggish decision making.
An analysis particularly of the internal measures employed by the
state in this context reveals that in large part its actions were
taken for purely political reasons. Official pronouncements of
public expenditure and investment cuts were primarily designed as
political manoeuvres to regain the confidence of the British
electorate in the face of the on-caning General Election and to exert
influence over the Ami!rican administation.
By the beginning of 1950 the major obstacles to expanding
accunulation in the postwar era were slowly being overcane. Whilst
the i.nt>alancein production and trcde between the Eastern and Western
hemispheres (of which the dollar famine was a manifestation),
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remained the prbnary barrier to accumulation, the United Kingdom's
positive adjust:mant to the changed circumstances of the world economy
since 1945 had enabled the state to clarify future economic policy.
Devaluation and participation in the Washington talks had dispelled
American fears of a British retreat into a soft currency area system.
The precise short term role Britain would adopt, given its long tenn
carmitm:mt to one world 1Il1ltilateralism,remained unclear however
until the summer of 1950. Despite growing European dissatisfaction
with Britain's intransigence over the terms of the EPU, and the
realisation within the UK that regional multilateralism would benefit
capital accumulation by reducing dollar loss and stilllllating
intra-European trade, British acceptance was contingent upon ECA
concessions effectively underwriting the financial stability of the
UK within the EPU. The revised British accumulation strategy now
established on the twin pillars of regional multilateralism in Europe
and the maintenance of the Sterling Area system signalled not only
Britain's overall multilateralist orientation but also the end of the
ECA a~ to establish British-led European economic integration. The
creation of the EPU could no longer be seen as the first step towards
the political and econanic integration of Western Europe, altl'x>ugh
the US acceptance of the 'special position' of the UK and the
Sterling Area in the postwar world (and the develqment of French
thought in respect of the German problem) had revealed opportunities
for the formation of a Little European customs union defined in terms
of a camal market of strategic C<Jl1ll:dities.
In the short-term h~, since neither &lropean
integration nor currency re-alignment had prOYed adequate steps to
secure American objectives (large export surplus, sterling
convertibility, and worldwide non-discrwnation in trade), in the
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aftermath of the Marshall Plan the US administration faced a major
crisis in external economic policy. The resolution of this crisis
came with the outbreak of the Korean hostilities which not only
sustained domestic demand to a level which countered the effects of
the falling US export surplus, but also enabled the dollar gap to be
further closed with rrdlitary replacing economic aid to Europe and
American political interests safeguarded as the nations of Western
Europe rallied forces against the spectre of 'communist' expansionism.
It is thus to the analysis of the British rearmament programme which
suddenly became "the first objective of the government's economic
policy"119 that the final chapter is addressed.
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CHAP1'ERSIX
THE IMPACT OF REARMAMENT
The last year of Attlee's ~nistration - from mid-1950
until the Election defeat of October 26th 1951 - was d~nated by
concerns about the impact of rea.rmanenton the strongly recovering
British econ~. Prior to the outbreak of the major hostilities
across the 38th parallel the revised accumulation strategy appeared
to be so successful that the usually cautious EconomicSurvey
provisionally clainai "by the end of 1950 the imnediate task of
postwar recovery would be COOl>lete".11 Yet, contrary to this early
optimism (and even before the acceleration of the defence prograxme),
manyTreasury officials believed that a large seale revival of
mmitions prcxluction woo.ld"meandemandson our resources which would
render inescapable the abandonmentof our efforts at economic
recovery under present policies".21 According to this view Britain
could not secure viability by early 1952 and at the same time devote
substantial resources to rearmament. Evenwith considerable
reductions in prcxluction for export and civil use, rearmamentwas
deemed inpossible by manyanalysts withoot recourse to large American
assistance whichwould once again for an indefinite timespan
"roortgagethe future". 3/
Manytheorists have thus claimed that the acceptance of the
rearmamentprogranme "was the end product of the processes of
subordination to the global strategy of the United States which
Attlee and Bevin had established as the keystone of British
poliey".4/ '!be origins of British postwar eoonanic decline, such
writers suggest, can be narrowed dawn to the critical nanent of
reaI'lllSDelltwhenthe "heart of British manufacturing industry and
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engineering was virtually pulled out of operation" with the result
that markets lost during the &orean war were never recovered and a
twenty-five year relative decline of British capitalism was set in
train.51
Given the wide circulation and ~rtance of these
interpretations it is surprising that a detailed exanUnation of the
specific econanic impact of rearmament rarely accanpanies such claims.
This chapter therefore assesses the exact implications of rearmament
for the British state's economic strategy. Detailed study reveals
that although British rearmament occurred in response to an American
request issued to all members of the ~ alliance for "information
concerning the nature and extent of the increased effort both as
regards increases in forces and increases in military production" ,61
the British defence acceleration cannot be seen as "evidence of
further subordination to the Usn. Not only did the UK oppose US
policy on many issues, but the overall stance of the British state
was in alignment with the newly revised accumulation strategy and the
rejection of &1ropean integrative proposals. The cabinet Defence
~ttee thus viewed British ~litary involvement in the light of
the urrlerstaOOing that "we no longer had to rest content with the
knowledge that we were a Great Power, but were becaning able, for the
first time since the war, to sustain our worldwide camU.tments". 71
Shouldering a large military burden re-inforced opposition
to any ErA integrative programne which included the UK and provided
the government with an opportunity to indicate to the us that Britain
has attained "irdependent econanic status" in Western &!rope and
would not be treated as "just another necessitous Fm'opean nation" .81
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Aclear appraisal of the impact of rearmamenton the
progress of British accumulation indicates a far moreambiguous
series of effects than the promulgators of the British decline
interpretation would lead one to expect. The acceleration of defence
revealed manyareas of weakness in the state's ability and canpetence
to quickly re-fashion sections of the econany. However,contrary to
popular conception, the limiting factor in the state's refomulation
of accumulationwas not productive capacity but turned on problems
associated with acute shortages of rawmaterials and skilled labour.
For instance the WorkingParty investigating the metal-using
industries did not find themselves considering howto make the best
use of scarce capacity (by cutting sane fonns of production to make
wayfor defence> but howto employcapacity which had becane spare
because of rawmaterial shortages. Deriding the lack of
understanding shownon the part of the Ministries of Labour and
Supply (and at the Board of Trade) the WorkingParty concluded "what
is wrongwith productive capacity is not that there any too many
claims upon it, but there are not enoughclaims" .9/ Furthermore,
whilst the defence appropriation of supplies of metal-goods increased
over the period 1950-52, defence never absorbed nore than 12' of the
output fran this oft-cited group of industries, with exports of
metal-goods maintaining a figure of 31' over the sameperiod and the
distribution of supplies of metal-goods used for investment aM the
home.marketmaintaining their percentage shares.1Q/
It cannot therefore be stated that the simple effect of
British rearmamentwas to send manufacturing industry into a
long-term decline. 'lbe precise effects on each of the major
candidates for this interpretation - metal-goods industries, textiles
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and building - reveal ambiguous impacts which are not liable to
overall generalisation without analysing the effect of the rise in
import prices that resulted fran massive us raw material use
exacerbating the world raw material shortage.
'1b approach this mre precise specification, and to
indicate more generally the state's ability to refashion
accumulation, this chapter will firstly locate the major developments
in the British economy that occurred in 1950 before detailing the
mst significant changes in American domestic and international
economic policy fran which a close study of the British response can
begin.
1. Expanded British Accum.1lation and American Policy
Industrial Expansion and De-Stocking
'Ibepropitious econanic conditions which had facilitated
the British state's decision to roove away fran Dalton's dual
accumulation strategy continued throughout 1950. Only with the
benefit of hindsight could the Treasury remark in 1952 that the
strength of the British economy at this stage had perhaps been
overestimated "because it was not recognised at the time how
temporary were so many of the favourable econanic circumstances" .11/
Industrial production displayed continued vigour·throughout 1950,
with the index of industrial production for all industries increasing
11' over the 1949 figure. The principle manufacturing industries
outstripped this overall figure by recording a 14' increase on the
previous year, with production fran the metal, engineering am
vehicle industries rising by 16' and textiles achieving a 10'
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rise.121 Oltput fran the steel industries similarly exceeded the
target given in the EconomicSurvey for 1950, whilst the total
production of motor vehicles increased al.Ioost25%over the 1949
production total.131
The continuation of this upwardtrend in the output of
British productive capital could no longer simply be attributed to
factors associated with the process of reconversion. Indeed the
objective of the European RecoveryProgranme,Gaitskell was sanewhat
prematurely to boast, had already been achieved in the early part of
1950and the UKeconomyhad completed its basic reconstruction,
ceasing to depend on external financial assistance.141 Increases in
productivity were largely the result of the slow and unevenadoption
of IOOreintensive productive techniques and the easing of certain
international constraints which had up until that point limited
British industrial growth. 'nlus Gaitskell was to claim throughout
1950 that "technical advance continued unflagging ••• whilst •••
never have greater efforts been made in scientific and industrial
research both public and private- .151 ltDreover full enploym!llt and
the absence of major selling problems enabled manufacturers to plan
for long runs given the t.eqlorary easing (experienced towards the end
of 1949) in the availability of raw materials and, llDre cogently for
the UK,the ability to freely purchase the precious materials
extracted in the USA. This dependenceof Western &!rope on the
supply of US primary products, which accounted for half of US total
exports ,161 was to have serious repercussions on British econanic
performance in 1951with the iDp)sition of US export controls in late
1950designed to safeguard supplies for Americanindustry .171
Nevertheless the inmediate postwar shortages of industrial raw
materials had tellp)rarily eased for a six ID:lnthperiod fran late 1949
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(scarcity ~ng a major factor again by ~d-1950, resolved only by
the decision to run downstocks) reducing a key constraint on British
industrial output. '!be level of gross fixed investment accordingly
remainedhigh throughout 1950achieving a small increase in the
physical volumeof investment added to an £8Om. increase due partly
to price changes.18/
To sustain this industrial output required a degree of
coherent forethought whichwas absent in the British state's policy
planning at this time. Robert Hall remarks that the Treasury
throughout the first half of 1950were pre-oocupied with the outcome
of devaluation, the level of gold reserves and the course of US
business activity. Consideration of the consequences for British
industry of the major de-stocking progranmeadopted by the state as
part of its dollar econ~es following devaluation did not occur
until mid-Sept.eltDer1950when, as Hall points out, lithe Treasury
finally took the step of pressing the SUpplyDepartments to increase
their purchase for stockpiling but ••• it was then too late".19/
Gaitskell's diaries s~lary reveal the incredulity felt by
state officials whenit was suggested that shortages of materials
would becane a problem for British industry in 1951.20/ Nevertheless
as early as October 1948Hitchman of the Fconcmic Planning Staff had
pleaded for an increased supply of industrial materials and Hall had
even suggested oolding vast levels of stocks instead of dollars
thereby postponing the termination of Marshall Aid since lithe
Americanswould look less seriously on our assets if these were not
too nuch concentrated on gold".21/ To the consternation of Hall and
Hitcl'lllan the Treasury decided to continue de-stocking as a
dollar-econauy, falling in line with the idea that policies should be
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as unhamperedby financial need as possible.
To a keen observer substantial de-stocking in an era
characterised by fluctuating rawmaterial supplies woulddo little to
strengthen future prospects for productive capital and in conditions
of world rearmamentcould result in industrial dislocation and a
drain of dollar reserves through higher import prices. It is not
only in retrospect that the factor of rearmamentcan be introduced.
Hitchmanfor instance had written to Plowdenin late 1948expressing
the "grave dangers in the present situation because of the absence of
a policy on industrial supply and rearmament", indicating the "evil
consequenceswhich rearmamentwould have within the period of
recovery".22/ Neither Cripps nor Gaitskell howeverattended to this
adviceandsofailed to appreciate that the export boan experienced as a
result of the industrial growth in 1950 relied upon the expansion of
those industries whichwouldbe JOOStdirectly affected by raw
material problems and the claims of defence.
TheTeDporaIY Trade SUrplus in 1950
The iIrpact of devaluation and higher world camoiity prices
on total UKinports began to be experienced in 1950when the i.qx>rt
bill rose by approximately £40Om.over the 1949 figure despite the
volumeof retained i.np)rts showingno appreciable change.
Dollar-econanies adopted to accc.apany devaluation reduced iDports
fran the Westernhemisphereby 3' with the result that the growing
scarcity of non~llar supplies of rawmaterials (wool, softwood,
non-ferous metals) accelerated a reduction in cianestic stocks.
Whilst the dramatic rise in iDport prices experienced throughout
1950, a 13' increase fran January to Deceab!r, was partially offset
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by a highly favourable £20Om.surplus on invisible account, the
British state still relied upon visible exports and re-exports to pay
for 93%of the ~rt bill.23/
The strong export drive received fresh impetus from the
upsard trend of industrial expansion, increasing over 16%above the
1949 level and achieving an export figure 62%greater than that
realised in 1947.24/ Continued expansion of exports of vehicles,
~tals, and engineering goods remained i.np:>rtant to the overall
growth of export earnings in 1950 comprising over 55%of the total
value of UKexports. ltk>reover,despite the level of export prices
remaining fairly constant, the UKachieved a 3%increase in the value
of exports to the dollar markets at the slight expense of exports to
the Sterling Area.25/ OVerall therefore the measures taken in late
1949appeared to have benefited capital aCCWlUlationwith increased
iooustrial output aOO expaOOed exports. A series of favourable
international economiccircumstances together with the effects of the
state's short-term measures adopted to halt the 1949dollar drain
also produced a temporary strengthening of the state's foreign
currency reserves.
Thus the balance of paynents on current account realised an
overall surplus of £244m., (recently upwardly revised to £307m.) to
build upon the small £5m. surplus achieved in 1949. The Sterling
Area gold and dollar accounts consequently increased reserves fran a
level of £603m.recorded for 1949, to £l,178m. achieved by IleceiIt)er
1950. Finally the UKbalance in the EPO,a reflection of the whole
Sterling Area balance on current and capital account with EPU
nations, recorded a net surplus of £l7Om.between July and
l)eceIli)er •26/
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Factors Limiting a Continued EconomicExpansion in 1951
British accumulation had been invigorated by the end of
1950and justified the state's revised economicstrategy. In the
light of this growthmanyanalysts view the crisis of 1951 solely as
the result of the British state's decision to rearm. Close study
howeverreveals that the upwardpattern could not be expected to
continue even in the absence of rearmament. This can be justified on
three counts.
Firstly, as mentionedabove, the drain in British stocks of
rawmaterials had been aooompaniednot only by a non-dollar area
scarcity in late 1950but also by the imposition of export controls
on the part of the United States designed to retain canoodities as
part of their large stockpiling programmebegun in late 1949. A
significant increase in tmport prices and a slowing down of
industrial output were therefore to be expected even before world
rearmamentbecame an additional factor. ~reover the increased
demand for Sterling Area primary products experienced in 1950, which
greatly contributed to the increase in gold and dollar reserves and
EPUsurpluses, could only result in larger incanes for the overseas
Sterling Area whichwhen they cameto be spent were bound to effect
an increase in expenditure on inp:)rts.
Secondly three additional factors were discernible in 1950
whichwere to further reduce the strength of the British econany.
'ftle termination of Marshall Aid had been arranged for [)eceni)er1950,
whilst the beginning of the OK's obligation to canuence repayment
under the tenns of the loan agreements with Americaand canada was to
caae into operation in 1951. ~eoever a reduction in invisible
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earnings fromBritain's overseas oil industry had been anticipated
since 194827/and began to look a certainty towards the end of 1950.
Finally by 1950 the Treasury had expressed anxiety that the
British economywas facing increased foreign competition,
particularly fran the re-fashioned econcmiesof Germanyand Japan.
For examplealthough in the immediatepostwar years British cotton
textiles daninated world export markets it had long been anticipated
that by 1950 the reconstruction of the Japanese and Pakistani
industries (with their relatfvolv plentiful supply of cheap us cotton)
wouldseverely limit the expansion of British textile exports.
Direct British assistance to the Japanese textile industry in 1948
(agreeing to exchange essential rawmaterials for over £16m.worth of
Japanese cotton textiles28/) and British dollar-econanies limiting
the inportation of technologically advanced textile machinery into
Britain both combinedto produce a situation wherebyin early 1950
Japan had regained full control of its textile production and was
suspected of deliberately holding downdomestic cloth consumptionto
facilitate a sustained export drive.
The steady expansion of capital accunulation could not be
taken for granted in 1951 si.q;>lyas a concanitant of the expansion
achieved in 1950. Specific factors had arisen which would threaten
productive capital growth, limit the expansion of exports, aOO renew
pressure on the British balance of payments. The overall structure
of British aCCUlIIllationwas therefore far less secure than at first
appeared whenon the 26th July 1950 the USgovernmentapproached the
UK on the subject of rearmament. To understand both the inpact of
rearmamenton the eoonany and the quick political assent given by
Attlee to the Americanrequest (an assent which Gaitskell calmly
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considered should "give no cause for alarm" either politically or
econClllically29/) it is necessary to chart how the Anerican decision
to rearmwas seen by the State Departmentas providing a solution to
a series of interlocking problems associated with the domestic US
economyand the role of the United States in the econoadcand
political reconstruction of Western Europe.
ReaI'IllameIlt as the State DepartmentSolution to Econanic and
Political Crisis
As the previous chapters have outlined, the strategies
adopted by the EX::A as steps towards the overall objective of a
U5-dondnatedworld multilateral system continually ran up against
the specific determinations of individual and joint Western&1ropean
nations. With the termination of Marshall Aid to Britain quickly
approaching, the USadministration now faced a newcrisis. Acheson
remarkedin early 1950 to Truman "unless vigorous steps are taken the
reduction and eventual ~nation of extraordinary foreign
assistance in accordance with present plans will create eoonanic
problemsat home and abroad of increasing severity".30/ Acheson's
anxieties focussed on oonditions for the maintenance of a high export
surplus with the JB)Stpressing problem, "how can &1rope obtain the
dollars necessary to pay for a high level of US exports, which is
essential both to their own basic needs and to the well being of the
United States econany?"3l/ This question, largely insoluble for the
EX:A and the Treasury Departments, was answered by the State
Departnent in a series of mem:>S which attenpted to link the major
political crises of the day to the approaching econanic difficulties.
In the face of Soviet expansionism in Central and Fastern &lrope and
the establis!lDent of the Chinese People's Replblic in October 1949
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Achesonand Nitze (replacem:mt for Kennan as head of the Policy
Planning Staff in 1949) proposed in late 1949massive Americanand
&.lropeanrearmarrentas the solution not only to the deepening Cold
Warbut also to problems of danestic econanic policy.
The 'Report to the National Security Council by the
Executive Secretary on USobjectives aOO programs for national
security', referred to as NSC-68,prepared in response to a request
fran Truman and delivered on the 7th April 1950, provided a focus for
the State Departmentsolution. Arguing in classic Cold War terms
NSC-68 announced"the assault on free institutions is worldwide txs«,
and in the context of the present polarisation of powera defeat for
free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere".32/ The
"integrity of the capitalist system" it concluded "will not be
jeopardised by any measures covert or overt, violent or non-violent,
which serve the purpose of frustrating the Kremlin design". NSC-68
hc1t.Ieverwent further than sinply affinning the paranoia of the
AmericanColdWar. Drawingon the views of Leon Keyserling fran the
Council of Econanic Advisors, the documentsll99estEd that increasing
defence expenditure need not result in a drain of governoent funds or
10ng-teDnbudget deficits.
Whilst at present, the State Department argued, only 5' of
the USgross national product was allocatEd to defence, the US
economy was operating well below full capacity. With a higher level
of general econanic acti vi ty, GNPcould be raised and the increment
used to sustain a significant udlitary build-up without decreasing
daoestic Ii ving standards. In tum the substantial increase in
armamentproduction would stiDulate further dynamicgrowth in the
general econany which would again increase the annmt avaiable for
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military-related consumption. In essence NSC-68provided an
interesting variant on Kidron's thesis of the PermamentArms
Economy33/ wherein massive armamentproduction acts to stabilise
capital accumulation by stimulating investment, demandfor labour,
technological 'spin-off' and international trade. In addition to
offering a solution to the ailing machine-tool and aircraft
production industries it also appeared to secure on a "politically
neutral basis" Americaneconomicgoals in Western Fllrope.
Themassive export of advanced us military technology and
the replacement of Marshall Aid by substantial mdlitary aid would
prevent the developnent of &!ropean regionalism and emphasise the
inportance of the USAto the reconstruction of Western &!rope.34/
~reover in support of these proposals the UKChiefs of Staff had
soberly concluded in March1950 that Western &!rope was facing
imninent invasion fran the Soviet Union. This pralpted a major
foreign policy re-appraisal on the part of the United States, whose
military focus on Western &!rope had declined since 1947.35/ The
revised assumptions for USforeign policy were therefore that the
rearmamantof the 'free ~rld' was necessary for Americansecurity
ard that large scale military assistance was necessary for the
required scale of r~t which ~uld have a nultiple effect on
the rearmamentefforts of other nations. The political and security
arguments for econanic aid in the guise of military assistance, the
camu.ttee on Foreign EconaDicPolicy informed, "are the sameas those
long plt forward in favour of the containment of camunism by
economic means·.36/
After the frustrated efforts of foreign econani.c policy led
by the FrA, the USAdministration adopted NSC-68as official policy
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in the Spring of 1950. In the wakeof the outbreak of hostilities
across the 38th parallel COngressimmediately broke the $13.5 billion
ceiling on defence, increasing this original amountby 257% for the
fiscal year 1951. 371 The State Department's advocacyof rearmament
had ramifications in three areas. Firstly despite the rhetorical,
almost ~ssionary, tone of documentssuch as NSC-68it is clear that
domestic and international economicpolicy considerations were
parenount in its construction and important in its final acceptance
by Congress. Secondly the outbreak of hostilities in Koreaappeared
to verify the poli tical/mili tary sentiments of the State Department's
assessment and any interpretation of the hostilities whichdid not
square with this dominantview of global Stalinist expanSionismwas
ajuclgedinconprehensible. Finally the COngreSSionalassent to rearm
iItplied that aimi.Lar policies wouldbe followed by WesternEuropean
nation states despite the less than stable condition of their
econanies. '!bus the US Aide- Melooireon Interim aid camunicated to
the UK on October 3rd 1950 recognised that "as the size of the
defence effort of the UK increases, it will ~ progressively
greater burdens on the econany", 381 yet such burdens were a necessity
since nif anything happens in Western Europe the whole business goes
to pieces".391
Britain's Political Response
The Sri tish state's interpretation of the I(orean
hostilities bore a strong reseab1ance to that expressed in washington.
Bevin inmediately decided that "Koreawas one exalII>leof Russian
trouble making and there was no telling where or when she might make
trouble next". 'lherefore"the I(oreanwar should not be oonaidered in
isolation but as part of a global struggle between the West and
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Russian•40/ In fact recent evidence, supported by Kruschev's
account, suggests that KIM11 Sungacted independently in instigating
the hostilities and thereby campr~s~d both Stalin and Maointo later
support for his North Korean reg~.41/
Attlee's response was to immediately release Naval forces
frcm HongKongin support of ADerican ground troops. Within one
mont.h the British carmi tment had extended and the UK eventually
contributed two infantry brigades, three assorted regiments with
supporting ground staff, the Far Eastern Fleet, and the Sunderland
aircraft of the RAF.42/ Before assessing the impact of the
acceleration in defence spending on the UK econany it is worth
reviewing the state's political rationale for such significant
involvement in the hostilities.
The popular interpretation of Britain's decision is couched
in the familiar frameworkof "political subservience to the United
States" wherebyAttlee and Gaitskell "felt swayedby the need to back
up the Americansat almost all oosts".43/ As with the other
capitulation to ADm"icanhegenonyexplanations encountered in this
thesis, close study of the British state's actions revealsa rather
different and more ambiguousrationale which can easily be lost in
generalisation •
TO understand the state's decision attention must initially
focus upon the strang econanic recovery staged fran the secord half
of 1949 and the adoption of the revised &CCI.DD.ll.ationstrategy made
possible by that recovery. 'Dle British state had proclaimed that
Marshall Aid would end in December 1950 and had flatly rejected any
involvementwith American-sponsored&lropean econanic integrative
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scheres • Gaitskell had claimed that the task of postwar recovery was
nowcanplete and Britain IIUlStpreserve its "econanic strength and
independence".44/ This developoont of economic independenceBevin
and Gaitskell stressed "gave us weight in the counsel of nations •••
and allowed us ..• for the first t~ since the war, to sustain our
worldwide~tmentsn.45/ MoreoverBritain had onerous
responsibilities in the Pacific and South East Asia with ndlitary
contingents in Hong Kongand Singapore, and an active canp!ign
against 'nationalists' being wagedin Malaya. Whilst the cabinet
sought to maintain Anglo-Americansolidarity on issues of foreign
affairs this solidarity was perceived by the UK after 1949as one of
equal partnership. TheWesternworld could not be defeOOedwithout
Amaricanmilitary strength but nevertheless the outbreak of Korean
hostilities wouldallow "a useful dellkXlstration of the United
Kingdan's capacity to act as a world power with the support of the
camDnwealth".46/ The iOOependentBritish recognition of the Chinese
People's Republic accorded on the 2nd January 1950 and Britain's
refusal throughout the Koreanepisode to operate political or
eoonanic sanctions against the Mao administration (both decisions to
the considerable dissatisfaction of Washington47/) point. yet further
to the inaccuracy of seeing the British state as involved in a
political capitulation.
The state's revised accwtUlation strategy built upon the
twin pillars of regional nultilateralism in &!rope and the
maintenanceof the Sterling Area system worldwide could now support,
in the cabinet's opinion, a foreign poliey clenalstrating Britain's
ability to sustain its worldwide cauni.tments 1n oonjunction (whenever
convergent) with the interests of the United States. Further support
for this interpretation is provided from a study of the finance of
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British defence which indicates that by October 1950 Bevin and
Gaitskell had agreed that Britain's position "makes it entirely
appropriate to find a multilateral exandnation of what constitutes an
equitable distribution of new burdens".481 Britain could not submit
in isolation a special justification for a direct plea for dollars
(despite early moves in that direction) since "we could not easily
reconcile such a presentation with our basic determination to stand
on our own feet at the earliest possible mcment".491 The costs of
this determination mist; be examined.
II. Econanic Growth and Rearmament
'!berea.rmaIIeIltprogranme involved an expansion of defence
expenditure over three distinct stages. Fran a progranme which stood
at £2340m. for the years 1951-53 in December 1949, an increase to
£340Om. was announced in August 1950 (revised.to £360Om. in Sept.eni>er
of that year), and a final planned increment to a level excluding
stockpiling of £4655m. was unveiled on the 19th January 1951.SOl
Fach increment was announced by Attlee as the most that could
physically be achieved without reverting to a war econany aOO even
with the final rise Gaitskell was resolved that "the UK's external
accounts shall not run into deficit during the rearmament period" .511
'!'nepublic blandishnents however concealed the grave consequences of
rearmam:mt outlined by the Treasury.
Meeting Rearmament Costs 'rhrwgh Increased Prcxiuction
As early as October 1948 Treasury officials had assessed
that the disruption to productive capital caused by any increased
level of rearmament would necessitate severe restrictions in hane
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consunption and social \relfare invest:m9nt. Yet both Attlee and his
PPSRoyJenkins were insisting as late as March1951 that "the impact
of the rearmamentprogrammeupon our standard of living is likely to
be less dramatic than manypeople at first believed, since muchof
the resources wouldcomefrom increased production".52/ The idea
that the demandsof the defence programmecould be met fran an
increase in production was howeverffdsguided.
It was clear that the accelerated defence prograane would
have a selective impact. Anyincrease in productivity wouldnot be a
flat rate increase since the various engineering industries would
increase production at different rates, with somealmost inevitably
showinga decline. Attlee I s assessment inplied free
inter-changeability of labour and capital within the engineering
sector, a suggestion with limited applicability to labour and only
marginal accuracy to the transfer of plant capacity. Anyincrease in
overall production wouldmoreoverderive in part fran the
installation of newequipnent, aId to the extent that the defence
programmewoulddeprive productive capital of newequipnent (and
severely limit the inp:>rtation of new1m!rican engineering goods)
increased industrial production could in no sense be ass\.1l18i.
TheMinistry of SUpplyhad reached a similar conclusion by
AugUst1950 (that is before an extra £l,075m. had been added to the
planned defence expenditure) in noting that "it would be wrong to
imagine that a solution to the main problemcan be fown in
att~ing to balance additional defence claims against increases in
productivi ty" •53/ casual correlations between overall industrial
productivi ty and the selective claims of defence were therefore based
upon inaccurate assunptions. To assess the true i.npact upon
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productive capital it was necessary to focus on the effects
experienced principally by the~etal-using industries - that is to say
the industries concernedwith engineering, shipbuilding, road and
rail vehicles, and electrical manufacture.
TheMetal-using Industries and GovernmentPolicy
The func1anentaldifference between the execution of
rearmamentin 1936-39- whenspare resources typified in
unemploym3Ilt,unoccupied factories and plants, and a surplus of steel
fromdomestic production were available - and that of 1951-53, when
the economy was already fully euployed, forced the governmentto
adopt the general principle that the iooustries within the
metal-using group engaged in the production of conswnerdurables
should be diverted into defence contract work in order to shield
production of essential capital goods for investment and export. To
accatplish this task Gaitskell announced"we nust choose deliberately
both on grounds of social policy and to assist the execution of the
defence progranme, the places where the sacrifices IIllSt fall and not
leave this to the arbitrary and inefficient operation of
inflation".54/ Yet the state's careful policy objectives did not
fully accord with either the danestic or international corkiitions
affecti~ productive capital at this point and to a large extent it
was the decisions of private capital, and the oovements in the
international supply of rawmaterials and their effect upon inport
prices, whichdetermined the outcaDe of the iupact on the metal-using
industries. To illustrate these remarks we need to consider the
state's proposals for the metal-using industries.
Themajor appraisal of the Service Departments anticipated
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that the defence workcarried out by the metal-using industries
(excluding vehicles) would increase by over two am a half times the
level preceding the Koreanwar. The production of military aircraft
wouldsubstantially exceed the manufacture of all aircraft carried
out in 1950, whilst at least one third of the capacity of the vehicle
industry wouldbe devoted to defence, am the volumeof work for the
Navy urXlertakenby shipyards and marine engineering establishnelts
wouldexceed by 40%their current output.55/ Tb achieve this
proqramrethe goverrunentdecided the following policy objectives.
A substantial transfer and re-allocation of labour wouldbe
required in four related areas. Firstly at least 250,000additional
workerswere likely to be needed in the aircraft and Royal Ordnance
factories alone over the period 1951-53since the specialised
capacity of these groups was not fully utilised under peacetime
conditions. Secondly sate of the defence load would fall upon
industries that were in any case experiencing a decline in size. The
new orders would therefore "assist in avoiding trouble" in such
industries as shipbuilding where the additional naval orders would
limit the rate of decline of the labour force.56/ Thirdly the Board
of Trade in conjunction with the Ministry of I.ocal. Governmentand
Planning decided that re-allocation of labour wouldbe made as part
of an overall strategy to relieve pressure on congested areas,
diversify industry in specific localities and bring work to
"developnent areas" .57/ Finally with regard to the transfer of
labour the key overall objective was stated to be the transfer within
firms and industries of workers fran civil to military types of work.
In addition to the efforts to be made in "squeezing labour out of
non-manufacturingeaployment" (such as the distributive trades) and
the concentration on plant capI!lCity in undevelopedareas together
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with the transfer fran conswnerdurable goods to defence contract
work, the governmentdecided to create substantial newcapacity in
certain sections of the metal-using groups in particular for aircraft
and tank production.58/
Thediscussion on the restriction of civil consumptionalso
explored moredrastic measures of discrLminatory allocation of scarce
resources, the prohibitions of end-use of scarce materials, the
lllnitation of supply orders, and the specific direction of firms to
make particular products.59/ Whilst the prohibition of end-use was
employedfor certain inessential articles madeof nickel,copper, zinc
and brass, the other ~ures failed to be widely adopted due to
administrative difficulties and nthe likelihood of arousing strang
opposition in peacetime".60/
Overall the policy measures were taken to meet the
governmentI s main objectives in the metal-using industries which
were, firstly to ensure that the defence impact fell upon consumption
goods for the haDe market rather than upon exports or essential
danestic investment, and secondly to ensure that the demandfor
productive resources (in particular labour) did not outstrip supply
in sane areas whilst in others resources were left unused.
Constraints on Industrial Restructuring
'!be ability of the state to re-structure sections of
productive capital in this mannerwas severely constrained firstly by
the nature of productive capital at this time and secondly by the
international scarcity of rawmaterials. Gaitskell discovered to his
dismay in 1951that al..naIt 80%of the resources of the metal-using
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industries were employedon civil work. There was no question he
decided of detailed governm:mtcontrol either over the size of their
output or its destination. "There is neither the staff nor the
knowledgeto work such a system", he concluded.611 This situation
contrasted sharply with that in 1943whenover 80%of the labour in
the metal-using industries was working directly or indirectly for the
SupplyDepartments. ~reover, as the Econanic Planning Staff soon
discovered in 1951, there was a fallacy in the widespread assumption
that defence workwould be available to absorb the capacity which
would become free as a result of the reduction in output of consumer
durables. The "essential fact" they discovered was that "material
supplies are limited - this would canpel sane f irma to curtail their
activities; it would not help to maintain employmentmerely to give
defence work to these firms as the expense of others".621 The
WorkingParty under the Productive capacity cann.ittee concluded that
the state's policy objectives were based on major errors of judgement.
Productive capacity, they decided, was not a bottleneck in the
defence progranmeand, short of full-scale war, maynever be a
bottleneck - "the real bottlenecks are rawmaterials and skilled
labour, with productive capacity a very poor third" .631
The state's aim, to make the best use of scarce capacity by
cutting down sane forms of production to enable others to develop,
was misconceived since the real difficulty was to employcapacity
which had or was likely to becaDe spare because of raw material
shortages. Ql financial grounds ooreaver it was clear to the Working
Party that, contrary to the anbition of finding enployment for
capacity which became spare, "it would be better to let it go (or
cause it to go) out of operation am let such materials am skilled
labour as are available to go to those firms who are getting defence
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contracts naturally because they are the best fitted to undertake
them".64/ This view is verified by the fact that even at the height
of rearmamentthe governmentcould not fulfil its planned level of
expenditure with defence spending 30%below the level envisaged in
January 1951. ~reover evidence fran Treasury melOOrandasuggests
that the state was not able to assist firms makingconsumerdurables
to secure defence work.
In February 1951 the governmentalready had more firms on
its trade lists than it could employand was receiving offers of
capacity at the rate of 400 a week.65/ Alfred Robens (Bevan's
successor) CCIIPlainedthat a numberof firms with outstanding
vacancies for work on the defence programmewere employinglabour
within the same institution on lIDreprofitable civilian '4IlOrk.In
addition there were nunerous other exanples of main contractors who
wouldneed to sub-contract part of their orders, terxiing to place
sub-contracts with their regular suppliers instead of expanding
contacts and trying other firms since they were viewed as
inexperienced and possibly IOOrexpensive even if labour and
facilities were available.66/
The state's inability to refashion sections of productive
capital due to the nature of that capital am the limitations i.np>sed
by international rawmaterial supply has thus been dem::mstrated
particularly with regard to the transfer of labour and the transfer
of industrial capacity to meet the newdefence requirements. Insight
into the nature of the relations between the state and productive
capital can be further gained fran an analysis of the state's efforts
to create new productive capacity, particularly its efforts to
establish new tank production facilities.
269
The reyland Tank Lesson
In view of the serious deficiency in tank production
capacity the Ministry of Supply invited the Leyland Motor Companyin
March 1951 to erect and manage two new tank production lines
in Lancashire. The selection of Leyland was based upon their simdlar
work in 1939, their retention of the sane managerial and technical
staff who had canpleted the earlier work, and their large research
and development facilities.67/ In view of the state's official
policy concerning the relief of pressure on congested areas
(particularly where labour was fully E!1Iployed), the diversification
of industry in each locality, the transfer of work to developnent
areas, and the creation of work in areas not already daninated by
essential export industries, the government was particularly anxious
that Leyland set up a new factory away fran their present location
and start production in an area where the labour situation was
comparatively easy. Unless this principle is firmly applied,
R. F. Bretherton informed the Econanic Planning Comnittee, -m:>Stof
our efforts to speed up the defence progranme will defeat themselves;
and the grounds for abandoning it in this - the first important test
case - seems inadequate·. 68/ Leyland' s ~ver refused such
directives and proposed that they would undertake the newwork
provided the new tank factory was erected on vacant land ~jacent to
their existing plant at Leyland. The catpany estimated that for an
output of 500 tanks a year it would require a new workforce of at
least 2,500 operatives.
'lbe inplications of accepting Leyland's decision were at
total variance with the state's policy objectives. Whilst the town
of Leyland itself supported a working population of 15,500, it had a
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maximumunemploymentfigure during 1949 of 40. The surrounding areas
(Preston, Chorley, Wigan, and Blackburn) had a total maroer of job
vacancies in December 1950 standing at 3,625 with a maximum
unemployedtotal of 1,673.69/ f.k>reoverthe principal manufacturers
in the region were directly involved in export-related production
<chemical, engineering, aircraft, and textile industries> with
further requirements for labour already existing in key defence
production areas at English Electric in Accrington and Preston (for
canberra aircraft production), Royal Ordnance factories at Chorley
and Blackburn, and De Havillands in Bolton. In an area whose
contribution to direct exports was second only to the Midlands, and
where there was absolutely no prospect of additional accomoodation
being provided for incaning operatives, the decision to canply with
Leyland's ultimatum would reduce the government's policy objectives
to a series of worthless statenents. Nevertheless, despite
opposition fran Harold Wilson and Bevan, the cabinet approved
Leyland's offer on the 21st March1951with no regard to the
requirements of the existing defence and export industries in the
area and no restrictions or guidance to be placed upon or given to
the Leyland management.
'!be Leyland episode is not an isolated case. A review of
new buildings sanctioned in connection with the defence progranme
reveals a s~lar aooount of private productive capital exploiting
the state's caunitment to the defence prograome. In the case of new
buildings the Board of Trade suspected that •f irms may be tempted to
use this opportunity to obtain authorisation for extensions which
they desire, but cannot obtain, for the normal d.evelopaent of their
business·.70/ In this respect can be cited the Rcotes Ltd.,
extension of 227,400 sq. feet; the ~ Ltd. extension of
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52,000 sq. feet~ the Austin ftDtors Ltd. extension of 965,660 sq.
feet~ and the Rover CompanyLtd. extension of 300,000 sq. feet - all
in the West ~dlands region and all producing simdlar commodities
despite the cabinet's policy objectives of diversifying industry and
limdting industrial expansion in congested areas.71/
In spite of official policy objectives it is clear that by
1951 the state was unable to refashion those sections of productive
capital uponwhich its programnewas based, The benefits accruing to
the more astute sections of productive capital were considerable in
this period and enabled in particular the vehicle industries to
secure expansion in buildings and equipnent (Leyland noreover
received "f inancial assistance over and above what we paid in
the GovernmentcontractR72/) far beyond that which would have been
secured under normal conditions. Contrary to those claims which
depict rearmament ·pulling the heart out of British manufacturingR,
the above episode suggests that the state (rather unwittingly) gave
great assistance to the mre astute sections of productive capital,
laying the foundations for the industrial expansion experienced in
the following years.
FurtherIOOrean analysis of the distribution of supplies
of metal-goods over the 1950-52 period shows that even at its peak
defence did not absorb oore than 12' of the outplt fran this
industrial group. Whilst defence appropriatei the 8' increase in the
production of metal-goods over the two years, the supplies allocated
to exports, investment and consumer goods for the bane market
remained constant.73/ 'nlose interpretations which claim that the
metal-using industries were decimated in the reaI1llalDentdrive are
guilty of firstly according the state a degree of direction and
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control over productive capital which it clearly did not possess in
1951, secondly underestLffiatingthe precise obstacles to the simple
transfer of production from civil to military output, and thirdly of
understating the regulatory effects of the rawmaterial shortage to
which this account mist, shortly turn as part of the consideration of
the effect of reaI1llalDenton British trade and balance of payments.
The state had long anticipated that a major effect of
rearmamentwould be the retardation of the government's social
policies which had already been launched. Towardsthe end of 1948 it
had been assessed that "fran the econanic point of viewwe should (in
the wakeof rearmam:mt)aim at diverting resources awayfran
consunption and social welfare investment leaving unscathed as far as
possible exports and productive investment".74/ Considerable
hardship for the lower incale groups was seen as unavoidable since,
as Gaitskell announced, "the redistribution of real incare which is
the consequence of rising prices followed by rising wages etc., •••
is mainly to the disadvantage of the lower fixed incane groups and
mayconfront us before long with difficult political problemsn.75/
SUch political problE!11L9were hoIiIIever deemed secondary in the face of
the government's overall econanic resolve that "the UK's external
accounts shall not run into deficit during the rearrnBl1entperiod,
except to the extent of strategic stockpiling". 76/
Priority Guidancefor Exports
To meet this objective attention focussed on the priority
guidance to be given to firms in the event of conflicts arising
between the demands of dollar export and those of the defence
progranme. Although the state's ability to intervene directly in the
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export effort was severely harrperedby the government's policy to
leave the conduct of the export trade a1.m:>stentirely in the hands of
private industry and commerce,proposals were drawnup to guide the
export industry through this uncertain period.
Firstly as a general principle it was decided that defence
and export orders should rank as an equal first priority over all
other supplies but with a tendency for defence orders to take
precedence in the last resort.77/ The principle was established and
implenented to the chagrin of the Minister of Supplywhoargued that
"if a decision is taken on political or defence grounds to prefer
defence suppl ies to dollar exports, it should be taken with the full
recognitition that the pranising canadian market for engineering
goods will be lost permanently".78/ The inability of the UK to
CCJlI>etewith US deliveries would justify, he argued, the deeply
rooted suspicion that in time of emergencythe UK will be an
unreliable source of supply. The implications of this view are worth
assessing and its accuracy will be analysed shortly. Secondly the
state reinforced the existing obligation of the export industry to
maintain exports to the dollar areas as a basic axicm of policy. An
expansion of total earniB}s at the expense of exports to these vi tal
markets wouldnot bring COlpensatOrybenefits. Thirdly the state
inplored that exports to the Comkmwealthshould be maintained aOO
rank in priority imDediately after defence supplies am dollar
exports. '!he supply to CaDlDnwealthnations was essential since they
were viewed as dollar savers, BaDe exports would contribute directly
to CcJmDnWealthdefence progranmes, and in the view of the Treasury
"the Cc:IImonweal.th is our best long term market·. 79/ Finally the
state advised that firms receiving enquiries fran Western !mope
should refuse orders where they are willing to do so, and in other
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cases give orders fran all other sources precedence over orders frcm
Eastern EUrope.
Although the UK prevented the export to Eastern
Europe, China and North Korea of strategic items capable of
contributing directly to the production of arms, the British state
throughout the Koreanhostilities refused the Americandemand of
preventing the export of UK goods which would serve to "increase a
country's basic industrial strength". 801 The reasoning behind this
rather curious line of policy was econanic. The Export Credit
Guarantee Department (&:GO) had assessed that if delivery of goods to
these nations were stopped, the state would be liable for 90% of the
value of goods for which paymenthad not yet been made. The disposal
of such goods elsewhere would be difficult and "public funds would no
doubt also have to bear the cost of cal1;)ellsatingfirms [including
those not covered by the EX:X;D] whowere involved in the loss of
their exports".811
Priority GuidanceRe-inforcing Traditional Trade Routes
The priority guidance system had an overall effect of
consolidating the viewthatBritish interests would best be
safeguarded by directing exports to the dollar areas and the
camDnwealth. Whilst the state recognised that it nust allow for
large rEductions in the volwoe of exports of rawmaterials, coal and
steel if the output of productive capital was to be sustained, it
decided that it would be unreasonable to expect to secure any
increase in the total volumeof exports of engineering goods (which
had contributed 50% of total UKexports in 1950) due to the claims of
defence and the rawmaterial shortages. It was therefore to the
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oonsuner goods industries (which roughly accounted for 45%of exports
in 1950) that the government looked for an increase in the total
V01URe of exports in the wake of rearmament. Howeverthe threat of
direct foreign competition in Western Europeanmarkets from the rise
of Germanyand Japan prompted the government to exhort industry to
export to the morewell established British export destinations. The
perception that in EUrope,Germancoopetition was to be most severe
and that the raw material shortages would give i.npetus to the
Japanese to develop consuner goods products specifically for EUropean
markets which did not involve heavy use of scarce metals, led the
British state to the conclusion that "we expect once again to be in a
muchstronger position in dealing with foreign CCJIllE!tition in the
sterling Ccmoonwealthmarkets than in most others notably Europe" .82/
Japanese canpeti tion in textiles and miscellaneous consumer
goods was likely to be at its keenest in Europe rather than in the
independent CcIIInonwealthnations, whilst the Germans "are a little
reluctant to challenge our C<JIIDal¥lingposition in the
canoonwealth"•83/ priority guidance re-inforced the tendency for
British exports to sell in the largely \lIlCall)etitive and undemanding
ecmoonwealthnations, excluding Britain fran the expanding European
high value export destinations and continuing to leave the UKforeignsubject
trade sector largelyfto mvements in the American econauy and to
perceptions in the Western hemisphere of the reliability of British
deli very. '!be pressures which the rearmament progranmewere thought
to entail for British exports consolidated the conservatism of the
state with regard to export destination
,a conservatism which in no small
part was significant in the subsequent decline in the econanic growth
of the UKin relation to other Western &1ropean nations, whose
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concentration on intra-EUropean trade at this time was at the expense
of manytraditional export markets. However,before drawing any
overall conclusions, the precise iRpact of the defence programneon
the export trade rust be examined.
RawMaterials and 'rrade Balance in 1951
As late as the 12th Sept.erlb!r 1950Attlee was convinced
that "as to rawmaterials, it is not considered that there should be
any serious shortage". 84/ By October however the international
scramble for all major raw materials (sulphur, sulphuric acid, zinc,
and copper in particular) was well under way and this position did
not ease until the SUIIIDeI' of 1951. '1tle raw material shortage, due
principally to the increases in industrial production in Western
:&lrope (accentuated by the dramatic rise of West German industry)
and, fran late 1949 onwards, the recovery of the USAfran its mild
recession, had been exacerbated by the massive Americanstockpiling
policy begun prior to June 1950 and fed by the speculative demand for
canoodities engendered by expectations of rising prices aM limited
supplies.85/ Worldrearmament intensified this shortage with
predictable results for the UK. '!be price of raw materials rose fran
an index which stood at 100 in I)ecent)er 1949 to 215 points by June
1951. 'Ibis increased overall UKi.I1p)rt prices by 60' over the same
period.86/ 'lbe total inport bill for 1951 therefore sholMi an
increase of £l,lOOm. over 1950with two thirds of the rise due to
higher prices resulting mainly fran the raw material shortage and a
16' increase in the volumeof iDlx>rts made principally to counteract
the reckless run down of strategic stock carried out in 1950.87/
In attalpting to anticipate the likely effects of the raw
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materials situation on the output of exports the goverl'lllelt decided
the following points. Firstly over the period 1950-52 the export of
rootal-goods would, in view of defence, only be maintained at the 1950
level on the most optimdstic reading. Secondly the high level of
world commodityprices and the inflationary pressures generated by
these prices and by defence programmesshould definitely support a
level of world demandfor manyother classes of manufactures
substantially higher than that recorded in 1950.88/ Thirdly the
governmentdecided to advise export industries to increase their
prices (by as mich as 36%>,where this could be done without damaging
either long-term ccmnercial prospects or the chances of substantially
increasing the vo1uneof foreign sales. Overall howeverthe
goverl'lllelt was convinced that the expected reduction in the volumeof
rootal-goods and raw material exports would fail to neet the required
export objective, which for 1952was £3,20Om.90/
In this assessment they were broadly accurate, despite
underestimating the size of the import bill in 1951 and overstating
the inpact of defence on the metal-using industries in both years.
In spite of the shortage of steel and other raw materials for
industry the volumeof engineering exports increased by 4' in 1951,
contrary to governmentexpectations. 'Ibis 00wever lIIlSt be seen
against the background of an export increase of 16' experienced in
the year 1949-50. overall the volumeof exports increased by l' in
1951 oomparedwith a 16' rise in the previous year.9l/ With the peak
of rearmamentexpenditure occurring in 1952 the metal-using
industries failed to increase overall production, and exports fran
this group fell slightly in volume. The fact however that defence
took nearly one eighth of the total supplies of metal products in
1952 ooopared with less than one twelth the year before should be
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borne in mind together with the greatly increased foreign carpetition
in metal-goods in overseas markets experienced in 1952, when
assessing the Unpact of defence on exports.92/
The iItpact of rea.rmauenton the export trade over these
years was iIlp:>rtant in that it acted to check the substantial export
drive at a t~ when the rise in Lmportprices precipitated yet
another balance of payments crisis. lnp:>rtant sectors of the
engineering industries were engaged on defence work when their output
wouldotherwise have contributed to substantial export gains.
~reover the retention of manpower within the Services at a time of
acute civilian labour shortage only created fresh difficulties for
firms primarily engaged on production for export. Indeed the total
level of British exports declined in early 1952 and did not regain
the level achieved in 1951 until the second half of 1953.93/ A
n\lJli)erof econanic circumstances however contributed to this decline
(circumstances whoseanalysis transgresses the boundaries of this
study) and it would be grossly inaccurate to claim that rearmament
alone caused the reductions. It nust be concluded that the pressures
generated by rearmament firstly re-inforced the conservatism of the
state with regard to export destination and secondly acted to check
the UK's essential export drive at a time of acute balance of
payaents difficulties. Analysis of the state's abrupt foreign
currency drain will further elucidate these conclusions am enable
the study to clarify the precise iq;)act of rearmament upon
accunulation.
Tabour's Last crisis
The massive increase in UK inplrt prices for 1951
279
dislocated the British balance of paymentswhich had been
strengthened in 1950. A large surplus on the balance of paymentswas
reversed by almost £68Om.,producing a deficit of £36~. for 1951.94/
As noted earlier it should have been possible to foresee that many
costs wouldbe incurred in 1951even without intensive world
inflationary pressure.
The interest and anortisation on the us and canadian loans
wouldcost the UK over £75m.annually, seriously depleting invisible
earnings, especially with the termination of Marshall Aid. In
addition increased foreign competition was assured from the end of
1950reducing the hi therto 'sellers market', and the strategic
materials that had been run downover 1950would also need
replacement. An exceptional conjunction of unfavourable developnents
in the second half of 1951 intensified the pressure on sterling.
Thus the 60%increase in UK import prices over an eighteen month
period (the result it should be stressed of raw material shortages
whichbegan before rearmamentcould have an iJrpact), was acconpu1ied
by a sharp fluctuation in world demand for textiles, am the Persian
seizure of the Abadan oil refineries which incurred a new cost of
over £lOOm.a year for replacement dollar oil.95/
This unfavourable situation had an irrmediate effect on the
UK'sgold and dollar reserves which began to substantially decline in
to end the year at £8~4m.
June 1951 fran a level of £1381m.fUK inplrts fran the Western
hemisphereby value increased. over $84(0. during 1951 arXl the gold
and dollar drain was not halted until the second quarter of 1952when
world ccmlOiity prices bad stabilised, raw material shortages had
eased am Butler had irIposed sharp iDplrt cuts.96/ In addition the
UKbalance in the EPUshc::Jwedsigns of increasing specu!ati ve
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movementsagainst sterling after the first quarter of 1951with an
accumulateddeficit of £30Om.by October of that year and the very
real prospect of the gold free credit available to the UKrunning dry
by the beginning of 1952.
To assess the precise impact of rea.rmam:mton these
unfavourable developnents we need to clarify the level of defence
expenditure throughout this period and relate this to the changing
fortunes of sterling. Despite the governmentI s intention of raising
defence expenditure from just under £80Om.in 1950 to £1694 in 1953
(1950prices) it appears that rearmamentreached its peak in 1952 at
a level of £l25Om., sema 30%below the level planned in
January 1951.97/ Expansion from the pre-Korean state was therefore
no nore than two-thirds, with defence, which absorbed 7%of GNPin
1950, not rising above an absorption level of 10.5%in 1952.98/ The
principal impact of rearmamentwas felt in 1952. Yet by the end of
that year the balance of paymentswas showinga surplus of £163m.and
the gold and dollar reserves had recovered from a low of £602m.at
the end of the second quarter to a figure of £659m.by 0ec;e1t)er
1952.99/
This change in the fortunes of sterling was achieved
because inport prices were well past their peak (Gaitskell had
forecast an import burden of £3,60Om.for 1952whereas the actual
figure was below £295Om.100/). The terms of trade had iaproved for
the UK,and Butler's policies of further reducing the social
progranmeand inposing i.np)rt cuts whilst reducing the anomt of
trade Britain had liberalised within the EPUfrom 90%to 60%, renewed
international confidence in the stability of sterling.
281
The conclusion with regard to rearmamentand the crisis in
the state's currency holdings is that the phenanenal rise in inport
prices fuelled by the shortage of rawmaterials (which in turn was a
result of the substantial increases in Western European and American
industrial activity in 1950 together with the massive USstockpiling
policies all intensified by the later world rearmamentprocess) was
the principal precipitating factor in the 1951 balance of payments
crisis. Although defence experniture absorbed approximately 1.5%
moreof available resources in that year than previous years its
effect on the deteriorating balance of paymentswas minimal carpared
to the rise in import prices. Whenthe world commodityprices
stabilised in 1952 the balance of payments recovered sharply, despite
the fact that this was the peak year for defence expenditure. The
foregoing analysis cannot therefore support the stmplistic view that
the British rea.IlllalleIltprogramne"caused a severe balance of payments
crisis".lOl/
Nevertheless there can be little doubt that in the
corxiitions of an overloaded econany any diversion of resources would
increase the burden experienced in all spheres of accunulation. The
balance of paymentscrises was exacerbated by the increased inplrts
of defence supplies and the increased proportion of supplies of
metal-goods used for defence. Although this increased proportion
remainedbelow 12' even at the peak time of rearmamentdemand, it
nonetheless absorbed resources which otherwise might have been
euployed in the export drive, whilst also checking the rise in
industrial investment at a time when the engineering industry was at
full capacity.
Realising this poeition the inoaning Conservative
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goverIlIteIltre-assessed the demandsof re.armaaent. Butler scrapped
Gaitskell's "priority guidance" system by re-affirming the need
of the governmentto put "full weight behind the export driven•102/
In addition he reduced the planned inpact of defence requirements on
the netal-using industries and attenpted to realign the scaled down
defence progranme to the requirements for the expansion of total
social capital.
Conclusion
The conclusions of the inpict of rearmal'lent upon overall
capital accumulation can now be clarified. Firstly it is clear that
the state's quick political assent to accelerate the defence
progranmecannot be adequately seen as political subservience to the
USA. The state's determined resistance to Americanattenpts to
iItp)Se ecOOClllichegelOOnyon the UK throughout the postwar per iod had
partially succeeded by early 1950 inasrruch as the revised
accunulation strategy signalled the end of the EX:A' s att.enpt to
subordinate the UK within a Us-daninated world nultilateral system,
the first step of which was premissed upon British-led F.uropean
econanic and political unification. The apparent econanic success of
Britain's new accunulation strategy enabled the state to attenpt a
political consolidation of its new position by demonstrating that for
the first time since the war it could, with the aid of the
ccmoonwealth,meet its worldwide ccmni.tments. The response of the
British state to the outbreak of Rorean hostilities 11WJtbe seen in
terms of the econanic expansion of 1950 and the political
determination which this expansion enabled.
Secondly the effects of rearmament on various aspects of
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capital were ambiguous, uneven and often indirect. '!be analysis
cannot lend credence to the simplistic view that rearmamentcaused
Britain's relative economicpostwar decline. Whenassessment is made
of the inpact on productive capital it is clear that the ef fect on
the metal-using industries (the industrial group roost directly
effected) was less severe than would be imagined. At the peak of
rea.rmanentdefence absorbed one eighth of the supplies fran this
industrial group, whilst supplies to investment and exports remained
constant over the entire 1950-52 period. The more astute sections
of productive capital were able throughout this period to
increase their industrial infrastructure at the direct expense of the
state in a mannerwhich would not have been possible under IOOre
normal circumstances. In particular (although by no means
exclusively) the IOOtorindustry can be seen to be benefited inmensely
via subsidised construction of new plant and buildings.
The effect of rearmamenton trade was rather less ani)iguous
inasmuchas the newdefence requirements clearly absorbed resources
which otherwise would have increased the export drive. Exports of
metal-goods increased only slightly in 1951. OVerall exports managed
only a 1%increase in 1951 compared with a 16%increment previously.
The check to exports was made IOOresevere by the unexpectedly large
increase in the 1951 import bill. Moreoverthe difficulties which
the state believed defence would bring to the export drive
(difficulties largely over eaphasised) re-inforced the 'safe'
geographical distribution for British exports which had been decided
in late 1949. 'lbe state's resolve, consolidated in the Korean
period, to maintain the traditional structure of UK trade left
Britain in future years supplying a wide variety of markets with
very different requirements, densities and low absorption rates for
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higher productivity manufactured exports. This was in contrast to
most other Europeannations whose turn to higher levels of
intra-European trade both precipitated the development of competitive
high productivity exports and largely sheltered these nations from
the more severe manifestations of periodic USrecession.
Finally it has been suggested that the state's management
of sterling was affected not so mich by the overall level of defence
expenditure, which even at its peak. remained sane 30% belO'tll1the
planned level, but by the irlpact on the balance of paymentsof
increased imports of defence supplies and increases in the supply of
the rawmaterials necessary to increase general industrial output.
In conditions of astronanical raw material price increases, which
would have seriously affected the UK even in the absence of British
rea..rmanent,the inplct of increasing the defence appropriation of the
GNP by alm:>st 4% over three years was to add an unnecessary burden to
an already overloaded econany. In this sense rearI'lllUlenthad a
contrary irlpact to that experienced in the United States, where a
long period of strategic stockpiling and under-utilised capacity
enabled rearmamentto tenporarily expand general econanic growth.
In the UK rearmament came at a time when a n\Jld:)er of
econanic factors catDined to slow econauic growth. Its particular
contribution to this interruption in British econanic developnent was
the check it caused to the export industry. But this selective
i.apact was tElllJOraryand easily reversed. Tabour left Office in
October 1951 under saDeWhatof a political and econanic cloud.
Nevertheless the serious barriers to accunul.ation had been overoane
in the postwar years and conditions had been lain for a decade of
unrivalled capitalist prosperity.
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Themost pressing task facing the postwar state was to
reconstruct Britain's international payments system to sustain
economicdevelopmentin conditions of production and trade imbalance.
Throughthe early adoption of fordist production techniques and its
imrense natural supply of rawmaterials, the United States had an
unrivalled economicbase in 1945. War-damagedWestern Europe found
its former trade patterns considerably dislocated. These
circumstances produced the world dollar shortage.
Yet despite her canparative weaknessBritain had a strong
bargaining position which rested on the strength of sterling as the
premier world currency and the City of London as the world's
financial centre. These factors (together with Britain's relative
economicand political strength vis a vis the other nations of
Western FAlrope - at least until 1947), meant that to achieve its
foreign economicpolicy aims the United States had no alternative but
to work through Britain, realising that the UKheld the key to the US
penetration of Europe.
'Ibe postwar years did not see the inposi tion of UShegeoony
over Britain. Rather the period was characterised by a series of
cauplex negotiations in which British Treasury 'experts' succeeded in
thwarting the ODrestrident USaspirations. By the end of 1951 the
United States was no nearer its anbition of creating a Us daninated
world nultilateral systen than it had been in 1945. The British
state by contrast had overcane the primary barriers to accunulation
which had constrained the econany in 1945, aIXi despite recurrent
balance of paymentscrises had established a payments system which
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facilitated high rates of eco~c growth.
In retrospect it maybe argued that the very success of
Britain's resistance to Americanpressure proved her later undoing.
AlthoughBritain reluctantly gave up the dual accumulation strategy
and accepted a partial multilateral paymentssystem in 1949, the
Treasury was insistent that Britain's best interest lay in a
withdrawal fram Europe and a concentration on trade with the Sterling
Area.and a 'special relationship' with the United States. As a
consequencethe UK continued its traditional geographical
distribution of exports and was largely excluded fram the expanding
intra-Western Europeantrade markets where the demand for
technologically advancedgoods st~lated higher productivity and
increased exports.
'lb infer however that the British state was mistaken in
resisting Americanpressure to lead European integration, is to
introduce a long-tenn perspective which is clearly absent in
capitalist economicpolicy. Short-term considerations are paraIOOWlt
in the IDaOagenentof contemporaryeconauies. The postwar state
trea.ted each specific barrier to accunulation as an end in itself and
was unconcernedwith long-tenn iq;>lications.
Fran this perspective the costs of taking the &1ropean
been
route would have}very heavy in the short-term. Fluctuations in the
balance of payments largely determined at what pace the state would
adopt nultilateral trade and payments arrangements. Fm"opean
integration (and the USwish for Lmmediatefull convertibility) and
the scrapping of Ccmlonwealthrelationships, was inconceivable for
the postwar state since it would have entailed a radical
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restructuring of production and trade and the abandonmentof the
privileged world role of sterling. Havinggained hard-earned
advances in economicgrowth since 1945 the Treasury was justif iably
resistant to risking future economicperformance for the benefit of
dubious Americanpolitical objectives.
Seen fran this perspective (and in manyways its the only
valid perspective which can be used to oversee capitalist economic
development) the state's postwar accumulation strategy was highly
successful. The following decade saw a generalised European econcmic
boom whichwas not the result of 'the Bretton Woodssystem' (which
had effectively collapsed by 1947), or the workof an American
,hegeroon'i.Irplsing international econcmicco-operation. '!he boan was
rather the result of iooividual nations pursuing specific
reconstruction policies. Once the British strategy had been
fornulated, it had its own developnental logic which, if only by
default, produced a period of long capitalist prosperity. '!he making
of postwar econcmicpolicy rested in the hands of a limited nUJ'li)erof
civil servants and 'expert advisers'. Specific political and
economicpressures constrained policy options. The short-term
success of the state's reconstruction of international paymentsand
the long-term drawbacksof a Sterling Area trade policy, reinforces
the validity of the sociological truth that -Men make their own
history, but they do not make it just as they please, they do not
make it UOOer circumstances chosen by themselves, but \Wier
circumstances directly encountered, given, ard transmitted fran the
past-.l/
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Appendix 1
The Changing Structure of M:xletary Account Areas in 1947
JULy 1947
STERLI~AREA(Scheduled Territories)
united Kingdon, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa,
Southern Rhodesia, Irrlia, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, British Colonies,
Iceland, Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, Greenland, the Faroe Islands.
AMERICAN ACCXXJNT AREA
united States; Philippines, Bolivia, Colunbia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Daninica, Ecuador, Guatemala , Haiti, Horrluras, Mexico, Nicaragua,
panama, salvador, Venezuela, Chile, Peru.
TRANSFERABLE ACXXX.JNT AREA
Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt & SUdan,
Ethiopia, Finlarrl, Iran, Italy, Netherlarrls, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
SWeden,Uruguay.
NATlOOSINVOLVEDIN SPECIFICNErol'IATlOO
Germany(occupation authorities), France, Japan (occupation
authorities), Switzerland.
NATIONSWITHWID1 ~ HADNC11' BEEN SIGNEDBY15m JULy 1947
Austria, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Paraguay, Poland,
Ranania, Siam, Turkey, USSR,Yugoslavia.
MISCELLANEnJS AREA UNAFli'ECI'ED BY CX>NVE2I'IBILITY EPlSOOE
Afghanistan, Albania, Korea, Liberia, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Tangier.
289
STRUCIUREOF K>NE1'ARYAREAS~ THESUSPEN3IONOF
CONVERl'IBILITYON THE 20THAUGUST1947:-
STERLI~ ARFA
Unchanged except for the removal of the Faroe Islands and Greenland.
AMERICAN AOXXJNT ARFA
As before except for the removal of Chile and Peru.
TRANSFERABLE ACCOUNT ARFA
Chile, Czechoslovakia, Faroe, Egypt & Sudan, Ethiopia, Finland,
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, USSR, W. Germany.
BILATERALAaXlJNl'S
Argentina, Belgium, France, Brazil, Bulgaria, canada, China, Hungary,
Japan, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, RaDania, Switzerland, Tangier,
Turkey, Uruguay, Yugoslavia (the Exchange Control Act of 1st October
1947 also placed Denmark, Austria and Greece in this category).
MISCELLANEXXJS GRCXJP
Unchanged.
f91!3CF§: H C Debates November 26th 1946; Shannon 1949; p.223;
Zupnick 1954, Tables 46, 48; PRO T236/1667 various
documents.
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APPl!H)IX 'D«)
'!'he Research Process
Standard accounts of historical research into problems of
contemporary governmentare keen to emphasise two points.l/ Firstly
they stress that the ·shifting sands of statistical revision"
present difficulties for studies whosemain ideas rest upon
numerical evidence. Trusting official statistics is a precarious
act not only because of continual revision (even after thirty years
by the central Statistical Office) but also because exactly howand
for what purpose the figures were catpiled is virtually never known
to the researcher. Secondly in discussing the research process it
is ooanon for writers to point out the problems of relying upon
written c1ocurIentation. In respect of public records three points
are worth considering. Firstly not all papers reach the Public
Records Office (PRO). Manygovernment papers are intentionally and
inadvertantly destroyed in the initial selection procedure.
Continual revision of docunents considered worth retaining is an
administrative necessity. Yet Robinson - econanic adviser to the
govermelt between 1939-48 - knows that many i.np:>rtant papers
written for internal circulation have now either perished or are
very difficult to find.2/ Secondly JOOStof the documents that were
ultimately published as official papers are the culmination of
numerousearlier drafts. In JOOStcases the published document is
far less illuminating than the amended earlier papers which reveal
hoW governmentpolicy developed. cabinet drafts however (in
contrast to Treasury drafts) are difficult to locate and in many
cases no longer exist. 'Ihirdly and in spite of the 'Treasury thirty
year rule' the state has numerousadministrative devices which
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deny the researcher access to inportant papers regardless of their
original circulation date.
These points are well known and continue to be relevant to
the researcher working on the state. I learnt mien from studying
the initial draft agreements for Marshall Aid which revealed far
more information about Americanintentions to restructure British
capital than the considerably amended final document. Similarly the
official paper 'capital Investment in 1948' is of little interest
for the information it contains comparedto the reasons for its
publication which can only be found in earlier drafts. ltt>reoverin
studying the inpact of Korean rearmamentmanyi.qx)rtant files were
st.aJllled'Closed - access denied' and a conclusion on rearmamentand
the econanycould only be inferred from the obtainable documents (a
less than satisfactory procedure). The standard research proviso's
nust therefore be borne in mind.
But concentrating on these formal problems of research
does not begin to touch the real difficulties of research as a
process. '1he purpose of the following account is to relate the
informal problems encountered in Ph.D. research on the postwar
government. 'lbese problems are not specific to a thesis on Attlee's
governmentnor are they exclusive to historically based study.
Although individual aspects are particular, the discussion
highlights problems for Ph.D. research in general. '!Wo areas which
the standard literature overlooks are firstly how the central ideas
of a thesis develop and secondly how research and writing are
actually carried out.
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CHOICEOF THE THFSIS 'roPIC
In its finished foon this thesis addresses a sociological
problem. It explores the constraints that the accumulationprocess
places upongovernmentaction in a specific historical period.
AlthoughI amnow able to articulate this problemrelatively easily
this has not always been the case. Until approximately half way
through the research, the overall problemwhich the thesis addressed
remainedvaguely formulated and elusive.
I originally proposed to investigate the 1974-79Labour
governmenton the basis of studying bow particular policies had been
abandonedin the face of capitalist econanic constraints. '!Wo
factors showedthat this wouldnot be a viable research theme.
Firstly although narrative accounts of the period existed it would
be difficult to discover the uOOerlyingconstraints and policy
notives since detailed state papers wouldnot be available until
2009. Secondly the internationalisation of capital whichoccurred
frcm the 1960IS onwardsmade an understanding of the period
difficult and meant that I wouldhave to spend considerable time
investigating issues in international political econany. SUchan
urx'iertakingwouldhave produced little if at the end of these
preliminaries I was still denied access to the public records for
the period. Thus for a few I1D'lths althwgh I had a research area -
the relation between social deJlk)craticpolitics and capitalist
accunulation - I had no clear research topic. My time was spent
producing book reviews on British Tabour Party politics, SWedishand
French social deoocratic IIDVE!IDents, and accounts of theories of the
state and capitalist crisis. Initially I had wanted to write a
'theoretical' workgiven a general dislike for what I dismissed as
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unreflective empircism. The time spent reviewing international
poli tical econanyand state theory however led me to the conclusion
that many'theoretical' works \1Ilere::plally invalid. Understanding
capitalist develq::Jtent and producing adequate theoretical
propositions relied upon theoretically infonned historical study
where access to important research materials was already available.
This conclusion pushed MJ attentions towards the i.Irne:liate postwar
government. It was an area within myresearch field <social
de«ocracy and capitalist economy) where records were available and
t
no account of accunulation policy had been published since the early
1960's.3/
By the end of the second tenn of the first year I had thus
decided to focus on the Attlee governments. The research would deal
with the state's managementat the econany but beyond this vague
formulation Iaould say little. Fromthis time on howevermy
writing habits changed. Instead of producing tenuously connected
book reviews my writing had a definite focus. Using secondary
published material and newspaperarticles I spent the rest of the
first year producing five papers each approximately 6,000 words on
the economicstrategy of the state under the three Olancellorships
of the postwar government. As with all my work the papers were
prepared in long-hand and then revised, typed and given to the
supervisor for ooomentat regular intervals. Establishing this
routine of reading, writing, and consultation helped focus the
research, provided motivation, and helped to give each small act a
purpose in terms of the overall project.
'Dlese five papers gave me the necessary gounding in the
politics of the era and amassed a lot of material for critical
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discussion through which the central ideas of the thesis developed.
It was clear that the secondary material claimed Britain had
capitulated to Americanhegemonyafter 1945 and that subsequent
British developmentcontinued and deepened this subordination. On
the basis of the earlier studies I had madeinto international
political econany this hardly seened an adequate explanation. The
only wayto test its accuracy was to go to primary sources.
The second year was therefore spent studying state
documentsin the Public RecordsOffice and reading private papers of
Cabinet members. Researchers often claim that theory construction
takes place in three stages.4/ Firstly it is suggested you read the
published works, then you IOOVeon to official papers, and finally
after reading unpublished documentsyou arrive at the 'real
explanation'. Not only does such an aocount ~ly a positivist
theory of knowledge, it is also an inaccurate am idealised
description of the research process.SI TOmake sense of a mass of
primary data you RUStbe conscious of the theoretical perspective
whichyou use to select value-relevant material. ENeryoneof course
has a theoretical perspective, whether it's acknowledgedor not. It
is advisable therefore to consciously develop your critical
perspective before plunging in to the primary sources.
The publicatioo of Vander Pijl's work on class formation
in the North Atlantic area6/ helped to point up ~ own theoretical
premisses. As I will detail later I had for saoe time been
considering using the notion of 'circuits of capital' to analyse the
international accunulation process. Vander Pijl used a similar
notion, although for a different purpose, in a different time
period, and using what I consider to be an invalid fractionalist
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interpretation. Nevertheless his work was a IOOtivat ion towards the
construction of a frameworksuitable for my purposes am it pranpted
me to sift the public records in such a way that I could uncover
changes in accumulation.
The mechanics of the research undertaken in the public
records office and elsewhere took the following form. Firstly I
would read very thoroughly the published works looking not so much
at the minute details of study but at the overall direction the
study takes and the main supports to its overall conclusion. I
would then go straight to the public records with an idea of the
areas I needed to research but remaining open to study any
interesting sounding document. The actual process of PRO research
involves going through the index of the index noting relevant
section titles and class nwmers. Armed with a reference such as
T230 I could then survey the contents of the T230 index recording
interesting sounding paper ti ties and nunbers. I would then order
the papers through a CCJlP1terterminal in batches of three. This is
clearly a lengthy procedure caIplicated further in that the paper
you receive is often s~ly a large compilation of hand written
menos not necessarily in chronological order and often anonynwlUS.
Fach page of the relevant documentwould be quickly scanned looking
for main lines of policy developDent keeping in moo the overall
conclusions of published studies. To reduce time 1 would mark each
page I tOOughtparticularly i.np)rtant, and at the ern of the day
have these pages photocopied at &aile expense (26p a sheet).
The publication of C&irncr08s's book1/ was helpful
inasRllChas I could check his PROreferencesto see if I had missed
any inportant documents. ~ile waiting for the photocopying to be
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posted on (although expensive this was a vital time-saving nove,
without which the priaary research time would have been vastly
extended), I would take a few days off fran reading and search for
relevant articles on particular areas of study in academic journals.
Before beginning writing I would re-read the published accounts,
re-read the PRO papers, arxl check the argumentof both against
official papers and statistics. Usually I'd then leave all the
information for a few days and intentionally avoid research activity.
My experience in the PRO praIpts me to suggest a useful
tip for saooone beginning research on public documents. The first
visit to the PRO (as with the first visit to any newcanplex
institution) will be JOOStusefully spent as an exercise in
familiarisation. Although it is possible to search for relevant
documents straight from the massive indices to the government
records (arxl I began my research in this way), it is advisable if
possible to locate sane reference (for exanple T236/2l2) fran a work
already published in your area before you visit the PRO for research
proper. If you have this slim startinq point then it becaDes
easier, and less discouraging, to work through other related
documents. ItDrecwer, the fact that only three documentscan be
ordered at any one time <and depending on availability they take
approximately 45 minutes to arrive), means that you can save
valuable time if you have a prior reference numberto punch into the
CCIIPlter. You can then profitably spend the unavoidable 45 minute
delay by searching for relevant paper nUldlers in the PRO index.
Althwgh at the beginning of the process I may not have
had a very clear idea of the argument I would develop, by the end of
the procedure - which wool.d involve re-reading all the material
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again before writing - I wouldbe in a position to write a
reasonable first draft. Apart fran the PRO, information was
collected fran deposits of private papers held at various
universities, fran workingpapers held by the ESRC, and fran other
unpublished sources.
Althoughmanyresearchers talk about 'the research stage'
am the 'writing up stage' I never workedwith this division. After
gathering necessary information on each Chancellorship I wouldwrite
a long-hand draft whichwouldbe revised, typed and then subnitted
to the· supervisor for discussion. This wouldusually result in lOOre
research and clarification before a draft chapter wouldbe re-typed
and again submitted for CCJlIleIlt.This procedure was followed for
each chapter, sane requiring substantial revision others needing
only minor IOOCiificationto retain their status as 'working drafts' •
B¥ early in the third year I therefore had a series of
rough chapters which contained a lot of enpirical evidence to refute
the 'capitulation thesis'. There is a tendency at this stage to
believe that the Ph.D. is nearly finished. But the time needed for
the laborious task of preparing the thesis for submission should not
be overlooked. Reading the collection of draft chapters as a whole
is no easy task when you have been so close to the material for the
previous two years. Fditing the work was made considerably easier
after reading Becker's recent accountS/ which stressed the
i.q)ortance of re-writing and indicated that many reseachers
initially write long pretentious sentences which need not present
any problemafter editing.
298
WRITIl'li
In terms of Becker's acoount I must clarify my writing as
an exanple of "real anxiety production" .9/ At each writing session
I would try to "get it right first t~" in my head and then on
paper. I no longer think this is necessary. CNer-concentration can
produce undue strain which ~es the production of regular written
work. I am less convinced howeverabout the viability of Becker's
system which involves just sitting down and writing without any
prior serious thought. In myview adequate understaOOingshould go
beyondeveryday attitudes to reveal in greater depth the causes and
consequences of action. A considerable aIOOWltof reading and
thought is a prerequisite for written work at any stage. But it is
important to realise that you don't have to get it right the first
or the second time. 'Ibe lOOStproductive orientation is to begin
with the attitude that you intend to get it right first tine but to
have no anxiety whenyou realise that the first effort maybe
scrapped.
The ccmnand "let us say what we mean in the "language
really used by men" - [and womenl",lO/ is especially significant for
sociological writing. 'Ibis is because lack of clarity often
reflects unresolved problems of sociological theory. Writers often
have difficulty specifying the causes, agents, and consequences of
action, so phraseology is left aDiliguous. In the early stages of
research I would use such phrases as 'the political and economic
exigencies', instead of specifying exactly the corxlitions am
developDel'ltsI had in mind. en reflection I can see that the reason
for this ambiguity is that until ~te late in the thesis close
specification of material is premature. I would even sugqest that
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early on it is advisable to write caq;>licated sections in a vague
style because this leaves open a numberof interpretations which can
be tightened up in the later essential revision. It is advisable to
leave the horizons open until you re-write the whole thesis since
it is easier to clarify ambiguities in the light of the overall
argumentof the thesis.
This consideration yet again E!lll,>hasisesthe inportance of
thorough editing. It wouldbe superfluous to recount BecKer's tips
on editingll/ aside fran mentioning the abuOOanceof unnecessary
qualification and redundant phrases which I found in my own first
drafts. For instance I found I could shorten the sentence - 'Such
considerations have lent manysubsequent theorists the opportunity
to claim that the acceptance of the rearmamentprogranmewas the end
product of the processes of subordination to the global strategy of
the United States', to 'Manywriters claim rearmamentwas the end
,
product etc.', - witbout losing any meaning. Qlce practiced this
form of editing becanes contagious and it is difficult to read
anything without looking for redundant words. This tendency is
howevercarpensated by a nuch clearer pattern of sentence
construction and meaning.
Although three years is not a long time-span in which to
devise, research, and write a thesis there are many maDentswithin
that period when research can becane directionless and the
researcher dissatisfied with the written results (or the lack of
them) • Becker coyly suggests that by -paying attention- in the zen
sense you can get a lot of what you do under cootrol.l2/ This may
be an anathema to &aile sociologists but in the context of getting
down to writing it does house a serious point. Manypoints could be
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cited as useful in helping to develop an efficient writing
attitude.l3/ There are three which I have fOUI'rluseful.
Firstly, give the present act your total attention. For a
limited time-span say one or two hours consciously decide that you
are going to study a particular area or problemand let no
extraneous thoughts deflect you fran this task. Secordly see that
you stand at the centre of the problem and as far as possible rerove
the element of III. Thewriting, typing, and continuous revision
involved in producing a thesis can be accomplished moreefficiently
if you ignore the aspect of what 'I want' to do - usually it is
possible to see what ought to be done but the physical and mental
friction involved slows the completion of the task. I therefore
think it helpful to see each small section of writing as both a
rreansand the end and as far as possible forget any thoughts of the
ultimate purpose and design of the thesis. Thirdly be canfortable
with the insecure nature of the writing process. Olee a draft has
been written it is best to expect that it will have to be changed
manytines before it is considered (above all by yourself) as
acceptable. Similarly after the final revisions realise that the
workwill always remain incomplete, accept its status as a
postgraduate piece of writing (not a life's work) and "get it out
the door".14/ These are personal reflections whichon occasion have
helped meget back to writing after a spell of inactivity,
maintaining the critical perspective which is essential to research
work.
Finally a weedabout 'originality' and writing.
Originality in a thesis is neither the path breaking ccmtribution to
knowledgesuggested in university regulations nor is it siq;>ly "the
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product of a faulty IIeOOry" .15/ For In:! it neans building upon
existing studies and developing aspects of those studies in a
direction not anticipated by the initial writer. Ideally in
historically based research this process should be a~ied by an
interpretation of social changewhich can be supported by primary
sources and mayeither clarify a previous ambiguity or complicate a
previous truism.
For instance, I was concerned to develop an understanding
of crisis based on the notion of 'circuits of capital'. The idea
that accumulation consists of integrated circuits (productive,
ccmoodity, and noney capital) derives of course fromMarx. Using
the notion of circuits to understand contemporarydevelopments
offered, I thought, an iaproveaent over analysts who sinply invoked
an unexplicated concept of hegeoony. '!Wo recent studies which
followed a simdlar line of thinking were those of Urry and Vander
Pijl.16/ But Urry's workdid not offer a suitable theoretical
frameworkfor studying the particular problem I was considering am
Vander Pijl embraceda fractionalist position which led his
analysis awayfran the type of study I wished to make. Both studies
contained theoretical errors which I did not intend to replicate.
Over time I therefore developed an understanding of
capitalist changewhich could relate international political econany
to the danestic constraints on state action. The idea of viewing
accunulation in terms of international capital circuits, and then
relating this idea to productivity, trade balance and rroneyflows,
thus appeared an original wayto highlight the specific constraints
on governmentaction which derive fran the need to secure high rates
of accunulation. As a perspective this frameworkcan be used to
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study the state's eoonoadc policy in any historical period without
relying upon an abstract notion of hegemony.
The problem of originality like many others associated
with Ph.D. research is mainly a psychological one. Research is an
activity. It is nothing special. Its principal requirements are
flexibility, a gentle determination, and an awareness that the goal
is to produce a document, with a limited objective, in conditions of
limited resources and a limited t~span.
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2/ Theworkof ~rgan 1984; Pe11ing 1984; Fatwe111979; Hinton
1983; Tomlinson1986; Gi11iat 1983; and Bullock 1983, has
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world production and trade imbalance. The COllP1exnature of
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in the hands of civil servants and 'expert advisers'. A focus
on 'the state' rather than sirrp1y 'the government', is
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Foot 1984, p.13l; Benn in FDNman 1982, p.167, and TheGUardian,
29th September1980.
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7/ Brett 1982, p.132, and below, p.138.
8/ Radice 1984, p.125.
9/ Brett 1985, p.139 am below ibid.
10/ ibid, p.140.
11/ Gott 1987.
12/ ibid.
13/ Brett 1985, p.141, and below, pp.142-3.
14/ Brett 1982, pp.137-8 - see in particular his isolated quote of
cripps' worry on this point.
•
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15/ Van der Pijl 1984, p.35 and p.167.
16/ ibid, pp.161, 138.
17/ Brett 1982, pp.137-8.
18/ ibid and saville 1983, p.159.
19/ Morgan 1983, p.434.
20/ Aaronovitch and Srndth 1981, pp.70, 77.
21/ Brett 1982, p.141.
22/ Telegram, Playfair to Christelow, 20th September 1947 in PRO
(Public Records Office) T236/1667.
23/ Gaitskell's and Bevin's assessment in PRO CAB 129/42.
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1/ An indication of the extensive yet inconclusive nature of this
writing can be seen from an examination of Jessop 1982; Frankel
1983; carnoy 1984; Benjamdn and Elkin 1985; King 1986.
2/ The popular historical studies of the postwar period - Eatwell
1979; Pelling 1984; Morgan 1984 - all adopt pluralist
approaches•
3/ Almond 1983, pp.245-260.
4/ Martin 1983, p.92.
5/ See for instance the accounts of Therborn 1986, p.138; Schadtter
1974, p.96; carnoy 1984, p.37; Held 1983, p.40.
6/ King 1986, p.116.
7/ Berger 1981, p.8.
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Fine and Barris 1986.
13/ ibid, pp.159-186.
14/ ibid, p.161.
15/ G1yn and SUtcliffe 1972; pp.41-3.
16/ Haines 1977; Pollard 1982; also see Browning 1986 for an
alternative view.
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Treasury 'view' in the 1930's whilst Ham 1981, Pliatzky 1982,
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Treasury. Also see '!bain1984 on Pollard's interpretations.
18/ Pollard, p.72.
19/ Pollard op cit, pp.7l-86.
20/ Brett et a1 1982 inp1ies this about the Labour Party, while The
Labour Party 1982 is more explicit. Relating econondc decline
to Trade Union power, see Hayek 1984; Friedman et al 1980;
lawson 1978. For an overview see Bosanquet 1983; am GanD1e
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22/ See Dahl 1961; Nordlinger 1981~ and Dahl's revision 1978.
23/ Clarke 1978 provides a good critique of thLs aspect of
fractionalism.
24/ See Marx capital Vol.2 for an analysis of the functional
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25/ See Clarke 1977, 1978.
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27/ Mann 1984, p.186.
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'car-owners'. (Urry 1981, p.143).
36/ Marx, capital VaLl, Preface to First edition, p.92 <1976
Penguin) •
37/ Marx, capital Vol.3, p.152 (1981, Penguin).
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review, see Callinicos 1976. A broader discussion of Marxism
and positivism can be found in COlletti 1972 (especially
Chapter 1); ~u:mnan 1981; Rose 1978.
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'compellingness' of state institutions. See Schmitter 1985. A
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71/ Marx, Capital Vol.3, p.300.
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1973.
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Ingham 1984.
76/ Jessop 1983.
77/ ibid p.94.
78/ ibid p.lOO.
79/ See Clarkels carmentary on Jessop in Kapitalstate 10/11 1983.
80/ Jessop op cit, p.93.
81/ See the work of Aglietta 1979, 1982; Ltpietz 1982, 1984;
De Vroey 1984; and Elbaum and Lazonick 1986.
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process, are Dow 1963; Worswick and My 1952; and IOOrerecentlyand less technicist Cairncross 1985.
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